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In the 1970s, the Supreme Court rejected several equal protection
challenges to government programs that singled out members of Indian tribes,'
invoking a constitutionally grounded "special relationship 2 between the
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1. Like many commentators, I generally prefer to use the term "Native American" rather than
"American Indian" or "Indian." Substituting "Native American" for "American Indian" in this Article would
create difficulties, however, because the Article analyzes whether Native Hawaiians have the same
constitutional status as tribes of American Indians, and "Native American" is frequently used to encompass
both groups. A related terminological issue is that the constitutional provision on which the special
relationship is grounded, Article I, Section 8, clause 3 gives Congress authority over "Indian Tribes." See
U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; infra notes 24-29 and accompanying text. This Article examines whether
Native Hawaiians are an "Indian Tribe[]" for constitutional purposes, so substitution of a different term for
"Indian Tribes" would not correspond to the crucial constitutional language.
For purposes of clarity and simplicity, this Article will use the term "American Indians" to refer to
the descendants of the original residents of what are now the lower 48 states; "Alaska Natives" to refer to
those descended from the original residents of what is now the state of Alaska: "Native Hawaiians" to refer
to the descendants of the original residents of what is now the State of Hawaii. see also infra note 6. and
"Native Americans" (or "native groups") to refer to all of these groups combined (that is. the groups
originally residing in what are now the 50 states). Also, because this Article considers what is (and is not)
an "Indian Tribefl" within the meaning of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8. cl. 3. it will. in refcmng
to the constitutional standards, use "Indian" and "Indian Tribes" as terms of an.
2. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552 (1974), was the first Supreme Court case to utilize the term
"special relationship" to refer to the relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes. The
Supreme Court (and other courts) have since used the term in a number of cases, and it has become a
commonplace phrase. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell. 445 U.S. 535. 546 n.7 (1980): LaPier v.
McCormick, 986 F.2d 303, 305 (9th Cir. 1993); Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Yazzie. 909 F2d
1387, 1432 (10th Cir. 1990). Outside the equal protection context, the Court has also referred to a "trust
relationship" between the federal government and Indian tribes. See. e.g.. County of Oneida v. Oneida
Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985) ("The canons of [statutory] construction applicable in Indian law
are rooted in the unique trust relationship between the United States and the Indians."); United States v.
Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 226 (1983) ("(TMhe existence of a trust relationship between the United States and
an Indian or Indian tribe includes as a fundamental incident the right of an injured beneficiary to sue the
trustee for damages resulting from a breach of the trust."). In fact, "trust relationship" is the more common
phrase among commentators. See, e.g., FEuX S. COHEN. HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL LNDtAN LAw 220-28
(Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982). Because this Article focuses on the application of current equal
protection standards to programs singling out Native Hawaiians. it uses the term that the Court used in
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United States and Indian tribes under which tribal classifications were political,
not racial, and were subject to mere rational basis review. 3 More recently, the
Supreme Court has held that all government programs with racial or ethnic
classifications are subject to strict scrutiny.4 The Court has never squarely
addressed the relationship between these two lines of cases, however, or
explicitly delineated the boundary between tribal and racial classifications. In
particular, the Court has not had occasion to decide whether the rational basis
review for programs singling out members of Indian tribes applies to programs
that utilize nontribal categorizations of Native Americans.5 This Article
addresses the constitutional status of such programs, using as a case study the
programs involving one particular indigenous group-Native Hawaiians.6
The issue considered here is a significant one in both constitutional and
Native American law, for it sheds light on the breadth of the principles
articulated in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena7 and City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co.,8 and therefore on whether, and to what extent, federal and
state governments can enact legislation for the benefit of Native
Mancari, namely, "special relationship." However denominated, the concept, as implemented in Mancari
and its progeny, is that there is a relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes under which
the federal government can single out Indian tribes for different treatment without triggering heightened
scrutiny. For more on the constitutional grounding of the special relationship, see infra notes 24-29, 35-36
and accompanying text.
3. See Mancari, 417 U.S. 535; United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977); see also cases cited
infra notes 43-44.
4. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
5. References to "singling out" groups and "different" or "special" treatment often carry negative
connotations, but no such implication is intended here. This Article uses those terms simply to clarify that
the focus is not on programs that apply to all persons with equal force but nonetheless have a
disproportionate impact on Native Hawaiians, but rather on those that specify Native Hawaiians as the
objects of the legislation and do not apply to the other Hawaiian citizens.
It also bears noting that the singling out of Native Hawaiians takes two different forms. Some of the
legislation applies to all Native Americans, see, e.g., Native American Programs Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2991-92d (1994), or to Native Americans and other minority groups, see, e.g., Disadvantaged Minority
Health Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-527, 104 Stat. 2311 (1990) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), and enumerates Native Hawaiians as one of several beneficiary groups.
Other legislation, including the most important program, the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, see infra
notes 64-65, as well as virtually all of the State of Hawaii's legislation benefiting Native Hawaiians, applies
to Native Hawaiians only. This Article does not distinguish between these two categories, as both involve
classifications of Native Hawaiians pursuant to which Native Hawaiians are treated differently from the
general population of Hawaii.
6. In some statutes, "Native Hawaiian" has a specialized meaning; for instance, the statutes of Hawaii
distinguish between a "Native Hawaiian," defined as a "descendant of not less than one-half part of the
races inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands previous to 1778," and a "Hawaiian," defined as any descendant of
pre-1778 aboriginal inhabitants, regardless of blood quantum. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-2 (Michie
1995); see infra notes 64-65, 71-73 and accompanying text. Also, some statutes use other terms, such as
"Hawaiian native," to refer to descendants of pre-1778 inhabitants. See 20 U.S.C. § 351a (1994) (giving
benefits to "Hawaiian natives"); id. § 2313 (same). This Article will use the term "Native Hawaiians" to
refer to all classifications based on descent from pre-1778 inhabitants of what is now the State of Hawaii.
The significance of 1778 is that it was the year that Westerners-in the form of Captain
Cook---"discovered" Hawaii.
7. 115 S. Ct. 2097.
8. 488 U.S. 469.
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Americans-including American Indians who are not members of Indian
tribes, 9 Alaska Natives who are not part of entities that constitute tribes,"0
and possibly native groups who live in United States territories." The answer
to this question will have important ramifications, because there are many
statutes that single out members of native groups, defined racially. This Article
concentrates on programs that benefit Native Hawaiians, as the stakes are
particularly high for them: Whereas much legislation benefiting American
Indians is tied to membership in a tribe, all legislation for Native Hawaiians
define "Native Hawaiian" by ancestry, as "any descendant of not less than one-
half part of the blood of the races inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands previous to
1778," ' 12 or, in those programs without a blood quantum requirement, simply
as the descendants of pre-1778 inhabitants.' 3 Thus, if such a definition
constitutes a racial classification under the Supreme Court's case law, all
legislation treating Native Hawaiians specially is presumptively invalid."
An examination of statutes for Native Hawaiians is particularly timely in
light of the recent vote among Native Hawaiians regarding whether "the
[Native] Hawaiian people [shall] elect delegates to propose a Native Hawaiian
government."' 5 This Article casts light on the political significance of the
decision to create such a government, as it concludes that, without a Native
Hawaiian political entity that can constitute an "Indian Tribe[J" for
9. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 297 (1994); id. § 482.
10. Some statutes utilize racial definitions in giving benefits to Alaska Naiiics. and thus would likely
stand on no firmer constitutional footing than the statutes singling out Native Hawmians that are the focus
of this Article. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 500n. In addition, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971.
43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-24 (1994), provided the impetus for the creation of Alaska Native Regional
Corporations and Alaska Native Village Corporations. and these corporations now rcgi',e some gocrmcn
benefits provided to tribes. See infra notes 266-71 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has neser
had occasion to address the constitutionality of benefits given to such corporations.
I I. The applicability of this analysis to native groups in temiones is complicated by the separate. and
controversial, question of the extent to which the equal protection component of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments applies to particular territories. See generally \Vabol v. Villacrusis. 958 F2d 1450. 1461 (9th
Cir. 1992); Marybeth Herald, Does the Constitution Follow the Flag into United Stares Territories or Can
It Be Separately Purchased and Sold?. 22 HASTINGS CONsT. LQ. 707 (1995): Robert A. Katz. The
Jurisprudence of Legitimacy: Applying the Constitution to U.S. Terntortes. 59 U Ciii. L REv 779 (1992).
Jon M. Van Dyke, The Evolving Legal Relationships Between tile United States and Its Affilated U S.-Flag
Islands, 14 U. HAW. L. REv. 445 (1992); Stephen J. DiGianfihippo. Note. 77te Reach of the Constitution
Beyond the Territory and "People" of the United States. 16 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 117 (1992)
12. This is the definition from the first (and most important) federal statute benefiting Natise
Hawaiians. See Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of 1920, Pub. L No. 34. § 201(a)(7). 42 Stat 108
(1921) (codified as amended at HAw. CONST. art. XII. § 1) [hereinafter HHCA], infra notes 64-65 and
accompanying text. For other statutes utilizing this definition. see infra note 96.
13. This definition is utilized in, inter alia, the legislation creating the Office of Hawaiian Affairs
(OHA), which is the main state program that benefits Native Hawaiians. See HAw. REv STAT ANN § 10-2
(Michie 1995). For other statutes utilizing this defintion. see infra note 97
14. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643-44 (1993) ("'A racial classification, regardless of purported
motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an extraordinar) justification.') (quoting
Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979)).
15. Rice v. Cayetano, Nos. Civ.96-00390 DAE. Civ.96-00616 DAE, 1996 WL 562072. at "2 (D Haw.
Sept. 6, 1996); see also infra notes 251-53 and accompanying text. Although only 40% of the ballots were
returned, 73% of those who returned ballots voted in favor of the proposition. See mifra text accompanying
notes 254, 261.
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constitutional purposes, there is no "special relationship" between Native
Hawaiians and the federal government pursuant to which programs singling out
Native Hawaiians would be subject to rational basis review.'6
Interestingly, despite the fact that dozens of statutes treat Native Hawaiians
specially (including one that sets aside approximately 200,000 acres of land for
dollar-per-year leases to those with fifty percent or more Native Hawaiian
blood), 17 the Supreme Court has never addressed the constitutionality of
programs for Native Hawaiians. In fact, there have been only two challenges
in the federal courts to programs singling out Native Hawaiians (the second
involving the aforementioned Native Hawaiian vote), and in each case the
district court addressed the question fairly briefly, concluding that preferences
for Native Hawaiians were subject to rational basis review. 8 Similarly,
commentators have uniformly contended that programs for Native Hawaiians
have the same constitutional status as those for Indian tribes. These
commentators, however, generally have not developed the argument at
length. 9 This Article examines anew the constitutional status of programs for
Native Hawaiians, considering the arguments that could be raised in support
of rational basis review and the implications of applying heightened scrutiny.20
16. It bears mentioning that the normative implications of such a result for Native Hawaiians are far
from clear. The Supreme Court has upheld, pursuant to the federal government's special relationship with
Indian tribes, laws that harmed as well as helped Indians. See infra notes 30,40-44 and accompanying text.
While the creation of a Native Hawaiian government may enhance Native Hawaiians' collective ability to
act, a resulting special relationship would not necessarily benefit Native Hawaiians or enhance their rights;
the rights that the special relationship enhances are the federal government's, for good or ill. See infra note
42, text accompanying note 201. The desirability of such a relationship, then, turns in part on the
speculative question of the federal government's future actions and their impact on Native Hawaiians.
17. See HHCA § 203; see infra notes 64-97 and accompanying text.
18. See Rice, 1996 WL 562072; Naliielua v. Hawaii, 795 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Haw. 1990), aff'd on
other grounds, No. 90-15842, 1991 WL 148771 (9th Cir. 1991). In Naliielua, the district judge concluded
that the special relationship applies to Native Hawaiians because "Native Hawaiians are people indigenous
to the State of Hawaii, just as American Indians are indigenous to the mainland United States." Id. at 1013.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, ruled that the plaintiff lacked standing to raise this
equal protection argument. See Naliielua, 1991 WL 148771, at *1-2; see also infra notes 104-06 and
accompanying text. In Rice, the same district judge denied a motion for a preliminary injunction to stop
the release of the results of the Native Hawaiian vote; he relied in part on his opinion in Naliielua and in
part on the unique aspects of the Native Hawaiian vote in assisting the creation of a native Hawaiian
government. The Ninth Circuit has not considered the merits of this challenge.
19. See, e.g., Lisa Cami Oshiro, Recognizing Na Kanaka Maoli's Right to Self-Determination, 25 N.M.
L. REV. 65, 75-76 (1995); Haunani-Kay Trask, Coalition-Building Between Natives and Non-Natives, 43
STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1206 (1991); Mililani B. Trask, Historical and Contemporary Hawaiian Self.
Determination: A Native Hawaiian Perspective, ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L., Fall 1991, at 77, 82-83; Jon
Van Dyke, The Constitutionality of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 7 U. HAW. L. REV. 63, 66-68, 73-80
(1985); Michael M. McPherson, Comment, Trustees of Hawaiian Affairs v. Yamasaki and the Native
Hawaiian Claim: Too Much of Nothing, 21 ENvTL. L. 453, 479-80 (1991).
There is one article that considers the constitutional status of Native Hawaiians in some detail,
Richard H. Houghton III, An Argument for Indian Status for Native Hawaiians-The Discovery of a Lost
Tribe, 14 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1 (1989), but its analysis is flawed. See infra note 156. Of the other
commentators who have discussed legal issues involving Native Hawaiians, only Professor Van Dyke gives
the question of the constitutional status of programs for Native Hawaiians anything more than cursory
consideration, and his analysis, too, is flawed. See infra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
20. Some litigants have suggested that there is a "trust relationship" between Native Hawaiians and
the federal government. See Han v. Department of Justice, 824 F. Supp. 1480, 1486 (D. Haw. 1993), aff'd,
540
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The larger issue, though, is how the current case law treats statutes that
benefit native groups and that are not tied to membership in a tribal
organization. Analyzing this question brings to light the difficulties and
peculiarities arising out of the uneasy relationship between the Court's
construction of the authority granted by the Indian Commerce Clause and of
the limitations entailed in the equal protection component of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments; between the federal government's special relationship
with Indian tribes recognized in Morton v. Mancari' and the hostility to
racial classifications in Adarand and Croson; and, ultimately, between the
historical tradition of treating native groups differently and the idea that racial
classifications are repugnant and therefore are presumed to violate equal
protection norms.
This Article's focus on current doctrine as reflected in the case law differs
from that of most commentators on Native American law. Those commentators
usually write normatively about how the courts should be construing Native
American law, and they often criticize the existing case law (in particular the
Supreme Court's cases) as poorly reasoned and inconsistent. - That the
Court's reasoning may lack a sound theoretical foundation or fail to support
45 F.3d 333, 337 (9th Cir. 1995). The Han litigants appear to have regarded the trust relationship as
synonymous with what I am calling the special relationship--the relationship identified in Mancan and
grounded in the Indian Commerce Clause under which the federal government can single out certain groups
for different treatment without triggering strict scrutiny. See also supra note 2; infra note 28. Insofar as
they are asserting that this constitutionally grounded relationship exists. this Article responds to that
assertion.
Others, however, have articulated the trust relationship as aising out of certain statutes. ,ithout
addressing (perhaps because they assumed it was not an issue or not relevant) the constitutional grounding
for it. See Mark A. Inciong, The Lost Trust: Native Hawaiian Beneficiaries Under the tlananan llones
Commission Act, ARtZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L.. Fall 1991, at 171: Charles F Wilkinson. Land Tenure in the
Pacific: The Context for Native Hawaiian Land Rights. 64 WASt1 L. REV. 227 (1989) That is. they have
contended that Congress, through the Hawaii Admission Act. Pub. L. No 86-3. 73 Stat. 4 (1959)
[hereinafter Admission Act], the HHCA, and the Annexation Act of 1898. Act of July 7. 1898. 30 Stat.
750, has entered into a trust relationship with Native Hawaians. and they have not focused on the
underlying question of Congress's constitutional authority to enter into such a relationship The question
addressed in this Article-whether there is a constitutional grounding for treating Natie Hawaians
specially such that this treatment will not be subject to strict scrutiny-is antecedent to the question whether
the language of certain statutes provides for such special treatment. Congress's acknowledgement of a trust
relationship would still leave open the question whether Congress did so pursuant to the special relationship
with Indian tribes (in which case rational basis review would apply) or whether Congress legislated outside
the scope of the special relationship (in which case strict scrutiny would apply, as it does to other racial
or ethnic classifications in legislation). See also infra text accompanying notes 32-44. It may be. then, that
Congress did obligate itself to provide certain services to Native Hawaiians, but that in so doing it exceeded
its constitutional authority. Conversely, it is possible that Congress did not enter into a trust relationship
with Native Hawaiians, but nonetheless the special (or trust) relationship extends to them. After all,
constitutional authority may exist irrespective of whether Congress has ever acted on that authority to enter
into a particular relationship.
21. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
22. See, e.g., Vine Deloria, Jr., Laws Founded in Justice and Humanity: Reflections on the Content
and Character of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REv. 203 (1989): Philip P. Fnckey. Congressional
Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law. 78 CAL L. REV. 1137 (1990);
Sharon O'Brien, Tribes and Indians: With Whom Does the United States Maintain a Relatiomnshtp 7. 66
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1461 (1991).
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its conclusions does not, however, render its cases indeterminate or unworthy
of analysis. For better or worse, the cases addressed in this Article have, in my
view, clearly drawn a distinction between tribal and ethnic classifications, and
have given rise to discernible doctrines. The possible tensions in the Court's
cases do not condemn the enterprise of understanding the doctrines those cases
create; on the contrary, identifying and evaluating such tensions is a powerful
reason to understand the Court's doctrines. A judgment on the distinctions the
Supreme Court has drawn must rest on an understanding of the current state
of the case law. The purpose of this Article, therefore, is to explore the case
law on statutes singling out Native Americans, and in particular Adarand and
Mancari, not in an attempt to justify the cases, but rather in an attempt to
bring to light the interplay between them, and the difficulties that such
interplay produces.
The first Part of the Article sets out the legal standards for legislation
treating Indian tribes specially. The second Part addresses the history of Native
Hawaiians and the enactment of laws singling them out for different treatment.
The third Part posits arguments that could be made in favor of application of
rational basis review to legislation for Native Hawaiians, ultimately concluding
that current statutes would be subject to strict scrutiny. The fourth Part briefly
discusses the potential impact of this conclusion on programs singling out
Native Hawaiians. The fifth Part addresses ways of bringing Native Hawaiians
within the special relationship. The sixth and concluding Part notes the
ramifications of the analysis contained in this Article for native groups more
generally.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS FOR LEGISLATION THAT SINGLES OUT
INDIAN TRIBES
Before 1974, the Supreme Court considered a number of challenges to
government actions with respect to Indians, but none involved an equal
protection challenge to the singling out of Indian tribes (or Native Americans
more generally) for different treatment; instead, the litigants usually contended
that a particular action exceeded the scope of Congress's power over Indians.
The Court consistently rejected these challenges, finding that Congress had
broad--often called "plenary"-power over Indians.23 Over the years, the
23. One commentator has argued that the Framers rejected a clause proposed by James Madison that
would have granted Congress plenary authority "ft]o regulate affairs with the Indians" and instead chose
the language of the Indian Commerce Clause in order to give Congress narrower powers. See Mark Savage,
Native Americans and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 57, 73 (1991)
(quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 325 (M. Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937)
(Aug. 18, 1787) (motion of James Madison, Virginia)). On this basis, he argues that the Court should not
have interpreted the Clause so broadly. See id. at 72-87; see also Robert N. Clinton, Isolated in Their Own
Country: A Defense of Federal Protection of Indian Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L. REv. 979,
999-1001, 1011-12 (1981) (discussing need for additional limits on congressional power in light of plenary
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Court has articulated different sources for this authority. Chief Justice Marshall
grounded it in both history and the Indian Commerce Clause of the
Constitution, which gives Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce ...
with the Indian Tribes., 24 Later, in United States v. Kagama,25 the Court
rejected reliance on the Indian Commerce Clause2 and instead concluded that
the federal government's power "must exist in that government, because it
never has existed anywhere else, because the theatre of its exercise is within
the geographical limits of the United States, because it has never been denied,
and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes."2'7 More recently,
the Court has moved away from Kagama's suggestion of extraconstitutional
powers and has instead grounded Congress's power over Indians-and the
concomitant special relationship between the federal government and Indian
tribes-in the Indian Commerce Clause and, at least to some extent, the Treaty
Clause of Article 11.28 Under both the former extraconstitutional approach and
interpretation of Indian Commerce Clause); infra note 28. This Article addresses the constitutional status
of legislation giving benefits to Native Hawaians under current case law and so will not consider
arguments that reject the prevailing jurisprudence.
24. U.S. CONST. art. , § 8, cl. 3; see Cherokee Nation % Georgia. 30 U S (5 Pet )1. IS 11831. lee
also Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present. Colontalism. Cons ituitonalhun. and Interpretation
in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REv. 381, 390-92 (1993)
25. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
26. See id. at 378-79.
27. Id. at 384-85. As Professor Philip Frickey has pointed out. this reasoning, based on the inherent
power of the federal government, bears a strong resemblance to the reasoning in the Chinese Exclusion
Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), involving federal power over immigration, and in United States v Curtiss.
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). involving federal power tin that case., specifically the
President's power) over foreign affairs. See Philip P. Frickey. Domesticating Federal Indian Las. 81 SIMs
L. REV. 31, 60-66 (1996).
28. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n. 411 U S 164. 172 n 7 (1973) ("The source of
federal authority over Indian matters has been the subject of sonic confusion, but it is now generally
recognized that the power derives from federal responsibility for regulating commerce with Indian tribes
and for treaty making."); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535. 551-52 (1974) (locating source of power over
Indian tribes in Indian Commerce Clause and Treaty Clause)" United States % Antelope. 430 U S 6A1. 645
& n.6 (1977) (citing Indian Commerce Clause as providing for federal classification of Indian trbes)-
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163. 192 (1989) ("ITlhe central function of the Indian
Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the heild of Indian affair- ".
see also Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians. Its Sources. Scope. and Limitations. 132 U PA
L. REv. 195, 230-31 (1984) (noting that "the Court has looked increasingly to enumerated poers" and
has "repudiated the notion that Congress's plenary power was extraconstitutional"). Alex Tallchief Skibine.
Braid of Feathers: Pluralism. LegitimacO " Sovereignt, and the Importance of Tribal Court Jurisprudence.
96 COLUM. L. REv. 557, 568 (1996) (reviewing FRANK POMMERSIIEIM. BRAID OF Fi-AnER.S 1995)). Mikc
Townsend, Congressional Abrogation of Indian Treaties: Reevaluation and Reform. 98 YALE I 793. 808
(1989).
Congress's plenary power and the basis of a special (or trust) relationship are significant issues that
many commentators have addressed at great length. In doing so. the) ha'e frequently taken issue with the
Court's articulation of the special relationship and have suggested different wa)s of conceptualizing the
relationship between the federal government and Indians. An example of one such altematise sie is the
suggestion that other provisions of the Constitution. such as the Fourteenth Amendment. pros idc the
grounding for the special relationship. See infra note It 5 Another theor) is that there is no plenary powser
over Indians, so that the Court's claimed constitutional grounding for the special relationship does not exist-
See, e.g., Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes. 1987 AM B. FOUND R-S J I, Savage. supra
note 23; Clinton, supra note 23; Skibine, supra, at 568-69. Yet another is that plenary poser and the trust
(or special) relationship are quite different--that the former describes Congress's pow ers (% hich should be
limited), and the second describes an extraconstitutional relationship that not only transcends the Indian
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the current one based on the Indian Commerce Clause, the Court invariably
found Congress's power to be quite broad29 -encompassing measures that
harmed as well as helped Indians.30
The only successful challenges to Congress's power to enact a particular
law have argued not that the Indian Commerce Clause was insufficient, but
rather that an independent constitutional limitation-most recently, the
penumbral emanations from the Eleventh Amendment-constrains Congress's
exercise of its authority.3' One set of such cases (albeit one that has never
met with success in the Supreme Court) involved the contention that a given
federal government action violated the equal protection component of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The central case, decided in 1974, is
Morton v. Mancari,32 the first in which the Supreme Court confronted an
equal protection challenge to a law benefiting Native Americans. In Mancari,
non-Indian employees of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) argued that a BIA
employment preference for Indians (authorized by a statute allowing Indian
preferences) violated the equal protection component of the Due Process
Commerce Clause (and the rest of the Constitution) but also entails a trust responsibility that Congress has
toward Indians. See, e.g., Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The
Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 1471, 1495-505; Sharon L. O'Brien, Freedom of Religion
in Indian Country, 56 MONT. L. REv. 451,475-83 (1995). Such arguments perform the important function
of addressing how the Supreme Court should construe the federal government's authority vis-h-vis Indians,
but this Article is concerned with the implications of the Supreme Court's current jurisprudence; and, as
the cases cited above indicate, the Court appears to treat the special relationship as arising out of the broad
powers conferred on Congress by the Indian Commerce Clause and perhaps the Treaty Clause.
29. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), might portend some limit on Congress's powers
under the Indian Commerce Clause. In invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the Court, for the first
time in half a century, struck down an enactment as beyond Congress's interstate commerce power. It is
possible that the Court will also apply some limits to the Indian Commerce Clause. Cf. Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1126-27 (1996) (rejecting argument that Indian and Interstate Commerce Clauses
entailed different balances of power between federal and state governments). Thus Lopez could be the
catalyst for a change that some Native American law scholars have been championing for years-namely,
a limitation on Congress's plenary power over Indian tribes. See, e.g., Ball, supra note 28, at 61-66.
30. See, e.g., Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (upholding convictions of tribal members under more rigorous
federal, rather than state, criminal laws that applied to them because they were Indians and rejecting
argument that Mancari applied only to programs that helped Indians); Washington v. Confederated Bands
& Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979) (allowing imposition of "checkerboard"
jurisdiction over Indian reservations despite tribes' objection that it harmed them); see also Duro v. Reina,
495 U.S. 676, 692 (1990) (noting "the Federal Government's broad authority to legislate with respect to
enrolled Indians as a class, whether to impose burdens or benefits"). For more on this point and its
implications, see infra notes 244-47 and accompanying text.
31. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1133. In Seminole Tribe, the Court focused on the Indian
Commerce Clause as the grounding for Congress's power over Indians even as it found that all of
Congress's Article I powers were limited not by the "straw man" of constitutional text, but instead by a
"background principle" embodied in the Eleventh Amendment. See id. at 1130-31; see also Hodel v. Irving,
481 U.S. 704, 713-14 (1987) (citing Takings Clause as limiting force on Congress's power); Choate v.
Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912) (holding Fifth Amendment restricts Congress's Indian Commerce Clause power
in matters of Indian taxation); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911) (dismissing case as outside
power of Congress to confer jurisdiction); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899) (holding construction of
treaties to be outside congressional power).
32. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
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Clause of the Fifth Amendment.33 The Court's discussion of the equal
protection challenge was fairly brief.' The Court began its analysis by noting
the "unique legal status of Indian tribes under federal law" and the "plenary
power of Congress ... to legislate on behalf of federally recognized Indian
tribes. '35 The Court stated that this plenary power
is drawn both explicitly and implicitly from the Constitution itself.
Article I, § 8, cl. 3, provides Congress with the power to "regulate
Commerce... with the Indian Tribes," and thus, to this extent,
singles Indians out as a proper subject for separate legislation. Article
II, § 2, cl. 2, gives the President the power, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, to make treaties. This has often been the
source of the Government's power to deal with the Indian tribes.
6
The opinion then suggested that both Congress and the Court had recognized
the "special relationship" between the federal government and Indian tribes."
After laying this groundwork, the Court turned to the program at issue.
The Court's analysis revolved around a crucial conclusion-that the BIA
preference did not constitute racial discrimination, and in fact was not even a
racial preference: "The preference is not directed towards a 'racial' group
consisting of 'Indians'; instead, it applies only to members of 'federally
recognized' tribes" and thus "the preference is political rather than racial in
nature. 38 The Court then amplified this point, stating that
33. Although Mancari used the term "due process" rather than "equal protection." the language in
Mancari (and in later cases) indicates that the Court treats the difference as semantic. In Mancan. the Court
characterized the challenge as "whether ... the preference constitutes invidious racial discnmination in
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Bolling v Sharpe. 347 U.S 497 (1954)"
Mancari, 417 U.S. at 551. The Court's citation to Bolling is significant, because that case involved a
challenge under the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. It
appears, therefore, that Mancari refers only to the Due Process Clause because that is the clause at issue
in equal protection cases against the federal government. See Delaware Tribal Bus Comm v Weeks. 430
U.S. 73 (1977) (citing Mancari as delineating proper standard in equal protection cases, and frequently
referring to plaintiffs' claim under equal protection component of Due Process Clause of Fifth Amendment
simply as due process claim); Yakima Nation. 439 U.S. at 500-01 (citing Mancan as applicable equal
protection precedent); Antelope, 430 U.S. at 645-47 (treating Mancan as equal protection case).
34. The non-Indian employees also argued that the hirng preference was prohibited by the Equal
Employment Act of 1972; the Court devoted most of the opinion to rejecting this challenge,
35. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 551.
36. Id. at 551-52. The suggestion, made here and in other Supreme Court cases, that the special
relationship is grounded in the Indian Commerce Clause (and perhaps the Treaty Clause) has provoked
commentators to offer possible alternatives. See supra note 28. The contrast between the Court's modem
focus on constitutional grounding and the view it articulated in United States I: Kagama. 118 U.S. 375
(1886), is particularly striking. See Steven Paul McSloy. Back to the Future: Nanve American Sovereignty
in the 21st Century, 20 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 217. 275 (1993) ("In Mancan. the power justified
in Kagama on the basis of wardship is said to be instead based upon provisions of the Constitution. even
though Kagama had explicitly rejected such a constitutional basis.-).
37. See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 552.
38. Id. at 553 n.24. One of the most important aspects of the Court's conclusion was left unstated: The
Court ignored the statutory definition of "Indian" and instead looked only to the BIA regulation's definition.
This was crucial, because the statute--the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. 48 Star. 984 [hereinafter
IRA]-provided for benefits to "Indians," defined as members of federally recognized Indian tmbes and
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[t]he preference, as applied, is granted to Indians not as a discrete
racial group, but, rather, as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities
whose lives and activities are governed by the BIA in a unique
fashion. See n.24. In the sense that there is no other group of people
favored in this manner, the legal status of the BIA is truly sui
generis.39
The Court ruled that, in light of this distinction, the preference for tribal
members was not suspect and therefore was subject to review under a rational
basis test, rather than under heightened scrutiny."n
"all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood." 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1994); 48 Stat. 988. The Court did
not mention this definition, however, and instead focused entirely on the regulation implementing the
statute; the regulation did limit the beneficiaries to tribal members. See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24
(quoting BIA Manual, which limited preference to those who were "one-fourth or more degree Indian blood
and ... a member of a Federally-recognized tribe"). Thus, without saying so, the Court treated as binding
the regulatory implementation of the IRA, perhaps applying (without so stating) the principle of statutory
construction that a court should construe a statute so as to avoid constitutional problems.
39. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554. The footnote to which the Court referred (note 24) is quoted
immediately above.
40. The test enunciated in Mancari differed slightly from the ordinary formulation of the rational basis
test, as it looked to whether "the special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress'
unique obligation toward the Indians." Id. at 555 (emphasis added). The highlighted language arguably
indicates that the Mancari test differed from the rational basis test used with other classifications that are
not suspect (i.e., whether a law is rationally related to a legitimate government interest). See Newton, supra
note 28, at 273 ("[A]Ithough the Court used the phrase 'tied rationally,' the analysis in the opinion suggests
that the Court actually applied more than minimal rationality scrutiny ....."); Ralph W. Johnson & E.
Susan Crystal, Indians and Equal Protection, 54 WASH. L. REv. 587, 599 (1979) ("Ihe approach that the
Court in fact undertook in Mancari suggests something more than minimum rationality.").
The Court's post-Mancari opinions, however, have abandoned any suggestion that the level of
scrutiny for equal protection challenges to tribal classifications is more rigorous than that for other
nonsuspect classifications. See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation,
439 U.S. 463, 501 (1979) (referring to applicable test as involving "conventional Equal Protection Clause
criteria," under which "legislative classifications are valid unless they bear no rational relationship to the
State's objectives"); see also id. at 500 (stating that challenged Washington law "must be sustained against
an Equal Protection Clause attack if the classifications it employs 'rationally furthe[r] the purpose identified
by the State"') (quoting Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976)). The Court
in Yakima Nation did not attempt to justify the relevant federal statute under Congress's unique obligation
to the Indians (which, it should be noted, might have been difficult in that case); in fact, it did not intimate
that such an inquiry was necessary or even relevant. The Court simply suggested that ordinary rational basis
review applied, a point driven home by the citation to Murgia, which did not involve Native Americans
and was an ordinary equal protection case. See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 314.
Similarly, though statements in Mancari suggested that any preference must be related to "Indian self-
government," 417 U.S. at 554, 555, later cases have not required such a nexus. For instance, in United
States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977), the Court rejected an equal protection challenge to a federal
statute providing harsher criminal treatment of tribal members than would have been the case if they had
not been American Indians. The Court squarely noted that this differential treatment was unrelated to tribal
self-government but indicated that this was of no importance:
Both Mancari and Fisher [v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976),] involved preferences or
disabilities directly promoting Indian interests in self-government, whereas in the present case
we are dealing not with matters of tribal regulation, but with federal regulation of criminal
conduct with Indian country implicating Indian interests. But the principles reaffirmed in
Mancari and Fisher point more broadly to the conclusion that federal regulation of Indian
affairs is not based upon impermissible classifications.
Id.; see also Newton, supra note 28, at 280 ("After Antelope ... it is difficult to conceive of a federal
statute regarding Indian tribes, not motivated by racial discrimination, that could be found to violate the
requirements of equal protection.").
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The distinction between tribal and racial distinctions thus served as thelinchpin of the entire decision.I As long as the Court could characterize the
benefits to Indian tribes as existing on a government-to-government basis, it
could distinguish such a scheme from suspect classifications that are subject
to strict scrutiny.
4 2
41. In light of the great emphasis that Mancart placed on the trbe/race distinction, it is worth noting
that both terms may be more fluid than the Court might have belesed. A! to tnbes. the federal goemnment
often played a significant role in shaping their structure. Precontact Indians %%ere organized in many
different kinds of arrangements, some of which were subtrtbal (such as family clans) The presence of the
federal government and the need for an organized response to the federal government frequently led to the
disintegration of subtribal groupings and the prevalence of tribal organization See ST'rIEN CORNELL, TIIE
RETURN OF THE NATIVE 76-86 (1988). Moreover. the government on a number of occasions combined
several tribes into one or split a single tribe into several See FEux S COItH.. HADBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAw 268 (1942). Even today, the government can exert an enormous influence oser tribes in
determining which it will recognize (and, as importantly, which it will terminate) Although these decisions
do not necessarily alter tribes (because all that is terminated is the relationship sith the goverment. see
infra note 202), as a practical matter such decisions can have a significant impact on the stability of a tribe.
Meanwhile, many commentators have suggested that race is socially constructed, leading them to
conclude that racial classifications are fairly malleable. See. e.g.. Christopher A Ford. Administering
Identity. The Determination of "Race" it Race-Conscious Law. 82 CAL L RE%, 1231 (1994), Ian F
Haney-L5pez. The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion. Fabrcation. and Choice.
29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1994).
42. Although the Court did not directly address the question of the operation of the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment upon the Indian Commerce Clause (and upon the Treat) Clause. insofar
as that clause formed the basis of the Court's decision). its reasoning in Aluncart (and the other Supreme
Court cases discussing the special relationship) apparently relies on the notion that the equal protection
components of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments apply with limited force to legislation enacted
pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause. Professor David Williams has enticized this aspect of Mancar.
contending that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment should be understood as
effectively negating Congress's power to single out Indian trbes under the Indian Commerce Clause See
David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection Clause' Indians as Peoples. 38 UCLA L REv
759, 782-86 (1991). Any such evisceration of the Indian Commerce power would be sub stlentio in the
truest sense of the term. Both the text and the legislative history of the Equal Protection Clause are silent
as to its impact on the Indian Commerce Clause. This is not surprising. of course The Fourteenth
Amendment addresses state action, and its framers almost certainly gave no thought to the impact of the
Equal Protection Clause on the Indian Commerce Clause (which empo',ered Congress). particularly
because, then as now, relations with Indian trbes were generally treated as the pros ince of the national
government. It would have required a mighty far-sighted senator or congressman to anticipate the judicial
discovery of the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment and then to contemplate its possible
impact on the Indian Commerce Clause.
Relatedly, it is interesting to note that commentators have frequently grounded arguments for
expanded rights of racial and ethnic minorities in a broad reading of the equal protection components of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Here, however, in light of the Supreme Court's construction of equal
protection in Adarand and Croson, a narrower view of the impact of the equal protection components of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments on the rest of the Constitution would %sork to preserve programs
singling out Indian tribes. This is a function, of course, of the fact that the Supreme Court has found an
independent constitutional basis for programs designed for Indian ribes; African Aenricans may have
nowhere to turn in the Constitution other than the Fourteenth Amendment. but Indians hae the Indian
Commerce Clause. More fundamentally, though, the notion that the Court's narrower interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment in the Indian tribal context enhances the rights of Indians is faulty The Court's
construction of the Indian Commerce Clause as informing (if not overnhelming) equal protection
considerations means that the government has more power: It can enact legislation singling out members
of Indian tribes that it cannot enact with respect to other racial or ethnic groups This legislation may. b)
and large, benefit Indians, and it may even empower them in some situations, but that is mere coincidence.
the group that is empowered (i.e., is given greater latitude and authorty) is Congress. not Indian tribes. See
also infra text accompanying note 201. The Court has driven this point home in ruling that Congress's
broad powers over Indian tribes render classifications that harm Indians. as well as those that benefit them.
subject to rational basis review; the constitutional touchstone, according to the Court. is Congress's power.
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 106: 537
After Mancari, there were several Supreme Court cases that raised equal
protection challenges to government actions that singled out members of Indian
tribes.43 In all of these cases, the Court applied Mancari's analysis without
attempting to modify its tribe/race dichotomy and upheld the constitutionality
of the provision; in fact, the Court often dealt with the relevant equal
protection claim simply by quoting Mancari and noting that the preference at
issue was for members of Indian tribes, rather than Indians generally, so that
it was a political and not a racial classification. 44
II. THE HISTORY OF HAWAIIAN GOVERNANCE AND THE ENACTMENT OF
STATUTES BENEFITING NATIVE HAWAIIANS
Though a full history of Native Hawaiians would be supererogatory and
cumbersome, the governance of Hawaii and the development of federal and
state laws singling out Native Hawaiians merit consideration. The history of
governance provides important background on Native Hawaiians' similarities
(and dissimilarities) to Indian tribes, and, more generally, on the impact of
non-Polynesians on Native Hawaiians; the focus on statutes enacted for Native
Hawaiians introduces not only the statutory framework but also some of the
complications arising from the interplay between statutes that require fifty
not Indian tribes' empowerment. See Antelope, 430 U.S. at 645-50: Yakima Nation, 439 U.S. at 499-502.
For more on the downside of the special relationship, see infra notes 244-47 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., Yakima Nation, 439 U.S. at 463; Antelope, 430 U.S. at 641; Moe v. Confederated Salish
& Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
There have also been equal protection challenges in the Supreme Court to government programs
benefiting several minority groups, including Native Americans (defined by race, not tribal membership);
all of the major challenges to affirmative action programs have involved laws that benefited, inter alia,
Native Americans. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2102 (1995); Metro Broad.,
Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 553 n.1 (1990); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 478
(1989); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 454 (1980). In none of these cases did the challenged
application involve a preference for a Native American; on the other hand, in none of them did the
Supreme Court give any reason to conclude that a different level of scrutiny would apply to preferences
for Native Americans. See infra notes 136-42 and accompanying text.
44. See Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. at 479-80 ("We need not dwell at length
on this (equal protection] argument [challenging special treatment for Indian tribes], for ... we think it is
foreclosed by our recent decision in Morton v. Mancari .... ); see also Yakima Nation, 439 U.S. at
500-01; Antelope, 430 U.S. at 646-47; Fisher, 424 U.S. at 390-91; cf. infra notes 122-31 and
accompanying text. Yakima Nation, decided in 1979, was the last Supreme Court case to address squarely
an equal protection challenge to a law singling out tribal Indians. The Court has, in fact, rarely cited
Mancari since then; the only case that has placed any weight on Mancari since 1980 is Duro v. Reina, 495
U.S. 676 (1990), in which the Court cited Mancari and Antelope in support of "the Federal Government's
broad authority to legislate with respect to enrolled Indians as a class, whether to impose burdens or
benefits." Id. at 692.
It is possible, especially in light of Croson, Metro Broadcasting, and Adarand (all of which were
decided after Yakima Nation) that, if the issue arises again, the Court will conclude that even political
classifications based on tribal membership are subject to strict scrutiny. It is also possible-though much
less likely-that the Court would abandon the tribe/race dichotomy in favor of minimal scrutiny for all
legislation benefiting people who are racially classified as Native Americans. Such possible changes in the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence are beyond the scope of this Article.
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percent native blood and those that merely require descendance from pre-1778
inhabitants.
The first settlers of the Hawaiian Islands were Polynesians who arrived
more than one thousand years ago. A second wave of migrants (also
Polynesians) arrived later, perhaps six to eight hundred years ago, and became
the dominant group (for instance, the chiefs were drawn from their ranks). The
Hawaiians then lived in relative isolation until the arrival of the British Captain
James Cook in 1778.45 The political and economic system that developed
before 1778 bears some resemblance to the feudal system of medieval Europe:
The land was divided into large units called ahupua'a, each of which was
controlled by a chief; land agents and subchiefs subordinate to the chief
controlled subunits of ahupua'a; and, at the bottom, common farmers worked
plots for the chief (though they also worked plots for their own use). All
landholdings were considered revocable, and there was no concept similar to
fee simple absolute.46
In 1810 King Kamehameha, with the aid of Westerners and Western arms,
unified the islands (which had been controlled by separate-and frequently
warring-kings) into a monarchical government under his control. "7 Western
nations, including the United States, treated the monarchy as a foreign
sovereign through most of the nineteenth century." At the same time,
Westerners arrived on the islands and began to influence life there. The King
and his court began to adopt Western ways, abandoning, for instance, the
traditional religion.49 The landholding system was also transformed, as the
feudal system began to disintegrate and some Westerners sought (and received)
from the King land on which they built plantations. The Hawaiian government
completed the defeudalization process in the middle of the nineteenth century
through the "Great Mahele"--or division-which replaced the communal land
tenure with fee ownership of all land. Commoners were promised one-third of
the available lands and were eligible to receive land that they had cultivated
plus a house lot; ultimately, however, only 8000 or so tenants received a total
of 30,000 acres, which amounted to less than one percent of the total land of
45. See I RALPH S. KUYKENDALL, THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM 177g-1854. at 3 (1938); GAVA.i DAWS.
SHOAL OF TIME at xii-xiii (1968); Wilkinson, supra note 20. at 227-28.
46. See COHEN, supra note 2, at 798-99; Neil M. Levy. Native Hawasian Land Rights. 63 CAL L.
REv. 848, 848-49 (1975); LAWRENCE H. Fucsis, HAWAII Poo: A SOCIAL HISTORY 6-7 (1961)
47. See I KUYKENDALL, supra note 45, at 32-5 1.
48. See Bradley Hideo Keikiokalani Cooper. Comment. A Trust Divided Cannot Stand-An Analysis
of Native Hawaiian Land Rights, 67 TEMP. L. REv. 699, 703 (1994); COHEEN. supra note 2. at 799 As the
Cohen treatise noted, Western recognition of the Hawaiian kingdom "'Is in contrast to the status of trbes
in the Americas, whose sovereignty was considered subordinate to 'discovenng' nattons." COHE!. supra
note 2, at 799 (citation omitted).
49. See I KUYKENDALL, supra note 45. at 65-70; Maivfin Clech Llim. The Kuleana Act Revisited: The
Survival of Traditional Hawaiian Commoner Rights in Land. 64 WASH. L. REV. 233, 238 (1989);
Wilkinson, supra note 20, at 228; see also COHEN, supra note 2. at 799 (noting Western influence and
collapse of traditional systems).
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Hawaii.50 The Hawaiian King controlled thirty-six percent of the land as
government lands and twenty-four percent as the sovereign's personal lands (or
Crown lands); the remaining thirty-nine percent was owned by chiefs and land
agents.5 1 Relatedly, there were changes to Hawaii's economy: The islands
were transformed from a subsistence economy to one based on producing
goods for trade, and many Native Hawaiians stopped farming on their
ahupua'a and instead became laborers. 2
This period coincided with a dramatic change in the population of the
Hawaiian islands. Western and Asian foreigners migrated to Hawaii in large
numbers (many as laborers), and the population of native Polynesians
decreased dramatically, driven down by Western diseases and, to some extent,
intermarriage with non-Polynesians.5 3 By 1890, those descended from pre-
1778 inhabitants constituted less than half of the population. A majority of the
inhabitants were non-Native Hawaiians; many of them were born in Hawaii,
and many were citizens of Hawaii.
54
Westerners also gained political power as their numbers and wealth
increased. In 1887, they gained effective control over Hawaii by means of the
"Bayonet Constitution," under which the King ceded much of his power to
Westerners (and disenfranchised most Native Hawaiians)." In 1893, in
50. See Levy, supra note 46, at 854-58; Am, supra note 49, at 236-37; see also I KUYKENDALL,
supra note 45, at 294 (noting that "extensive areas of crown, government, and chiefs' lands were useless
mountain wastes or lava strewn deserts," whereas nearly all the commoners' lands were "very valuable for
native agriculture"); JON J. CHINEN, THE GREAT MAHELE: HAWAII'S LAND DIVISION OF 1848, at 31 (1958)
(noting that tracts awarded "to the native tenants consisted chiefly of taro lands and were considered the
more valuable lands in the Islands").
51. See Levy, supra note 46, at 854-58; see also NOEL J. KENT, HAWAII: ISLANDS UNDER TilE
INFLUENCE 32 (1993) (contending that "ft]he ouster of the Hawaiian people from the land was an
irreparable blow .... [that] had the ultimate effect of undermining, once and for all, the viability of the
'Hawaiian way').
52. See Levy, supra note 46, at 858-61; COHEN, supra note 2, at 799-800; see also Sumner J. La
Croix & James Roumasset, The Evolution of Private Property in Nineteenth-Century Hawaii, 50 J. ECON.
HIST. 829, 845 (1990); DEPARTMENT OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, REPORT OF THE HAWAII GENERAL
SUPERINTENDENT OF THE CENSUS, 1896, at 72-83 (1897) [hereinafter 1896 CENSUS REPORT] (noting
percentage of Native Hawaiians in various occupations).
53. See Levy, supra note 46, at 850, 860; FUCHS, supra note 46, at 12-13, 68-69.
54. See HAWAIIAN ALMANAC AND ANNUAL FOR 1893, at 11, 14 (1892); RUSS APPLE & PEG APPLE,
LAND, LILI'UOKALANI, AND ANNEXATION 127-30 (1979); ROBERT C. SCHMITT, DEMOGRAPHIC STATISTICS
OF HAWAII 1778-1965, at 74, 182 (1968); W.D. ALEXANDER, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE HAWAIIAN PEOPLE
313 (1891); U.S. PARKER, THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS 81 (1907); COHEN, supra
note 2, at 800 n.21; ANDREW W. LIND, HAWAII'S PEOPLE 20-22 (4th ed. 1980); see also 1896 CENSUS
REPORT, supra note 52, at 31-39; CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES TAKEN IN THE YEAR 1900, at
ccxvi-ccxix (1902).
The current percentage of Native Hawaiians is the subject of some dispute. The 1990 Census, which
relied on self-identification, found approximately 140,000 Native Hawaiians, or 12.5% of the population.
The State of Hawaii also made a tabulation in 1990 (based on the racial background of the respondents'
parents) and found approximately 205,000 Native Hawaiians, or 19% of the population (and its 1992
figures, the latest available, show an increase to 221,000 people). See OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS,
NATIVE HAWAIIAN DATA BOOK 10 (1994); HAWAII DEP'T OF HEALTH, HEALTH SURVEILLANCE SURVEY,
REPORT FOR YEARS 1989-1992, at A-66 (1996); see also ELEANOR C. NORDYKE, THE PEOPLING OF
HAWAII 34-35, 104-09 (1989) (comparing methodologies of Census and health survey).
55. See McPherson, supra note 19, at 460-61; Cooper, supra note 48, at 704; RALPH S. KUYKENDALL,
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM 44-50 (1940). In light of the enormous powers seized by
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response to a threat by the reigning Queen, Lili'uokalani, to proclaim a
constitution increasing the crown's power, the United States Minister in
Hawaii, acting without presidential approval, ordered marines to land in
Hawaii.5 6 The next day, revolutionaries (including both Hawaiian-born
Westerners and foreigners) seized the government building and declared a
provisional government, which the Minister immediately recognized." The
provisional government not only abolished the monarchy, but also expropriated
the Crown lands without compensation to Queen Lili'uokalani and made them
available to citizens (which included most Westerners and Hawaiians, but few
Asians) for purchase or long-term lease.5 President Grover Cleveland
denounced the United States Minister's actions and refused to submit a treaty
of annexation to the Senate, but his successor, President William McKinley,
supported annexation; in 1898, five years after the overthrow of Queen
Lili'uokalani, the United States enacted the Annexation Act of 1898.59
The Annexation Act stated that the Republic of Hawaii had ceded, and that
the United States thereupon annexed, "the absolute fee and ownership of all
public, Government, or Crown lands" (though it left most of Hawaii's land
laws in place). 60 The Annexation Act made no special provisions for Native
Hawaiians (in fact, it did not mention them), but it did provide that revenues
from the ceded lands "shall be used solely for the benefit of the inhabitants of
the Hawaiian Islands for educational and other public purposes.""2
Westerners, some have called the imposition of the Bayonet Constitution a coup d'dtat. See Leslcy Karen
Friedman, Native Hawaiians, Self-Determinanon. and the Inadequacy of the State Land TruSts. 14 U HAw
L. REV. 519, 532-33 (1992); SYLvESTER K. STEVENS. AMERICAN EXPANSION IN IAW\AII 1842-1858. at
151-53, 189 (1968).
56. In 1993, Congress passed a joint resolution that "'acknowledgcldl the 100th anni'crsary of the
January 17, 1893 overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii. and ... offeied] an apology to Native Hawatians
on behalf of the United States for the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii." Pub L No 103-150. 107
Stat. 1510 (1993). The resolution condemns the overthrow in strong language, but its opcrative provisions
are modest (they merely acknowledge and apologize for the overthrow and its ramifications) and appear
to create no substantive rights. See id. § I (acknowledging overthrow, encouraging reconciliation, and
apologizing on behalf of United States); id. § 3 (providing that nothing in resolution serves as settlement
of claims); S. REP. No. 103-126, at 35 (1993) (averring that "'enactment of ST Res. 19 will not result in
any changes in existing law"); see also infra note 195.
57. See 3 RALPH KUYKENDALL, THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM 1874-1893. at 582-05 (1967)
58. See Land Act of 1895, 1895 Haw. Sess. Laws 49-83; Levy. supra note 46, at 863-64 Queen
Lili'uokalani brought a suit against the United States demanding compensation for her expropriated lands.
but the Court of Claims rejected her claim. See Uliuokalani v. United States. 45 Ct Cl. 418 (1910). ee
also Patrick W. Hanifin, Hawaiian Reparations: Nothing Lost. Nothing Owed. 17 HAw. BAR J 107. I 10-11
(1982) (contending that Hawaiian government officials controlled Crown lands and that Queen Ldi'uokalam
"had only a right to receive the income of the Crown lands for her life").
59. Act of July 7, 1898, 30 Stat. 750.
60. See id.; see also Levy, supra note 46. at 864: COHEN. supra note 2. at 801
61. 30 Stat. 750. An 1899 opinion of the United States Attorney General construed this language as
subject[ing] the public lands in Hawaii to a special trust, limiting the revenue from or proceeds
of the same to the uses of the inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands for educational or other public
purposes.... The effect of the language [in the Act] is to vest in Congress the exclusile nght.
by special enactment, to provide for the disposition of public lands in Hawaii
22 Op. Att'y Gen. 574, 576 (1899).
The 1900 Organic Act for the Territory of Hawaii. ch. 339. 31 Stat. 141. which delineated the
structure of government for the territory, also made no special provisions for Native Hawaiians It did.
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Two years later, the Organic Act of 1900 removed limitations on Native
Hawaiians' voting rights, and, because of the denial of citizenship to most
Asians, left Native Hawaiians as the majority of voters. 62 Nonetheless, the
economic condition of Native Hawaiians continued to deteriorate, and
Congress, professing concern about Native Hawaiians' plight, 63 enacted the
Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of 1920.64 The HHCA provides long-term
however, explicitly provide that all citizens of the Republic of Hawaii-which included Native Hawaiians
as well as Westerners-were citizens of the United States and of the Territory of Hawaii. See id.
62. In fact, Native Hawaiians "had a clear majority of voters through the 1922 election, and more than
any other group until 1938." FUCHS, supra note 46, at 161; see 1900 Organic Act for the Territory of
Hawaii ch. 339; COHEN, supra note 2, at 801 & n.32; DAWS, supra note 45, at 294.
63. The legislative history of the HHCA focuses on improving the conditions of landless Native
Hawaiians. See, e.g., Proposed Amendments to the Organic Act of the Territory of Hawaii: Hearings Before
the House Comm. on the Territories, 66th Cong. 129-31 (1920) [hereinafter 1920 Hearings] (statement of
Franklin Lane, Secretary of Interior). Some commentators have suggested, however, that the real purpose
of the HHCA was not to benefit Native Hawaiians but instead to protect Westerners by removing certain
lands from those available for homesteading. See, e.g., Levy, supra note 46, at 865 ("Although the [HHCA]
may be cited as a humanitarian effort for the surviving descendants of an indigenous people, it was enacted
by sugar barons who would not tolerate accelerated homesteading."). A related theory is that the real
purpose of the HHCA was to thwart Asian homesteading. See Bob Stauffer, Real Politics, HONOLULU
WKLY., Oct. 19, 1994, at 4 (referring to HHCA as "blatantly racist (and anti-Asian) package").
64. The HHCA has an unusual history. Congress passed it in 1921 and subsequently amended it, as
it might amend any ordinary legislation. In 1959, the Hawaii Admission Act, Pub. L. No. 86-3, 73 Stat.
4 (1959), provided, inter alia, that "[als a compact with the United States relating to the management and
disposition of the Hawaiian home lands, the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, as amended, shall
be adopted as a provision of the Constitution of said State." Id. § 4. The Admission Act also provided that
Hawaii had the power to amend certain administrative provisions of the HHCA, but that all other provisions
could be amended or repealed "only with the consent of the United States, and in no other manner." Id.
The United States thus imposed the Act on Hawaii-as part of its constitution, no less-but retained the
authority to approve substantive changes (though Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911), might be read to
suggest that the federal government's retention of such authority is constitutionally infirm).
Since 1959, the Hawaii legislature has passed a number of proposed amendments to the HHCA, many
of which required the consent of Congress. See infra notes 65, 67, 83, 84; see also Admission Act § 4
(delineating which changes require federal approval). The United States has enacted two different statutes
agreeing to many (though not all) of these amendments, but on both occasions the President expressed
concerns about the constitutionality of giving benefits based on an apparently racial definition and
suggested that the United States no longer be involved in the process of amending the HHCA. President
Bush, for instance, issued a signing statement for Pub. L. No. 102-398, 106 Stat. 1953 (1992), in which
he stated that federal ratification violated principles of federalism, and that Hawaii could competently
administer the HHCA on its own. See Statement by President George Bush Upon Signing SJ. Res. 23, 28
WEEKLY COMP. PRus. Doc. 1876 (Oct. 6, 1992). He then stated:
Because the Act employs an express racial classification in providing that certain public lands
may be leased only to persons having a certain percentage of blood "of the races inhabiting the
Hawaiian Islands prior to 1778," the continued application of the Act raises serious equal
protection questions....
Thus, while I am signing this resolution because it substantially defers to the State's
judgment, I urge that the Congress amend the "Act to provide for the admission of the State of
Hawaii into the Union," Public Law 86-3, so that in the future the State of Hawaii may amend
the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act without the consent of the United States, and note that
the racial classifications contained in the Act have not been given the type of careful
consideration by the Federal Government that would shield them from ordinary equal protection
scrutiny.
Id.; see also Statement by President Ronald Reagan Upon Signing H.J. Res. 17, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1462 (Oct. 27, 1986) (noting equal protection concerns and urging Congress to amend Act so that
congressional consent would no longer be necessary). Congress did not follow Presidents Bush's and
Reagan's suggestions about eliminating federal involvement in the HHCA amendment process.
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inalienable leases (at one dollar per year) to "native Hawaiians"-defined as
"any descendant of not less than one-half part of the blood of the races
inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands previous to 1778."65
In 1959, Congress passed the Admission Act, pursuant to which Hawaii
became a state.66 The Admission Act of 1959 required that Hawaii adopt the
HHCA as a provision of Hawaii's constitution. 67 The Admission Act also
In 1995, Congress passed legislation that. though not consenting to any other amendments to the
HHCA passed by Hawaii, creates a procedure for congressional approval of Hawaii's proposed
amendments: Under the statute, if Hawaii passes a proposed amendment to the HHCA. the Chairman of
the HHCA will transmit it to the Interior Secretary, and if the Secretary determines that the proposed
amendment requires congressional approval. he will submit it to Congress. See Pub. L No 104-42, § 204.
109 Stat. 353, 361-62 (1995) (to be codified in 48 U.S.C. ch. 3).
65. HHCA § 201(a)(7). As originally enacted in 1921, the HHCA designated approximately 200.000
acres of land in Hawaii as "available lands" that would be administered by a Hawaiian Homes Commission
(HHC). Id. §§ 202-03. The HHCA authorized the HHC to award 99-year leases (at a prescribed rent of
one dollar per year) of up to 80 acres of agricultural lands, up to 500 acres of "first class pastoral lands."
and up to 1000 acres of "second class pastoral lands." Id. § 207. Only "native Hawaitans" (i.e.. those with
"not less than one-half part of the blood of the races inhabiting the Hawaiian islands previous to 1778")
could be lessees. Id §§ 201(a)(7), 208.
Between 1921 and 1959, the main change to this arrangement was the addition of two other types
of land for lease: up to one hundred acres of irrigated pastoral lands and. more significantly. "not more than
one acre of any class of land to be used as a residence lot." which thus allow ed homesteading for
residential (rather than only agricultural or pastoral) purposes, see 48 U.S.C. § 701 (1958). In fact, some
of the designated lands under the HHCA are located in urban areas, such as approximately 134 acres in
the city of Honolulu, just behind an area known as Punchbowl. One other change of note was that the HHC
was given the authority to trade available lands for publicly owned land of an equal value, the new land
would "assume the status of available lands as though the same were originally designated-" Id § 698(4)
Since 1959, the Hawaii legislature (with Congress's consent) has broadened the scope of the HHCA
well beyond the provision of long-term homestead leases. For instance, the Department of Hawaiian Home
Lands (which oversees the implementation of the HHCA through the HHC) now has the authonty to-
construct multifamily housing, see HHCA § 207(a); enter into contracts with real estate companies to
develop available lands for commercial and multipurpose projects for the benefit of Native Haatians, see
id. § 220.5; issue revenue bonds to pay for its many different kinds of development, see id § 204 5. form
an insurance company (or acquire an existing one) to provide "homeowner protection" for lessees,. id §
219.1(b); and create "enterprise zones" on available lands if it "will result in economic benefits to native
Hawaiians," id. § 227.
66. See Act of Mar. 18. 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-3. 73 Stat. 4.
67. See supra note 64.
In the years since Hawaii's statehood in 1959, the Hawaii legislature has approed a number of
changes to the HHCA. Some of these additions were valid upon enactment by Hawaii because they did not
require the consent of the United States, see Admission Act § 4. 73 Stat. 5 (1959); other changes did
require such consent but received it in one of the two federal statutes that specifically approved certain
amendments to the HHCA. An example of the latter was the reduction of the blood quantum requirements
for purposes of the succession of certain relatives. See infra text accompanying notes 82-84. see also supra
notes 64-65. Interestingly, in both federal statutes approving changes to the HHCA. the President's signing
statement articulated serious equal protection concerns about the limitation of benefits to Native Hawaiians.
See supra note 64; infra note 83.
One amendment to the HHCA that Hawaii approved in 1990 but to which Congress has not consented
is a purpose section of the HHCA, which articulates as one purpose "the preservation of the values.
traditions, and culture of native Hawaiians." HHCA § 101(a): see also id. § 101(b)(5) (listing as one
purpose that "the traditions, culture and quality of life of native Hawaiians shall be forever self-sustaining").
It bears note that the purpose section also seeks to support the extension of the special relationship to
Native Hawaiians:
In recognition of the solemn trust created by this Act. and the historical government to
government relationship between the United States and the Kingdom of Hawaii. the United
States and the State of Hawaii hereby acknowledge the trust established under this Act and
affirm their fiduciary duty to faithfully administer the provisions of this Act on behalf of the
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granted Hawaii title to the public lands (which constituted most of the lands
ceded in 1898), with the proviso that such lands and the income therefrom
shall be held by [Hawaii] as a public trust for the support of the
public schools and other public educational institutions, for the
betterment of the conditions of native Hawaiians, as defined in the
Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, as amended, for the
development of farm and home ownership on as widespread a basis
as possible for the making of ublic improvements, and for the
provision of lands for public use.
This was the first time that a statute specifically identified Native Hawaiians
as beneficiaries of the ceded lands (as opposed to the smaller set of lands set
aside under the HHCA).
In 1978, Hawaii passed a constitutional amendment (and subsequent
statutes) providing that twenty percent of the funds received from these ceded
lands would go to a new entity, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, for the benefit
of Native Hawaiians. 9 OHA is the main state entity that provides benefits to
Native Hawaiians, and it does so in a wide range of activities, including
educational programs, grants, low-interest loans, and housing assistance.70
Interestingly, its benefits are not limited to "native Hawaiians, as defined in the
Hawaiian Homes Commission Act";71 it provides services and benefits both
to "Hawaiians," defined as "any descendant of the aboriginal peoples
inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands which exercised sovereignty and subsisted in
the Hawaiian Islands in 1778, and which peoples thereafter have continued to
native Hawaiian beneficiaries of the Act.
Id. § 101(c).
68. Admission Act § 5(f) (emphasis added); see also id. § 5(b) (describing cessation of land).
69. See HAW. CONST. art. XII, §§ 4-6; HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-13.5 (Michie 1995); see also
1993-1994 OFF. HAWAIIAN AFF. BIENNIAL REPORT (I MUA E NA POKI'l) 5 (hereinafter OHA BIENNIAL
REPORT]; Van Dyke, supra note 19, at 69.
The 1978 constitutional amendments produced other changes as well. For example, they created a
"Native Hawaiian rehabilitation fund," into which 30% of state receipts from lands previously cultivated
as sugarcane lands and from water licenses is deposited. Before Hawaiian statehood, those receipts had
been designated for loans to lessees of available lands, but the state constitutional amendments creating
OHA in 1978 changed the designated purpose of the receipts; now, the Department "shall use this money
solely for the rehabilitation of native Hawaiians which shall include, but not be limited to, the educational,
economic, political, social, and cultural processes by which the general welfare and conditions of native
Hawaiians are thereby improved and perpetuated." HHCA § 213(b)(5)(A); cf 48 U.S.C. 707(b) (setting
aside same receipts for loans to lessees).
70. See OHA BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 69, at 9-41.
It should be noted that there are other state programs that benefit Native Hawaiians. Many of them
are designed to ensure Native Hawaiians' use of-and to prevent non-Native Hawaiians from acquiring any
interest in-property on the roughly 200,000 acres that are subject to the HHCA. See HHCA § 209
(specifying rules for successors to leases). Others are benefits for Native Hawaiians unrelated to the HHCA
that fall outside the scope of OHA. For instance, by statute Kaho'olawe Island is reserved for the practice
of Native Hawaiian traditions; the only other acceptable uses are preservation, revegetation, and education.
See HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 6K-3 (Michie 1995).
71. Admission Act § 5(f) (quoted above).
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reside in Hawaii, 72 and to "native Hawaiians," defined as Hawaiians with
fifty percent or more native blood.73 OHA is governed by a board of trustees,
who shall be "Hawaiians" (as defined above); the trustees are elected through
a state election, the only qualified voters for which are "Hawaiians."7 The
inclusion of "Hawaiians" has created certain difficulties for OHA, as the
Admission Act provided for the betterment of those with fifty percent or more
native blood, rather than all those with native blood." OHA has been directed
by the Hawaii Attorney General's office not to use funds derived from the
ceded lands to better the conditions of "Hawaiians," as defined in OHA's
'76 it hasitipopry ie
statute, and it has been sued by litigants arguing that it improperly gives
benefits to individuals who, though "Hawaiian[]," do not meet the fifty percent
blood quantum requirement. 77 OHA's current policy is that if it uses solely
funds from ceded lands for a project, the beneficiaries must have fifty percent
or more native blood; but if the ceded lands funds are matched by funds from
the state government (or another source), then it opens the benefit pool to all
descendants of pre-1778 inhabitants.7S
Blood quantum issues have also played a prominent role in the
implementation of the HHCA. Originally, the only permissible lessees were
"native Hawaiians," defined as "any descendant of not less than one-half part
of the blood of the races inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands previous to 1778.""7
Individuals with less than the requisite fifty percent blood quantum could not
obtain any interest in such a lease.80 These restrictions applied even to
72. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-2. This definition of "Hawanans" may cause some confusion, as it
means that an individual who was born in Hawaii but who lacks native blood is not a "Hawmxan- for
purposes of OHA. As was noted above, this Article attempts to aoid such confusion by refemng to all
categorizations of descendants of pre-1778 inhabitants as "Native Hawaiians." See supra note 6
73. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-2. See generally HAW, CONST ant. XII. §§ 4-6 (creating OHA
and laying out its general purposes); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-1 to 10-21 (laying out specific purposes
and duties of OHA). Obviously, the category of "Hawaiians" encompasses all "nat'e 1-lauanans-"
According to OHA figures, adding those with any percent of native blood more than doubles the
number of eligible Native Hawaiians (from approximately 81.000 with 50% or more natie blood to
approximately 209,000 with any percentage of native blood). See OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS. Supra
note 54, at 34.
74. See HAW. CONST. anl XII, § 5. An opinion of the Hawaii Attorney General found the limitation
of the franchise to Native Hawaiians (as well as OHA itself) constitutional, relying on a reading of Mancari
as approving preferences for aboriginal peoples. See 80-8 Op. Haw. Att'y Gen. 7 (1980). see also infra note
106.
The Hawaii Attorney General has interpreted the limitation of the franchise stmctl). another 1980
opinion ruled that adopted children of Native Hawaiians could not ,ote in the OHA elections, because
"each voter must meet the qualification of being 'Hawaiian' in his or her own right, and not on the basis
of the racial descent of his or her adopted parents." 80-6 Op. Haw. Att'y Gen. 2 (1980) stee also infra text
accompanying note 86.
75. See Admission Act § 5(f).
76. See 83-2 Op. Haw. Att'y. Gen. (1983).
77. See, e.g., Price v. Akaka, 928 E2d 824 (9th Cir. 1990): Hoohuh v Anyoshi. 631 F Supp 1153
(D. Haw. 1986).
78. See OHA BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 69, at 5.
79. HHCA §§ 201(a)(7), 208.
80. See id. § 208(5) ("The lessee shall not in any manner transfer to. or mortgage, pledge, or otherwise
1996]
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inheritance, irrespective of the relationship between the lessee and the decedent
(though a decedent with less than the requisite amount of native blood did
have a two-year grace period before the commission could take the lease back
and evict her).8'
The rigid rules on succession engendered some opposition, and in 1986 the
blood quantum requirements were changed for purposes of the succession of
certain relatives.82 Under the 1986 amendments, a spouse or child can now
succeed as long as she is "at least one-quarter Hawaiian." 3 The fifty percent
blood quantum requirement applies to all other potential successors, and it still
applies to everyone in situations other than succession (original lessees and
transferees must have fifty percent native blood), but spouses and children with
a twenty-five to forty-nine percent blood quantum now have the ability to
succeed to a lease," The larger point, though, is that blood quantum
requirements are very much a part of the HHCA. Thus, to pick an example,
despite a Hawaii statute providing that "[a] legally adopted individual shall be
considered to be a natural child of the whole blood of the adopting parent or
parents,"85 the Hawaii Attorney General has officially determined that a
legally adopted child of a Native Hawaiian is not automatically a "native
Hawaiian" under the HHCA and must still establish herself by sufficient
hold for the benefit of, any other person, except a native Hawaiian, and then only upon the approval of the
[HHC] .... ).
81. See id. § 209. Moreover, any violation of the HHCA's requirements gives the HHC the authority
to "declare [a lessee's or her successor's] interest in [a] tract and all improvements thereon to be forfeited
and the lease in respect thereto canceled," to remove her from the land, and to lease it anew to an eligible
Native Hawaiian. Id. § 210.
82. Supporters of the reduction argued that the existing 50% blood requirement for succession
adversely affected those Native Hawaiians with more than 50% (but less than 100%) native blood who
married non-Natives and thus whose spouse and children could not qualify as successors to the lease. See
H.R. REP. No. 99-473, at 2 (1986) ("In many instances, homesteaders of fifty percent Hawaiian ancestry
have spouses who are non-Native Hawaiian and neither the homesteader's spouse nor offspring have the
minimum blood requirement to qualify as successors."); Consenting to the Amendments Enacted by the
Legislature of the State of Hawaii to the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920: Hearing on H.R.J. Res.
17 Before the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 99th Cong. 85 (1986) (statement of Gard
Kealoha, Office of Hawaiian Affairs) ("The 50% blood quantum requirement has caused many horror
stories relating to the eviction of families from Hawaiian Home Lands homestead areas."). Opponents
argued that the reduction in the blood quantum would adversely affect those currently eligible (i.e., those
with 50% or more native blood). See H.R. REP. No. 99-473, at 7 ("We are opposed to H.J. Res. 17
primarily because we do not believe that the Committee has taken into consideration the views of the
affected people, the currently qualified Native Hawaiians.").
83. HHCA § 209. This alteration required congressional approval, which was obtained in the first of
two federal acts of approval; in his signing statement, President Reagan singled out this change, stating that
his equal protection concerns about the HHCA "are exacerbated by the amendment that reduces the native-
blood requirement to one-quarter, thereby casting additional doubt on the original justification for the
classification." Statement of President Ronald Reagan on Signing H.J. Res. 17, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1462 (Oct. 27, 1986); see also supra note 64.
84. The Hawaii legislature has passed (but Congress has not consented to) legislation that would
further loosen the rules on succession. The changes would add grandchildren to the list of those who could
succeed to leases with only 25% native blood and would provide that, if there were no spouse, child, or
grandchild who met the 25% requirement, then the lease could go to parents, siblings, or widows or
widowers of relatives. See HHCA § 209(a) (1995 Supp. & historical notes).
85. HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 578-16(a) (Michie 1993).
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documentation as a "native Hawaiian" qualified in her own right to be a lessee
under the HHCA. 6
In addition to state programs like OHA and the strange federal-state hybrid
of the HHCA, there are also numerous federal programs that single out Native
Hawaiians, providing a wide range of benefits. They include the Native
Hawaiian Education Act of 1994,7 the Native Hawaiian Health Care
Improvement Act of 1992,88 the Older Americans Act of 1965,' 9 the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 90 the Native American Programs Act of 1974, 91
the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966,92 the Developmental
Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act Amendments of 1987,9' the
Disadvantaged Minority Health Improvement Act of 1990,9 and the Indian
Health Care Amendments of 1988. 95 Some of these federal programs require
fifty percent native blood,96 but most require only descendance from pre-1778
inhabitants.97 Insofar as these statutes have articulated a constitutional basis,
86. See 73-18 Op. Haw. Att'y Gen. 5 (1973); see also supra note 74.
87. 20 U.S.C. §§ 7901-12 (1994).
88. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11701-14 (1994).
89. Id. §§ 3001-58.
90. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-95i (1994).
91. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2991-92.
92. 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1994).
93. Pub. L. No. 100-146. 101 Stat. 840 (1987) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.c.).
94. Pub. L. No. 101-527, 104 Stat. 2311 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
u.s.c.).
95. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1601-82 (1994).
96. A few simply incorporate the HHCA's definition. See Admission Act of 1959. 48 U S C ch, 3.
§ 5(f) (1994); 38 U.S.C. § 3764(3) (1994); Pub. L. No. 10442. § 202(2). 109 Stat. 353. 357 (1995) (to bc
codified at 48 U.S.C. ch. 3). Other statutes do not explicitly refer to the HHCA but use substantially the
same definition. See. e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-12(d) (1994) ("The term 'native Hawaiian' means any
descendant of not less than one-half part of the blood of the races inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands before
January 1, 1778."); 16 U.S.C. § 396a(b) (same); id. § 41Ojj-6 (same).
97. There are slight variations among these statutes. See. e.g.. 16 U.S.C. § 396d(e) ("For the purposes
of this section, native Hawaiians are defined as any lineal descendants of the race inhabiting the Hawmian
Islands prior to the year 1778."); id. § 470w(17) ("'Native Hawaiian' means any individual who is a
descendant of the aboriginal people who, prior to 1778. occupied and exercised sovereignty in the area that
now constitutes the State of Hawaii."); 25 U.S.C. § 3001(10) (using language identical to that in 16 U.S.C.
§ 470w); 20 U.S.C. § 80q-14(11) (1994) ("[T]he term 'Native Hawaian' means a member or descendant
of the aboriginal people who, before 1778. occupied and exercised sovereignty in the area that now
comprises the State of Hawaii."); id. § 2313(a)(I )(B) ("ITlhe term 'Hawaiian native' means any individual
any of whose ancestors were natives, prior to 1778. of the area which now compnses the State of
Hawaii."); id. § 7118(b) (using language identical to that in id. § 2313): 29 U.S.C § 150311) (1994)
(same); 20 U.S.C. § 351a(16) ("'Hawaiian native' means any individual any of whose ancestors were
natives prior to 1778 in the area which now compnses the State of Hawaii."): id. § 4402(6) ('The term
'Native Hawaiian' means any descendant of a person who. prior to 1778. was a native of the Hawaiian
Islands."); id. § 7912(l) ('The term 'Native Hawaiian' means any individual who is (A) a citizen of the
United States; and (B) a descendant of the aboriginal people, who prior to 1778. occupied and exercised
sovereignty in the area that now comprises the State of Hawa'i .... "'): 42 U.S.C. § 117113) (using
language identical to that in 20 U.S.C. § 7912); id. § 254s(c) ("(Tlhe term 'Native Hawatian' means any
individual who is (1) a citizen of the United States. (2) a resident of the State of Hawaii. and (3) a
descendant of the aboriginal people, who prior to 1778. occupied and exercised sovereignty in the area that
now constitutes the State of Hawaii."); id. § 2992c(3) ("'Native Hawaiian' means any individual any of
whose ancestors were natives of the area which consists of the Hawaiian Islands prior to 1778."): d.
§ 3057k (using language identical to that in id. § 2992c(3)).
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they have usually asserted that the programs are enacted pursuant to a special
relationship between the federal government and Native Hawaiians akin to that
with Native Americans.98
Ill. APPLICATION OF THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP TO NATIVE HAWAIIANS
With this background, I now turn to the central question: Are Native
Hawaiians within the special relationship, so that government programs
singling them out are subject to rational basis review? Or are such statutes
subject to strict scrutiny under Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena9 and City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.?'°
The argument that these statutes are subject to strict scrutiny is fairly
straightforward: Mancari drew a sharp distinction between American Indians
as a racial group and members of Indian tribes as a political group.'' The
Court stated that the governmental policy at issue was subject to rational basis
review because it applied "to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather,
as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities."" 2 Legislation singling out
Native Hawaiians, however, defines them simply by non-Western
ancestry--descent from "the races inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands previous to
1778"-plus (in some statutes) blood quantum."03 This definition of "Native
Hawaiian" is a straightforward racial classification with no suggestion of the
relevance of membership in any organized group of Native Hawaiians. It does
not, therefore, fall into the category of political classifications that Mancari
upheld as subject to rational basis review; so, in light of Adarand and Croson,
a court would apply strict scrutiny.
The few commentators and the two court opinions addressing whether
rational basis review applies to statutes singling out Native Hawaiians have
uniformly rejected the proposition that heightened scrutiny applies, but they
have not fully developed the arguments for their position."34 Nevertheless,
98. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 7902 (containing findings); 42 U.S.C. § 11701 (same).
99. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
100. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
101. This distinction is, of course, critical in light of Adarand and Croson, as those cases reflect the
Court's vigilance in subjecting all governmental racial classifications to heightened scrutiny.
102. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974).
103. HHCA § 201(a)(7). On the various forms of statutory language (and the 50% versus any percent
dichotomy), see supra notes 71-86, 96-97 and accompanying text.
104. The entirety of the reasoning in the first opinion, Naliielua v. Hawaii, 795 F. Supp. 1009, 1013
(D. Haw. 1990), aff'd on other grounds, No. 90-15842, 1991 WL 148771 (9th Cir. 1991), was that Native
Hawaiians and American Indians are indigenous peoples. See infra text accompanying notes 105-06; see
also supra note 18. The second opinion, Rice v. Cayetano, Nos. Civ.96-00390 DAE, Civ.96-00616 DAE,
1996 WL 562072 (D. Haw. Sept. 6, 1996), relied in part on Naliielua and in part on two other arguments
addressed here: that United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978), and Delaware Tribal Business Conittee
v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977), expanded Mancari's application beyond federally recognized tribes, see infra
Section III.A; and that Congress's passage of statutes for Native Hawaiians creates a special relationship
between the federal government and Native Hawaiians, see infra Section III.E. The one article devoted to
the question of the existence of a special relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes,
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one can posit a number of arguments that would support the application of
rational basis review to programs for Native Hawaiians: first, that Mancari and
later cases do not limit the special relationship to Indian tribes and their
members, and instead indicate that all preferences for Native Americans are
subject to rational basis review; second, that Mancari does impose a limit, but
merely that the relevant statutory definition of Native Americans must be
political (not that the group must be a tribe), and the definition of Native
Hawaiian qualifies because it excludes those whose ancestors arrived after
1778; third, that even if Mancari does limit the special relationship (and
therefore rational basis review) to Indian tribes, Native Hawaiians currently
constitute a tribe; fourth, that Native Hawaiians may not constitute a tribe, but
they nonetheless should be treated as a tribe in light of their history and their
treatment by the federal government; and fifth, that even if Mancari limits the
special relationship to tribes and Native Hawaiians are not a tribe, the history
of federal legislation treating Native Hawaiians specially has effectively
conferred tribal status on them.
A. The Special Relationship Extends to All Native Americans
One possible argument is that preferences for Native Hawaiians would not
be subject to strict scrutiny because the Court has never suggested that
preferences for members of nontribal groups are suspect and in fact has
indicated that the special relationship extends beyond the narrow confines of
the category of federally recognized tribes to include all Native Americans.
This is the apparent position of the one federal court to consider an equal
protection challenge to a statute providing benefits to Native Hawaiians,
Naliielua v. Hawaii. 5 In that case, the District Court in Hawaii upheld the
singling out of Native Hawaiians in the HHCA, stating that Mancari had
applied rational basis review to statutes that benefit "Indians," and that
"Indians" included Native Hawaiians. 1
6
see Houghton, supra note 19, did not address the constitutional question directly and thus did not focus on
the arguments for similar treatment of Indian tribes and Native Hawaians. It relied exclusively on a
definition formerly used by the BIA that was propounded by a BIA official and Indian scholar. This Article
addresses the inapplicability of that test. See infra note 156. The only other article to address squarely the
level of scrutiny for programs for Native Hawaiians. see Van Dyke, supra note 19. made one of the
arguments discussed in this Article: that the definition of Native Hawaiian is a "political- classification
within the meaning of Mancari. See id. at 75; infra note 146. This argument is addressed in Section II1.B.
105. 795 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Haw. 1990), aff'd on other gromds. No. 90-15842. 1991 WL 148771 (9th
Cir. 1991). But see Hoohuli v. Ariyoshi, 631 F. Supp. 1153. 1159 n.22 (D. Haw 1986) (noting that
plaintiffs did not challenge preferences for Native Hawaiians and stating that. "if plaintiffs were Caucasions
[sic] challenging appropriations to both 'Hawaiians' [defined as those descended from indigenous peoples)
and 'native Hawaiians,' [defined as those with at least 50% native blood) 'stret scrutiny* might be the
appropriate standard").
106. See Naliielua, 795 F. Supp. at 1012-13. The Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiff lacked standing
to bring an equal protection challenge to the HHCA's preference for Native Hawaiians. and so the court
simply affirmed based on standing without reaching the constitutional issue. See Natuelua. 1991 WL
148771, at *1.
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Although the district court's mere assertion seems inadequate, the
argument can be articulated in a more persuasive form. First, neither Mancari
nor any other case directly stated that statutes applying to American Indians
as a racial group would be subject to strict scrutiny, or even that the special
relationship was limited to Indian tribes and their members. By its terms,
Mancari merely held that the preference at issue, which was limited to
members of tribes, was subject to rational basis review. Second, in two cases
decided after Mancari-Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks t07
and United States v. John' 8M-the Court demonstrated some flexibility in
applying the tribe/race distinction, thereby leaving open the possibility of
rational basis review for statutes giving preferences to Native Americans.
Third, Mancari implicitly recognized that Native Americans share a crucial
similarity that no other groups share-the destruction of their sovereign
authority over their land-and it, along with Weeks and John, intimates that
the appropriate dividing line for the special relationship is between Native
Americans and other racial or ethnic groups, not Indian tribes and racial
groups.
At the outset, this argument raises the threshold issue of whether Native
Hawaiians are "Indian[s]" for constitutional (and therefore special relationship)
purposes.' 9 This question is central to every argument in favor of extending
the special relationship to Native Hawaiians, in light of the grounding of the
special relationship in the Constitution. Fortunately, courts have provided some
guidance. The few cases addressing the issue have treated Native Hawaiians
as "Indian[s]" for constitutional purposes."" More important, a large number
of courts have treated Alaska Natives"' as "Indian[s]" for purposes of the
special relationship, thereby indicating that "Indian" is not limited to the native
inhabitants of the first forty-eight (or original thirteen) states;"12 and it seems
The Hawaii Attorney General applied similar reasoning in a 1980 legal opinion concluding that the
limitation of the board of trustees of OHA to "Hawaiians" (defined as those descended from pre-1778
inhabitants) was constitutional. See 80-8 Op. Haw. Att'y Gen. 7 (1980). The Attorney General construed
Mancari as according "special equal protection treatment to legislation singling out for special treatment
Native Americans or aboriginal people." Id. (emphasis added). The opinion then concluded that OHA was
constitutional under this standard.
107. 430 U.S. 73 (1977).
108. 437 U.S. 634 (1978).
109. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ct. 3 (giving Congress power "ft]o regulate Commerce ... with the
Indian Tribes").
110. See Naliielta, 795 F. Supp. at 1012-13; Ahuna v. Department of Hawaiian Home Lands, 640
P.2d 1161, 1168-69 (Haw. 1982).
111. "Alaska Natives" are generally treated as comprising Aleuts, Eskimos, and Indians whose
ancestral residence in Alaska preceded that of Europeans. See Pence v. Kleppe, 529 F.2d 135, 138 n.5 (9th
Cir. 1976); THOMAS R. BERGER, VILLAGE JOURNEY at vii-viii (1985); COHEN, supra note 41, at 401.
112. See Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78 (1918); Native Village of Tyonek v.
Puckett, 957 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1992); Alaska Chapter, Assoc. Gen. Contractors of America v. Pierce, 694
F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1982); Pence, 529 F.2d at 138 n.5; Alaska v. Annette Island Packing Co., 289 F. 671
(9th Cir. 1923); Cape Fox Corp. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 223 (1983); Aguilar v. United States, 474 F.
Supp. 840 (D. Alaska 1979); Eric v. HUD, 464 F. Supp. 44 (D. Alaska 1978); see also Morton v. Ruiz,
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doubtful that a court would treat native peoples of Alaska as Indians but not
extend such treatment to Native Hawaiians. Thus, though it is possible that a
court would ignore the existing case law and conclude that Native Hawaiians
are not "Indian[s]" within the meaning of the Indian Commerce Clause, it
seems more likely that it would adopt the prevailing view and treat that
clause's reference to "Indian[s]" as encompassing Native Hawaiians.
Assuming, then, that Native Hawaiians would be treated as "Indian[s]" for
constitutional purposes, the argument that the special relationship extends to
all "Indian[s]" nonetheless fails, for a number of reasons. First, the Court has
grounded the special relationship primarily in the Indian Commerce
Clause,n 3 and that clause gives Congress the power to regulate commerce
"with the Indian Tribes,""'  not with Indians generally." 5 The Court has
415 U.S. 199, 212 (1974) (noting special status of "Indians" in Alaska. thus apparenil) intimating that
Alaska Natives are "Indian[s]" for constitutional purposes)
113. See supra notes 24-29, 35-36 and accompanying text
114. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. This language parallels the Clause's reference to international
commerce ("Commerce with foreign nations"), id. (emphasis added), rather than interstate commerce
("Commerce ... among the several states"), id. (emphasis added), thereby undersconng the similarity of
Indian tribes to sovereign nations, rather than to racial or ethnic groupings
One other textual matter bears mention: the Indian Commerce Clause emposers Congress vis-A-vIs
"the Indian Tribes," and it is not obvious that the authonty it confers should be construed to apply with
equal force to tribal members. A dichotomy between a tribe and its members is arguably implicit in the
notion of the special relationship as a govemment-to-govemment relationship. Morton v Mancan. 417 U S
535 (1974), however, resolved this question for purposes of the current case law (and therefore for purposes
of this Article): Mancari held that the special relationship allows the federal government to single out
members of Indian tribes for benefits.
115. The Court in Mancari suggested that an additional constitutional basis of the special relationship
was the Treaty Clause of Article I, U.S. CONST. art. 11. § 2. cl. 2, which gives the President the authority.
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. to make treaties. The Court noted that this Clause "has
often been the source of the Government's power to deal with Indian tribes" Mancari. 417 U S at 552.
see also McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164. 172 n 7 (1973) ("(Flederal authority
over Indian matters ... derives from federal responsibility for regulating commerce %% ith Indian tribes and
for treaty making."). The Court thus classified the Treaty Clause as one irnolsing the goserment's
relations with Indian tribes. This makes sense, as the Clause gives the President the poser to make treaties.
presumably with other governments. Nothing in the Clause suggests that it also gase the President the
power to make agreements with a racial group (and it should be noted that the Clause does not mention
Indians).
In addition to the Indian Commerce Clause. there are tso other references to Indians in the
Constitution: the references to "Indians not taxed" in U.S. CONST art I. § 2, cl 3 (apportionment shall
exclude "Indians not taxed"), and U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. § 2 (same). T%,o professors, but not the
Supreme Court, have suggested that these references are another possible source of power to deal sith
Indians. See Williams, supra note 42, at 830-50; Carole Goldberg-Ambrosc. Not "'Strictls - Racial A
Response to "Indians as Peoples", 39 UCLA L. REv. 169. 175. 189-90 (1991). Professor Goldberg-
Ambrose argues: "While the Indian Commerce Clause refers to tribal groups, the 'Indians not taxed'
language embraces Indians as individuals." Goldberg-Ambrose. supra. at 189 On this basis, she contends
that the "Indians not taxed" language permits Congress to legislate not only for Indian tribes and their
members but also for Indians defined racially. See id. at 190 This fails as a textual argument. ho% eser.
because all Indians are taxed today (because all are citizens, pursuant to a 1924 statute) and all are included
in the apportionment. See 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (1994) (providing that all Indians are citizens). 5e" alto I
UNITED STATES DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, OPINIONS OF THE SOUCrTOR OF TiE DEPARThIE.\'" OF TIlE
INTERIOR RELATING TO INDIAN AFFAIRS. 1917-1974. at 995-97 (1979) [hereinafter OPINIONS OF TiE
SOLIcrrOR] (Opinion of Nov. 7. 1940) (announcing that no one is excluded from apportionment. because
there are no "Indians not taxed" after citizenship law); David C. Williams. Somettines Suspect A Response
to Professor Goldberg-Ambrose, 39 UCLA L. REv. 191. 195 (1991) (% riting that. as textual matter. "the
'Indians not taxed' clause cannot ground a special relationship betssen Congress and any Indians. because
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 106: 537
shown no inclination to construe the phrase "Indian Tribes" to mean simply
"Indians," and there is no reason to believe it will ignore the additional word
"Tribes."116 As a result, preferences that exceed the scope of the Clause and
have a racial element would appear to be subject to strict scrutiny under
ordinary equal protection principles.
Second, Mancari clearly indicated that the special relationship was limited
to tribes. Mancari's central distinction was between Indian tribes as a political
classification and Indians as a racial classification. The Court's analysis of the
equal protection issue focused-and turned-on the special relationship with
Indian tribes, not with Indians generally. In fact, the Court began its analysis
of the equal protection challenge by stating that "[r]esolution of the instant
issue turns on the unique legal status of Indian tribes under federal law."
'' 7
Any remaining doubt on this score is erased by the Court's explication:
The preference is not directed towards a "racial" group consisting of
"Indians"; instead, it applies only to members of "federally
recognized" tribes. This operates to exclude many individuals who are
it now applies to no Indians at all"). Thus, even if one were to read the exclusion of "Indians not taxed"
from apportionment as giving a textual basis for Congress's legislating outside of the strictures of the Equal
Protection Clause for the Indians so described, the power is meaningless because the group so described
no longer exists. Professor Williams takes an extmtextual approach, arguing that "Indians not taxed" does
not refer to untaxed Indians per se (who do not exist), but rather to the category that Congress intended
to include in this group-tribal Indians. See Williams, supra note 42, at 832-41 (presenting historical
evidence that "Indians not taxed" was intended to refer to tribal Indians). This construction of "Indians not
taxed" would not expand the scope of the special relationship to all Indians-the interpretation would cover
only tribes that "retain[] enough sovereignty to control the texture of daily life on the reservation," id. at
831-but instead would serve as an alternate grounding for the special relationship with tribal entities. See
id. at 776-86 (rejecting Indian Commerce Clause as possible ground for rational basis review of statutes
treating members of Indian tribes specially and noting need for an alternative basis for special relationship).
This reading, then, also does not appear to provide a basis for extending the special relationship to all
Indians.
I will not discuss these arguments at length, because the point of this Article is to examine the status
of Native Hawaiians under the prevailing jurisprudence, and the Supreme Court has never suggested that
the Constitution's references to "Indians not taxed" are relevant, much less a foundation for the special
relationship. See Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6 (1956); see also Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 692
(1990) ("That Indians are citizens does not alter the Federal Government's broad authority to legislate with
respect to enrolled Indians as a class, whether to impose burdens or benefits.").
116. The Court has been willing to construe the Indian Commerce Clause expansively-after all, in
the many cases since McClanahan emphasized the Clause, the Court has never found, or even suggested,
that the Clause might not support a given federal government action with respect to Indian tribes-and it
may be willing to construe the term 'Tribe[]" more broadly than the Executive Branch has, see infra notes
157-67 and accompanying text, but it has never intimated that it would read the word "Tribes" out of the
Indian Commerce Clause. The Court's treatment of the Interstate Commerce Clause (which is, of course,
part of the same sentence in the Constitution) is perhaps instructive. As expansively as the Court has
interpreted "Commerce ... among the several states," it has always tied the regulated actions to some
aspect of interstate commerce, see Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Wickard v. Filbum, 317
U.S. 111 (1942). And the Court's recent invalidation of the Gun-Free School Zones Act in United States
v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), underscored the Court's unwillingness to construe the Clause as if no
interstate nexus were required. The Court's treatment of the Interstate Commerce Clause thus may suggest,
albeit inferentially, that the Court may construe the word "Tribe[]" broadly, but would not ignore it
altogether.
117. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 551 (emphasis added).
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racially to be classified as "Indians." In this sense, the preference is
political rather than racial in nature.' "
Thus, far from embracing the suggestion that all "'Indians" could be in a
political classification that was subject to the special relationship, the Court
specifically suggested that some members of the race would not qualify, and
that this exclusion demonstrated that the classification was political and
therefore subject to rational basis review. The Court clarified that the
preference was political, and permissible pursuant to the special relationship,
because it was limited to members of federally recognized tribes.
The proposition that benefits for American Indians generally could also be
subject to rational basis review cannot be squared with Mancari's careful
differentiation of tribal versus racial classifications. The Court, in its discussion
of Congress's power to deal with Indian tribes, did quote an earlier case noting
that "'the United States overcame the Indians and took possession of their
lands, sometimes by force,' 9 and this quotation does raise the issue of the
federal government's deprivation of the sovereignty and land of "the Indians";
but any implication that the Court was relying on this history of subjugation
and dispossession in rejecting Mancari's equal protection challenge is
eviscerated by the subsequent discussion of that challenge."2' If the Court's
view had been that all preferences for dispossessed, formerly sovereign
indigenous peoples (i.e., Native Americans) are subject to rational basis
review, it presumably would have written a very different opinion, one
focusing on what is unique about Native Americans, rather than what is unique
about Indian tribes. In actuality, Mancari's central distinction was between
tribes and nontribes, rather than Indians and non-Indians.' 2 ' In order to give
the Court's reasoning meaning, we must assume that something turned on this
distinction; the only available candidate (because it was the only issue
addressed by the Court in the equal protection section) is the appropriate level
of scrutiny.
There is, as was suggested above, a counterargument to this emphasis on
Mancari: In some subsequent cases-in particular Delaware Tribal Business
118. Id. at 553 n.24 (emphasis added).
119. Id. at 552 (quoting Board of County Comm'rs v. Seber. 318 US. 705. 715 1943))
120. See supra text accompanying note 118.
121. In addition, construing Mancari as recogntzing a special relationship with all Native Americans
would render inexplicable the opinion's avoidance of the relevant statutory language in favor of the BIA
regulation that applied to the statute. See id. at 553 n.24; supra note 38. The obvious explanation for the
Court's strange move--relying on the BIA regulation and failing to mention, much less quote, the statutory
language-is that the statute (the IRA, 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1994)) gave benefits to members of federally
recognized tribes and "all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood.- whereas the BIA regulation
limited the preference to members of federally recognized trbes; thus, relying on the regulation allowed
the Court to construe the preference as limited to members of Indtan inbes. If the Court dtd not so intend
to limit the special relationship, it is difficult to fathom why it treated the statute in the way that it did.
1996]
The Yale Law Journal
Committee v. Weeks 122 and United States v. Johnt23-the Court did not
emphasize the tribal nature of the preferences at issue. In Weeks, the Court
upheld a federal statute's distribution of an award based on a nineteenth-
century treaty to two recognized Indian tribes (the Cherokee Delawares and the
Absentee Delawares) and its exclusion of a nonrecognized group (the Kansas
Delawares). The Court noted in a footnote, however, that, though Cherokee
Delaware recipients had to be tribal members, Absentee Delaware eligibility
was "defined somewhat more broadly, so that some nonmembers of the tribe
are eligible under the statute"; yet the Court did not discuss this point or
suggest that it had any significance.' 24 In John, the Court held that the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA) applied to the Choctaw Indians, even
though they did not have a reservation or a constitution at that time. In so
holding, the Court emphasized the breadth of the IRA: "The 1934 Act defined
'Indians' not only as 'all persons of Indian descent who are members of any
recognized [in 1934] tribe now under Federal jurisdiction,' and their
descendants who then were residing on any Indian reservation, but also as 'all
other persons of one-half or more Indian blood.""'  The Court did not
suggest that this definition raised any constitutional concerns.
The Court's treatment (or lack thereof) of these points in Weeks and John
seems problematic, in light of Mancari's heavy emphasis on the tribe/race
distinction. The crucial question, though, is whether, in light of Weeks and
John, Mancari's clear limitation to tribes still applies; for several reasons, the
answer is yes.
In neither Weeks nor John did the Court in any way intimate that it was
altering-or even revisiting-Mancari's equal protection analysis, much less
that it was supplanting it with an emphasis on American Indians' shared
122. 430 U.S. 73 (1977).
123. 437 U.S. 634 (1978).
124. 430 U.S. at 82 n.14. The Court's silence is particularly remarkable in light of Justice Blackmun's
concurrence and Justice Stevens's dissent, both of which noted that the benefit was not limited to tribal
members. See id. at 90 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and in the result) (stating that Court's suggestion
of tribe/nontribe distinction "is undermined by the fact that Absentee Delawares who are not members of
that tribe nevertheless are entitled to participate"); id. at 94 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (rejecting Court's
reliance on Mancari because "some of those who would share in the distribution on behalf of the Absentee
Delawares are not members of that tribe").
It is unsurprising that Justice Blackmun, who wrote the Court's opinion in Mancari, would have
emphasized tribal membership. It is worth noting, however, that Blackmun (along with Chief Justice
Burger) concurred in the result, because
[t]here necessarily is a large measure of arbitrariness in distributing an award for a century-old
wrong. One could regard the distribution as a windfall for whichever beneficiaries are now
favored. In light of the difficulty in determining appropriate standards for the selection of those
who are to receive the benefits, I cannot say that the distribution directed by the Congress is
unreasonable and constitutionally impermissible.
Id. at 91 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and in the result).
125. 437 U.S. at 650 (bracketing in original) (quoting IRA, 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1976)). This is somewhat
ironic, as the same statute (the IRA), and thus the same definition of "Indian," was at issue in Mancari
(which was decided four years earlier), and in that case the Court construed the IRA, pursuant to the
relevant regulations, as applying only to Indian tribes. See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24.
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history of subjugation and dispossession. 26 In Weeks, in fact, the Court
applied Mancari and emphasized that "the Kansas Delawares are not a
recognized tribal entity, but are simply individual Indians with no vested rights
in any tribal property."'' 27 The Court's holding relied in part on the tribal
status of the recipient groups and the nontribal status of the excluded Kansas
Delawares. We may question the Court's treatment of the Absentee
Delawares-or, more precisely, the Absentee Delawares as defined by the
relevant statute, rather than by tribal rolls-as a tribe,'2 ' but we are still left
with a case in which the Court, far from rejecting Mancari's emphasis on
tribes, upheld the distribution based in part on the tribe/race dichotomy. The
Court permitted a statutory definition of a tribe that included some individuals
who would have qualified as Absentee Delawares under the tribal constitution
but for their blood quantum (and, significantly, all of the actual recipients
would have been eligible to be included on the tribe's 1940 census roll); 29
it never intimated that Indians who could not reasonably be considered to be
tribal members nonetheless could be subject to the special relationship. In
John, too, the context of the case mitigates the significance of its reference to
racial Indians as "Indians" for certain purposes. John was a member of the
Choctaw tribe, so there was no issue of the application of the special
relationship to someone who was not connected to a tribe; the only question
was whether the Choctaws had been a tribe at the time the relevant acts were
passed. And, in light of the Court's conclusion that the Choctaws were an
"Indian tribe," it did not address the equal protection ramifications of a
contrary finding. Once again, the Court did not disparage the constitutional
significance of affiliation with a tribe; indeed, it relied on the tribal status of
the Choctaws in concluding that certain federal laws applied to them.
126. Moreover, even assuming that the Court had cast doubt on the tmbenonmbe distinction, it is not
at all clear that the Court would replace that distinction with a Native/non-Nat'c American dichotomy.
whereby it would apply Mancari to benefits for Native Americans and Adarand to benefits for other
minority groups. The argument for such a change, after all. would depend on the contestable asscrtion that
the destruction of Native Americans' sovereign authority over their land (and the gos cmmcnt's insolscmcnt
in it) was so different from the deprivations suffered by other racial minonties that a completely different
level of scrutiny would apply to programs benefiting Native Americans. Cf. Williams, supra note 42, at
817-18 ("The historical dispossession argument still does not adequately distinguish Indians from other
racial groups, particularly African-Americans.") Johnson & Crystal. supra note 40. at 589 n 19 (comparing
American Indians with African Americans).
One could argue, of course, that both Native Americans and African Americans are entitled to special
treatment, and that programs benefiting them should be subject only to raional basis review Such an
argument, however, depends on the overruling of Adarand and Crson. and the purpose of this Article is
to address the current status of Native Hawaiians and the possibilities of changing that status in light of
current constitutional doctrines.
127. Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm., 430 U.S. at 85.
128. This appears to have been Justice Blackmun's position. See id. at 90 (Blaekmun. J .concumng).
129. See Brief for the Absentee Delaware Tribe Business Committee at 52. Absentee Delaware Tnbc
of Oklahoma Bus. Comm. v. weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977) (No. 75-1335); Weeks %, United States, 406 F
Supp. 1309, 1339 n.40 (W.D. Okla. 1975).
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Moreover, in other cases the Court has articulated the special relationship
in terms of tribal status and has never intimated that a shared history of
subjugation and dispossession is sufficient. Thus, the Court has stated that
"federal regulation of Indian tribes ... is governance of once-sovereign
political communities; it is not to be viewed as legislation of a "'racial" group
consisting of "Indians ... 30 and has referred to "legislation singling out tribal
Indians, legislation that might otherwise be constitutionally offensive. '2 3'
130. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977) (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24).
In that case, criminal defendants contended that their right to equal protection had been violated because
they had been subject to a harsher, federal sentence based on their status as Indians. The Court, in rejecting
this argument, emphasized-and relied on-the special status of tribes, as distinguished from American
Indians as an ethnic group. The Court began by stating that "federal legislation with respect to Indian tribes,
although relating to Indians as such, is not based upon impermissible racial classifications." Id. at 645.
Then, after quoting both Mancari and Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976), at length, the Court
stated that federal regulation of Indian affairs "is rooted in the unique status of Indians as 'a separate
people' with their own political institutions.... Indeed respondents were not subjected to federal criminal
jurisdiction because they are of the Indian race but because they are enrolled members of the Coeur
d'Alene Tribe." Antelope, 430 U.S. at 646.
Interestingly, the statute at issue in Antelope was not explicitly limited to tribal members. In a
footnote immediately after the passage quoted above, the Court noted the breadth of the definition but
reserved judgment on the equal protection issues it raised, relying instead on the defendants' status as tribal
members:
It should be noted, however, that enrollment in an official tribe has not been held to be
an absolute requirement for federal jurisdiction, at least where the Indian defendant lived on the
reservation and "maintained tribal relations with the Indians thereon." Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d
28, 30 (7th Cir. 1938); see also United States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935, 953 (9th Cir. 1974) (dicta).
Since respondents are enrolled tribal members, we are not called on to decide whether
nonenrolled Indians are subject to 18 U.S.C. § 1153, and we therefore intimate no views on the
matter.
Id. at 647 n.7. The broadening of the special relationship (at least as to federal jurisdiction) to which the
Court referred, then, was only to Indians who live on a reservation and "maintain tribal relations." This
clearly would not encompass a further expansion to Indians who are not connected to a tribe or tribal
reservation. And, of course, the Court did not even endorse this slight extension of the special relationship,
as the Court noted that the relevant parties were enrolled tribal members. Moreover, the first paragraph of
the footnote emphasized that federal jurisdiction "does not apply to 'many individuals who are racially to
be classified as "Indians.."" Id. (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24).
131. Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 501 (1979).
The full quotation is particularly revealing: "It is settled that 'the unique legal status of Indian tribes under
federal law' permits the Federal Government to enact legislation singling out tribal Indians, legislation that
might otherwise be constitutionally offensive." Id. at 500-01 (emphases added) (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S.
at 551).
The Supreme Court applied similar reasoning in Fisher. There, the Court held that denying access
to state courts and forcing litigants to tribal court did not constitute impermissible racial discrimination
because "[t]he exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribal Court does not derive from the race of the plaintiff but
rather from the quasi-sovereign status of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe under federal law." 424 U.S. at 390.
Also relevant is United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975). In that case, the Court upheld the
delegation of authority to tribes to regulate alcohol, because tribes were different from other groups of
people: "Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty both over their members
and their territory, Worcester v. Georgia, [31 U.S.] 6 Pet. 515, 557 (1832); they are 'a separate people'
possessing 'the power of regulating their internal and social relations ....' Id. at 557 (quoting United
States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886)). The Court then stated that "[c]ases such as Worcester
and Kagama surely establish the proposition that Indian tribes within 'Indian country' are a good deal more
than 'private, voluntary organizations."' Id. (citations omitted in original). The Court also emphasized the
special status of tribes (and quoted this language from Mazurie) in United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313,
322-23 (1978). Finally, the Court's only statement on this issue since 1980 invokes the importance of
membership in a tribe; in Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), the Court rejected an argument based on
American Indians' U.S. citizenship, stating: "That Indians are citizens does not alter the Federal
Native Hawaiians
This is consistent with the Court's reliance on the Indian Commerce Clause as
the source of Congress's authority to single out Indians. As was noted above,
the Clause empowers Congress to regulate commerce with "the Indian Tribes."
In order to accept the contention that the Court has expanded the special
relationship to all Indians, one must assume that the Supreme Court either has
abandoned the Indian Commerce Clause as the constitutional grounding for the
special relationship or has ignored its limitation to tribes; there are no cases
that intimate the doctrinal changes that could support either assumption.
Perhaps the most significant point, however, is that Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena132 and City of Richmond vi J.A. Croson Co.' have changed
the constitutional landscape. In the 1970s, when Weeks and John (and, for that
matter, all of the Supreme Court cases directly confronting the constitutionality
of laws singling out American Indians)' were decided, the Court had not
clarified the level of scrutiny that would be applied to laws containing racial
classifications designed to benefit minority groups. Since that time, Adarand
and Croson have squarely held that strict scrutiny applies to legislation
containing a racial or ethnic classification, irrespective of whether the
legislation was intended to harm or benefit the relevant group. Thus, insofar
as the cases cited above left open the question of the appropriate level of
scrutiny for legislation containing racial classifications of Native Americans,
Adarand and Croson appear to have answered the question."
Adarand and Croson are particularly relevant because the programs at
issue in those cases included Native Americans, defined racially, among the
enumerated beneficiaries (and none had any references to tribal affiliation). In
Adarand, the presumptively disadvantaged groups were .. Black Americans,
Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other
minorities. '"1 36 In Croson, the relevant definition was "'Blacks, Spanish-
speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts.""131 Similarly, the statute in
Fullilove v. Klutznick138 applied to "Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals,
Government's broad authority to legislate with respect to enrolled Indians as a class. whether to impose
burdens or benefits." Id. at 692 (emphasis added).
132. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
133. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
134. Yakima Nation, 439 U.S. 463, was the last Supreme Court case that squarely addressed this issue
See supra note 44.
135. It bears mentioning that Justice Stevens's dissent in Adarand seems to suggest that, under the
majority's view, strict scrutiny applies to classifications of Native Americans. In cnticizing the Court's view
of "consistency," Justice Stevens stated that the Court "should reject a concept of 'consistency' that would
view the special preferences that the National Government has provided to Native Americans since 1834
as comparable to the official discrimination against African Amencans that was prevalent for much of our
history." Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2121 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). The point of this cntcism
presumably is that the Court's concept of consistency did equate the two.
136. Id. at 2102 (emphasis added) (quoting Small Business Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 637(dX2)-(3) (1994)).
137. Croson, 488 U.S. at 478 (quoting RICHMOND, VA.. CODE § 12-23 (1985)) (emphasis added).
138. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
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Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts, ' 1139 and the program at issue in Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC40 applied to "'those of Black, Hispanic
Surnamed, American Eskimo, Aleut, American Indian and Asiatic American
extraction.""' 141 In none of these cases did the Supreme Court intimate in any
way that the benefits for Native Americans would be subject to rational basis
review.
Admittedly, the particular applications challenged in Adarand, Croson,
Metro Broadcasting, and Fullilove did not involve Native Americans, and it
is possible that the Court intended to apply a different standard of review to
classifications of Native Americans. Nothing in any of the opinions gives any
support to this reading, however. The Court treated the relevant provisions as
containing a series of racial or ethnic classifications, not as an agglomeration
of racial and nonracial ones. In fact, in Croson the Court specifically referred
to the benefited classes other than African Americans (namely, "Spanish-
speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut") as "racial groups."'' 42
139. Id. at 454 (quoting Public Works Employment Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (Supp. I1
1976)) (emphasis added).
140. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
141. Id. at 553 n.l (emphasis added) (quoting Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of
Broadcasting Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d 979, 980 n.8 (1978)).
142. Croson, 488 U.S. at 506. Indeed, in the same paragraph the Court made an additional statement
that appears to treat the Native American groups as subject to strict scrutiny: The Court stated that "[t]here
is absolutely no evidence of past discrimination against Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or
Aleut persons in any aspect of the Richmond construction industry." Id. (second emphasis added). The
emphasis on past discrimination is significant, because such discrimination (as the Court had just finished
explaining) is crucial in meeting the requirements of strict scrutiny, but, of course, totally unnecessary in
the rational basis context. If the Court had considered preferences for Native Americans to be subject to
rational basis review (just like, say, preferences for optometrists, as in Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348
U.S. 483 (1955)), then presumably it would not have mentioned them in focusing on the absence of past
discrimination (just as it would not have with respect to a classification of optometrists).
Concededly, it could be argued that the Court mentioned these other groups (i.e., "Spanish-speaking,
Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut persons") in an effort to show that the provision was not narrowly
tailored, and that there was no suggestion that the groups were racial. The paragraph following the one
quoted above, which focuses on the absence of narrow tailoring, provides some support for this hypothesis.
There are two problems with this reading, however. The first is the aforementioned reference to the other
groups as "racial groups." The second is the fact that the quoted paragraph appears immediately after one
concluding that the city of Richmond had failed to demonstrate a compelling interest for its preference for
African Americans because it could not point to any identified past discrimination. In the quoted paragraph,
the Court then turned to the classification of the other groups. The placement of the quoted statement about
past discrimination and the other groups, then, suggests (albeit obliquely) that the Court was similarly
subjecting these other classifications to the compelling interest analysis of strict scrutiny.
It might be contended that the Court was simply rejecting Richmond's inclusion of Native Americans
(because Richmond had no history of discrimination against them) without casting any doubt on the federal
government's (or state governments') ability to benefit Native Americans based on discrimination that
occurred outside of the Richmond construction industry. The upshot of Mancari, though, is that
classifications of Indian tribes are subject to rational basis review (like benefits for optometrists), so a
history of discrimination is unnecessary (and generally irrelevant).
It might also be argued that the Court was suggesting that the inclusion of Native Americans could
not survive any level of review (including rational basis), so that there is no reason to believe that strict
scrutiny applies. The point of the discussion in Croson, however, was that strict scrutiny had not been met,
and nothing in the opinion indicates that the Court was also stating that the inclusion of Native Americans
would not survive rational basis review.
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B. The Definition of "Native Hawaiian" Is Political, not Racial
Another possible argument would concede that Mancari requires that
benefits be given based on a political classification in order for rational basis
review to apply, but would not concede that this was limited to tribes. On this
basis, it might be contended that the category of Native Hawaiians is a
political classification akin to an Indian tribe.
The broadest form of such an argument would be that the definition of
Native Hawaiian has no racial or ethnic component, but such an assertion is
untenable in light of the definition's reliance on descent from "the races
inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands previous to 1778."' 13 Moreover, 1778 was
not some random year; it conveniently divides the original Polynesian
inhabitants from the subsequently arriving groups of variegated ethnicities. A
more plausible argument would be that, though there is an undeniable racial
element to the definition of Native Hawaiian, the definition is analogous to that
upheld in Mancari because it adds the nonsuspect political criterion of descent
from people who were subjugated and dispossessed. In Mancari, the Supreme
Court found that the relevant definition was political, even though it was
effectively limited to members of a particular ethnic group,' because there
One final alternative bears mention: The above passages from Croson might be construed as
indicating merely that there is no special relationship between Native Americans and state or local
governments, and holding open the question whether there is a special relationship between Nattie
Americans and the federal government; such a distinction between federal and state authority flo~s from
Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation. 439 U.S_ 463 (1979) See uitra note
217. If that had been the Court's point, though, it likely would have cited Yakuna Nation or othcr~is gtien
some indication that its skeptical view of benefits for Native Americans applied only to state prefcrcnces.
and not to federal programs. As it was. the Court's reference to Native Americans does not intimate that
the subtleties of Yakima Nation were relevant. Thus, although it is possible that the Court assumed that
there was a special relationship between the federal government and Native Americans but none with the
states, and that it saw no need to articulate this assumption, the more obvious conclusion is simply that the
Court believed that the classifications of Native Americans were racial classifications subject to strict
scrutiny.
143. HHCA § 201(a)(7); see supra notes 65, 96-97 and accompanying text
144. Interestingly, though the BIA regulation upon which Mancan relied required both membership
in a federally recognized Indian tribe and "one-fourth or more degree Indian blood." see supra note 38. the
Court's emphasis was on tribal membership, and it is not clear that the Court considered the blood-quantum
requirement to be necessary. If the Court truly were to treat all members of recognized Indian tribes as
subject to the special relationship, then a tribe that did not require ancestry would also be subject to the
special relationship and thus it might not be fair to characterize the special relationship as mvolimg race
plus tribal status; the relationship could simply depend on tribal status, with no ethnic requirement If so.
this would further distinguish tribal classifications from the existing classifications of Natic Hawaiians.
which obviously do turn on ancestry. This argument is speculative, however, because in neither Mantari
nor its progeny did the Court address the application of the special relationship to someone who %~as not
of Indian ancestry. But cf Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261. 266 (1901) ("By a *trbe' %c
understand a body of Indians of the same or similar race .... "); United States v. Rogers, 45 U-S (4 How
567 (1846) (holding that white person could not be treated as member of Indian tribe)
Some commentators have argued that Rogers and federal government policies focusing on blood
quantum have effectively racialized membership of Indian tribes. See. e.g.. Ball. supra note 28. at 17 "'The
United States has imposed upon Indians its own, alien, definitions of 'tribe,' and it has made race a
dominant factor in determining tribal membership."); M. Annette Jaims. Federal Indian Identfication
Policy: A Usurpation of Indigenous Sovereignty in North America, 16 POL'Y STUD 1 778 (1988). cf James
Axtell, The White Indians of Colonial America, 32 W1.1. & MARY Q. 55 (discussing some Indian tribes'
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was a further limitation to tribal members; those individuals who were racially
American Indians but who were not members of a tribe were excluded from
the definition.'45 Similarly, one could argue, the definition of "Native
Hawaiian" is political because, though effectively limited to members of one
ethnic group, it excludes those who share their racial or ethnic characteristics
but who do not share their history. 46 Under this reasoning, the definition of
Native Hawaiian is "political" under Mancari's typology, rather than racial,
and so strict scrutiny is inappropriate.
Mancari, however, did not suggest that there were several nonsuspect
political classifications that would suffice to eliminate the racial character of
a definition, of which tribal membership was one; indeed, it never intimated
that there was a category of political classifications that could cleanse a racial
classification. The Court was not discussing political classifications in general
or in the abstract, but rather in the specific context of characterizing tribal
membership. The opinion simply stated that the requirement of tribal
membership was political. The Court never suggested that a different political
classification in a definition of Native Americans could eliminate the
assimilation of Westerners in colonial times). If so, then the federal government's mcializing policies not
only trampled upon tribal sovereignty and integrity but also may have weakened the argument in defense
of the constitutionality of benefits to tribal members by effectively limiting tribal membership to those who
were racially "Indian." Cf infra note 145.
This point arguably adds equitable force to the Court's conclusion in Mancari; that decision's
emphasis on the political status of tribes can be seen as downplaying the very racial element that the
government helped to create. For a discussion of a somewhat analogous equitable argument involving the
federal government's historical treatment of Native Hawaiians, see infra notes 194-200 and accompanying
text.
145. Professor David Williams has strongly criticized Mancari's suggestion that the addition of a
political classification (tribal membership) to a racial classification (being an American Indian) renders the
entire classification political, and not racial. See Williams, supra note 42, at 798-807. Williams contends
that the definition at issue in Mancari is racial, just like other categories defined both by race and a
nonsuspect classification, such as left-handed African Americans or Latino government employees. See id.
at 807. Williams does not actually contend that Mancari should be overruled, however, and, more
importantly, the Supreme Court has not done so; for purposes of the current constitutional status of Native
Hawaiians, Mancari's reasoning still provides the framework.
146. This, in fact, was the argument put forward by Professor Jon Van Dyke (who has served as
counsel to OHA) in defense of the constitutionality of OHA. See Van Dyke, supra note 19. Professor Van
Dyke noted the political/racial distinction but argued that the definition of Native Hawaiian was political:
[he United States does not grant any special privileges to or have a trust relationship with
Canadian, Mexican, or Guatemalan Indians residing in the United States, even though they are
members of the same "race" as American Indians. Similarly, the preference involved in OHA
does not extend to native Hawaiians not residing in Hawaii, nor does it apply to other
Polynesians in Hawaii, such as Tongans and Samoans, who are members of the same "race"
as Hawaiians but who do not fit the "political" classification of being descendants of persons
who resided here prior to 1778.
The preferences granted to persons native to areas that now constitute the United States
are therefore, political in the sense that they arise out of a specific set of political and historical
relationships and are not an attempt to elevate one race over another solely for racial reasons.
I. at 75-76 (footnotes omitted). Holding aside the questionable characterization of an ancestry-based
limitation as political, Van Dyke's analogy fails because, under Mancari, not only are Canadian Indians
outside the special relationship, but so too are American Indians who are not members of tribes.
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definition's racial character, much less that such an alternative political element
could create a special relationship and give rise to rational basis review.
Moreover, the argument based on a shared history of subjugation ignores
Mancari's explicit distinction between preferences for Indians "as a discrete
racial group" and Indians "as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities." '
Presumably, every descendant of an American Indian shares a history of
subjugation and dispossession (as, arguably, all descendants of pre- 1778
Hawaiian inhabitants do), yet the Court did not intimate that this history
rendered a classification of all American Indians political, and in fact it
indicated otherwise. 4 ' The key, under Mancari, is that only some American
Indians are members of tribes, and only legislation limited to them is
considered under rational basis review.
One other point bears mention: Even if the presence of a nonsuspect
political criterion could cleanse a racial classification under Mancari, the
addition of the element of descent from a particular group of people seems
insufficient to transform the definition of Native Hawaiian into a nonsuspect
classification. Rather than adding an element that is ordinarily nonsuspect
(such as representation by a particular government or voluntary membership
in an organization), the definition of Native Hawaiian adds an element that is
ordinarily suspect: ancestry. 4 9 It is hard to understand how the introduction
of a requirement of descendance renders the definition of Native Hawaiian
nonsuspect, any more than introducing a religious or alienage criterion
would. 50 Simply stated, it is not clear that there is any distinction, for
purposes of the level of scrutiny, between a hypothetical classification of "the
races who . . ." and the actual classification of Native Hawaiians based on
having the "blood of the races . . .. "'5
147. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554; see also i&. at 553 & n.24.
148. See supra notes 121, 130-31 and accompanying text.
149. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 646 (1948); Hernandez v. Texas. 347 U.S. 475. 479
(1954); see also Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604. 613 n.5 (1987).
150. The Court reached a similar conclusion in Hoohul v. An)'oshi. 631 F Supp. 1153 (D. Haw.
1986). In that case, "native Hawaiians" (that is, those with 50% or more native blood) challenged the
inclusion of "Hawaiians" (those with any native blood) in the statute creating the Office of Hawaiian
Affairs. See id. at 1154-56; see also HAW. CONST. art. XII. § 6 (providing that OHA shall exercise its
authority to benefit "native Hawaiians and Hawaiians"); HAw. REv. STAT. A.4,N. § 10-2 (Michie 1995)
(defining "native Hawaiian" and "Hawaiian" for purposes of OHA). As the district court repeatedly noted.
neither party challenged the constitutionality of OHA or of preferences for Native Hawaiians per se; rather,
their dispute was whether the benefits should be given only to "native Hawaiians" or could also include
"Hawaiians." See Hoohuli, 631 F. Supp. at 1159. The plaintiffs argued that the definition of "Hawaiian"
was racial, but that the definition of "native Hawaiian" was not. The court noted that. in furtherance of this
argument, the plaintiffs
asserted that although the definition of "native Hawaiian" also (i.e.. like the definition of
"Hawaiian"] used the term "races," it was not subject to strict scrutiny because it was in fact
based on aboriginal lineage and not race. This court finds that if there is a distinction, it is
without a difference.
Id. at 1159 n.23.
151. HHCA § 201(a)(7). The definition of "Native Hawaiian." then, would stand on no different
footing than one that applied to African Americans, but only those descended from slaves; or one that
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C. Native Hawaiians Are an Indian Tribe or Tribes
Perhaps the most obvious argument is simply that Native Hawaiians
constitute a tribe or tribes and thus are squarely within the core holding of
Mancari, so the failure of the arguments delineated above is of no
consequence.152 This proposition may seem attractive at first glance, but it
appears to be untenable.
One difficulty is that it is not compatible with the language of statutes
singling out Native Hawaiians, which refer simply to Native Hawaiians (rather
than to members of the Native Hawaiian tribe or tribe-like group)., 53 All of
the other arguments discussed in this Article are compatible with the statutory
language, in that they assert either that the breadth of the definition of Native
Hawaiian is unproblematic because Mancari does not limit rational basis
applied to only those Chinese who descended from people who arrived as underpaid laborers. In such a
circumstance, it seems highly unlikely that a court would find that the addition of a nonracial criterion to
an explicitly racial definition would thereby cure the definition of its racial character and render the entire
classification nonsuspect for equal protection purposes. The limitation might help to demonstrate that the
group was neither under- nor overinclusive and that the legislation, therefore, was narrowly tailored, but
that would apply, of course, only after a court had determined the appropriate level of scrutiny and was
applying that scrutiny to the legislation. Many of the classic cases of suspect classifications have involved
definitions that could be construed as having political elements as well (e.g., African Americans who
certified that they suffered economic disadvantages in Adarand), and yet the Supreme Court had no
difficulty concluding that, in light of the limitation to members of a particular race, further limitations
within that race did not render the classification nonsuspect. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115
S. Ct. 2097, 2103 (1995); see also id. at 2121 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that government
had-unsuccessfully-attempted to avoid strict scrutiny in Adarand by relying on fact that not all members
of preferred minority groups were eligible for statutory preference); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944) (treating classification of persons of Japanese descent who resided on West Coast as racial);
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (holding "political" redefinition of municipal boundaries with
clear racial intent is not immune from judicial review).
Admittedly, there is one significant Supreme Court case (other than Mancari) in which the Court has
found that a suspect classification could be rendered nonsuspect by the addition of a nonpolitical criterion:
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). In that case (which was, perhaps not coincidentally, decided the
same day as Mancari), the Court found that pregnancy discrimination is not gender discrimination because
"[ihe program divides potential recipients into two groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant persons.
While the first group is exclusively female, the second includes members of both sexes." Id. at 496-97
n.20. Many commentators have severely criticized the suggestion that the classification was not suspect.
See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITIONAL LAW § 16-29, at 1578 (2d ed. 1988)
(Geduldig's reasoning "approach[es] the farcical"); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution,
132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 983 (1984) ("Criticizing Geduldig has since become a cottage industry."); see also
Newton, supra note 28, at 285 (comparing Mancari and Geduldig and criticizing both cases: "The premise
of Mancari's tribal status argument (as well as the premise of Geduldig's pregnancy status argument) is
faulty and should not stand unchallenged."). More importantly, the Court has never applied in any other
situation Geduldig's suggestion that a suspect classification could be rendered nonsuspect by the addition
of a separate, nonsuspect criterion. This, combined with the Court's vigilance in treating statutes that
contain a racial element as suspect-even if other elements also are present-indicates that the Court would
apply strict scrutiny to a racial classification that also had nonsuspect criteria attached.
152. The question whether a group is an "Indian Tribe[]" for constitutional purposes (irrespective of
whether it has been formally recognized by the federal government) is sometimes described as an inquiry
as to whether a group is an ethnological or legal tribe (as opposed to a recognized one). See, e.g., Eric
Smith & Mary Kancewick, The Tribal Status of Alaska Natives, 61 U. COLO. L. REv. 455, 471-82 (1990);
L.R. Weatherhead, What is an "Indian Tribe"?-The Question of Tribal Existence, 8 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
1, 8-9 (1980).
153. See supra notes 96-97.
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review to tribes (Sections A and B above); or that Native Hawaiians, though
not technically constituting a tribe, should be construed as constituting a tribe
en masse because of their history or treatment by Congress (Sections D and
E below). This assertion, however, is different. It concedes that the special
relationship is limited to tribes and that strict scrutiny otherwise applies, and
it does not seek to have the entire population of Native Hawaiians treated as
if they were a tribe because of their history; rather, it contends that they
currently are a tribe.
The problem is that, assuming that Native Hawaiians do currently
constitute a tribe, there would still be constitutional problems with the current
statutory framework; the statutes benefit Native Hawaiians (defined by
ancestry), not the Native Hawaiian tribe or members of the Native Hawaiian
tribe.'- 4 There are not even any regulations that could be construed as
defining Native Hawaiians as members of the Native Hawaiian tribe, as was
the case in Mancari. In other words, this argument fails in the first instance
because its success in bringing Native Hawaiians within the special
relationship depends on a mode of distribution of benefits-namely, through
tribes-that does not currently exist.1 55
154. One seeming counterargument to this point is that the definition of Nat'.c flassailan is no more
incompatible with Native Hawaiians constituting a inbe or tnbcs than a statute simpl) benefiting -the
Navajo" would be; the statute benefiting "the Navajo" would be interpreted as applying only to members
of the Navajo tribe, just as statutes benefiting Native Hawaiians ssould be limited to members of the Native
Hawaiian tribe or tribes. The problem with this argument is that the programs for Natisc Hassatians do not
refer simply to "Native Hawaiians," without more: They define "Native Hawaiians" as the descendants of
the races who occupied Hawaii before 1778. See supra notes 96-97. Thus the definitions are not analogous
to one referring to "the Navajo."
Moreover, a truly analogous statute for the Navajo would appear to be a racial, not a political.
classification under Mancari. If our hypothetical statute defined "the Navajo" as "the descendants of the
members of the Navajo tribe before their contact with Westemers." it would be difficult to characterize it
as a political classification. Some members of the benefited class might not ha%e any connection to the
current Navajo nation. The only required commonality would be in their ancestr)
It might seem possible to avoid the conclusion that this would be a racial classification by arguing
that a tribal entity could define its members as all descendants of the onginal members and no one else.
and could refuse to recognize renunciations. Under these circumstances, the categor) of all descendants
would be coterminous with the membership of the ribe. arguably rendenng the definition political. The
hypothetical "tribe" so defined, however, would not be a political entity at all. so it is hard to understand
how it could be fairly characterized as a political classification. As was noted above, the basis of Mancan's
distinction between racial and tribal classifications was that the latter were grounded in tibes' semi-
sovereign status and their existence as cognizable entities. See supra notes 38-42. 117-18 and
accompanying text. If a tribe were defined to include all Indians of a certain lineage. '.ithout any
suggestion of any other connection, it would presumably run afoul of this distinction
155. It bears mentioning that a potential difficulty anses from the fact that statutes for Native
Hawaiians utilize two different definitions of Native Hawatians: Some apply to all descendants of pre- 1778
inhabitants, and others are limited to those with 50% or more natise blood This rises a possible problem
for the argument that Native Hawaiians currently constitute a tibe, because it means that either the former
set of statutes are overinclusive or the latter set are undennclusive. That is. if the Native Hawaian trbe
includes only those with 50% or more Native blood, then programs (like OHA) that benefit all descendants
(not merely those with a 50% blood quantum) would still be racial, rather than political, because they
would not be limited to members of the tribe; and, if the Native Hawaiian ribe includes all descendants.
the programs limited to those with 50% or more native blood (like the HHCA) would hase grafted a racial
classification onto the political classification of membership in tinbe. In such a case, the addition of the
50% threshold would undercut the political argument based on tibal status. The existence (and seriousness)
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In addition to this problem of statutory incompatibility, there is a practical
problem with the argument that Native Hawaiians constitute one large Indian
tribe: Native Hawaiians are not organized into any entity that can reasonably
be called a tribe. 5 6 This raises the initial question of what attributes an
Indian group must possess in order to qualify as a tribe. t5 7 One possible
of this problem is not clear, however, for a simple reason: Though the logic of Mancari would seem to
suggest that assisting only the segment of a tribe with a particular blood quantum would constitute treating
that segment as a racial group, not as a tribal (or political) one, the regulation upon which the Court relied
gave a hiring preference only to those people who were members of federally recognized Indian tribes and
had 25% Indian blood. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974). The Court in Mancarl
ignored the second part of this requirement, and it has never directly addressed the constitutionality of a
blood quantum minimum in addition to a requirement of membership in a federally recognized tribe.
Mancari's silence may suggest, however, that it concluded that the addition of a blood quantum
requirement does not raise constitutional concerns.
156. It should be noted that the one other article that directly focused on the question of the tribal
status of Native Hawaiians reached a different conclusion. See Houghton, supra note 19. In that piece, the
author, after noting that "Congress may not apply its powers over Indians to a particular group or
community by arbitrarily calling them a tribe," applied five "considerations" from Felix Cohen's Handbook
of Federal Indian Law in arguing that Native Hawaiians were entitled to tribal status:
"(1) whether the group has had treaty relations with the United States; (2) whether the group
has been denominated a tribe by act of Congress or Executive order; (3) whether the group has
been treated as having collective rights in tribal lands or funds, even though not expressly
denominated a tribe; (4) whether the group has been treated as a tribe or band by other Indian
tribes; and (5) whether the group has exercised political authority over its members, through a
tribal council or other governmental forms."
Houghton, supra note 19, at 13-14 (quoting COHEN, supra note 41, at 271).
Houghton's analysis suffers from several flaws, however (in addition to the more general problems
with this line of argument discussed in the text). First, Cohen's book did not suggest that this list of five
considerations determined whether a group was a tribe or not for constitutional purposes. Rather, it merely
noted that the BIA and the Department of the Interior had utilized these criteria, among others, in
determining whether or not a given group was a "tribe" for purposes of the IRA, 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1994).
See COHEN, supra note 41, at 270-71. Cohen's five criteria are particularly inapposite in light of newer
BIA regulations-which include many more than the five criteria-that supersede the considerations listed
in Cohen's book. See infra notes 158-60 and accompanying text. Second, Native Hawaiians do not appear
to meet these five criteria. The fifth requirement is that the group "has exercised political authority over
its members." Apparently, this is not merely a requirement that the group exercised such authority in the
past, but also that it continue to do so (because otherwise the criteria would include former tribes). Cohen
himself indicated as much in his opinions for the Department of Interior on recognition of tribal groups.
For instance, a 1938 opinion rejected the Oklahoma Miami and Peoria Indians' application for tribal status,
stating:
It is not enough that the ethnographic history of the two groups shows them in the past to have
been distinct and well-recognized tribes or bands. A particular tribe or band may well pass out
of existence as such in the course of time .... There must be a currently existing group distinct
and functioning as a group ....
I OPINIONS OF THE SOLICITOR, supra note 115, at 864 (Opinion of Dec. 13, 1938); see also id. at 725
(Opinion of Feb. 8, 1937) ("While the St. Croix Indians ... might have been recognized as a separate band
at the time of the 1854 treaty, they now present no characteristics entitling them to recognition as a band,
particularly as there exists no form of band organization."). The problem, as will be discussed below, is
that there is no Native Hawaiian entity that serves this function. See infra notes 168-73 and accompanying
text.
157. Some commentators have suggested that such a question is problematic, both because indigenous
groups should define themselves (rather than having a definition imposed from the outside by others) and
because the organizational arrangements of indigenous peoples are too multifarious to admit of a single,
useful definition. See Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, Translating Yonnondio by Precedent and Evidence:
The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DuKE LJ. 625, 655-59 (discussing importance of self-definition);
Weatherhead, supra note 152, at 5-6 (discussing multiplicity of socio-political arrangements). The problem
here is that the Indian Commerce Clause of the Constitution refers to "Indian Tribes," and the Court has
treated that provision as empowering Congress to take action with respect to "Indian Tribes" that, if taken
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answer is the criteria laid out in the BIA regulations on recognition of Indian
tribes.'5s These criteria set a fairly high threshold, including requirements
that the group "has maintained political influence or authority over its members
as an autonomous entity from historical times until the present," and that "[a]
predominant portion of the petitioning group comprises a distinct community
and has existed as a community from historical times until the present." 59
It may be objected, however, that these criteria define the groups that the
federal government is willing to recognize, not necessarily those that it has the
authority to recognize. This point has some merit; it is not clear that the
Supreme Court, faced with the question of what can constitute a tribe, would
rely on the current BIA regulations. 6t It is also possible that the Court
would look to the definition of "tribe" it propounded in Montoya v. United
States'r'-the most-cited and most-quoted definition of "tribe," and the only
one the Court has put forward in the last hundred years. 62 Montoya stated
that "[b]y a 'tribe' we understand a body of Indians of the same or a similar
race, united in a community under one leadership or government, and
inhabiting a particular though sometimes ill-defined territory." ' 63 It should
be noted that the Court did not state that these were the constitutional minima
for an Indian tribe; it has never confronted this constitutional question. In
for a racial or ethnic group, would be unconstitutional. Under these circumstances, the courts and Congress
will need to utilize some definition of "'Indian Tribes." as that term is used in the Indian Commerce Clause.
to determine whether a given law violates equal protection. Whether that definition allows for one or many
kinds of tribes, and whether it is proposed by indigenous groups themselves or by the federal government.
the definition itself must exist in order to allow for the assessment of programs under present case law
(specifically, Mancari and Adarand).
158. See 25 C.F.R. § 83 (1996).
159. Id. §§ 83.7(b)-(c). These criteria do not, by their terms, apply to Native Hawaians. because their
application is limited to "American Indian groups indigenous to the continental United States " Id
§ 83.3(a).
160. It is worth noting, though, that the Ninth Circuit, in determining whether a Natise Hawaiian
group was an "Indian tribe or band with a governing body duly recognized by the Secretary of the
Interior," 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1994). applied the criteria from the BIA regulations. See Price v Hawaii. 764
F.2d 623, 627 (9th Cir. 1985). Similarly, the Second Circuit decided to defer to the BIAs ongoing
recognition process, rather than attempt to determine on its own whether a putat'e trbe should be treated
as an Indian tribe. See Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. \Vcicker, 39 F.3d 51. 60 (2d Cir 1994)
("[T]he creation in 1978 of the acknowledgment process currently set forth in 25 C.FR Part 83-a
comprehensive set of regulations, the BIA's experience and expertise in implementing these regulations.
and the flexibility of the procedures weigh heavily in favor of a court's giving deference to the BIA.").
161. 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901).
162. See, e.g., Smith & Kancewick, supra note 152, at 473-74 ("(l1n Montoya the Supreme Court
established a practical legal definition for the ethnological 'tribe* . . .. Thus, insofar as federal Indian law
is concerned, the existence of an historical-an ethnological--tribe should be determined by reference to
the Montoya definition."); see also infra notes 166-68 (citing cases and articles that rely on Montoya).
The main pre-Montoya case on the criteria for status as a tribe was United States v Forty-Three
Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188 (1876). which adopted a similar definition. See infra note 165.
163. Montoya, 180 U.S. at 266; see also Forty-Three Gallons of Whuskey. 93 U.S. at 195 ("As long
as [the Red Lake and Pembina Chippewa] Indians remain a distinct people, with an existing ibal
organization, recognized by the political department of the government. Congress has the power to say with
whom, and on what terms, they shall deal .... ").
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Montoya the Court was construing the word "tribe" from a statute,164 so the
Court's definition may have been merely descriptive of current tribes (or
current conceptions of tribes), rather than prescriptive, or the statutory
definition may otherwise have differed from the constitutional one. On the
other hand, there was no suggestion that it was relying on congressional intent,
or that it was backward-looking; the Court appeared to be propounding a
definition that would determine, in future cases, whether a group could be
called a "tribe" or not. Although it did not suggest that the statutory definition
was identical to the constitutional one, it gave no reason to suppose that the
two would differ.165 Furthermore, the Court has utilized this definition in
interpreting other statutes containing general terms such as "any tribe of
Indians," and has treated Montoya as providing the prevailing definition of
"tribe."'' 66 Finally, both courts and commentators have regarded Montoya's
definition as setting forth the minima for tribes; that is, they have utilized this
definition in addressing whether a group qualifies as a tribe.167
Exact determination of the BIA regulations' and Montoya's status is
unnecessary, however, because in this case there is little reason to suppose that
Native Hawaiians would satisfy any definition of "Indian Tribe[]" that the
Court would likely adopt. As the BIA regulations, Montoya, and perhaps the
word itself suggest, an apparent sine qua non of a tribe is that it be a coherent
entity composed of members who have accepted its authority.'68 In fact, in
164. The relevant language (which was part of the Indian Depredation Act) referred to property "taken
or destroyed by Indians belonging to any band, tribe or nation in amity with the United States." Montoya,
180 U.S. at 264 (quoting Indian Depredation Act, ch. 538, 26 Stat. 851 (1891)). The Court first defined
"nation," "tribe," and "band" and then determined whether the group in question was "in amity with the
United States." Id. at 265-70.
165. Moreover, the Court in Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey did address the issue of Congress's
constitutional power to deal with Indian tribes, and it treated "an existing tribal organization, recognized
by the political department of the government" as a requirement. 93 U.S. at 195.
166. See, e.g., United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 442 (1926) (adopting Montoya's language
as the definition to the term "any tribe of Indians" in the Indian Nonintercourse Act); United States v.
Chavez, 290 U.S. 357, 364 (1933) (using Montoya's language in defining "Indian country").
167. For instance, in the leading case involving an American Indian group seeking to be treated as a
tribe, the district judge treated Montoya as delineating the applicable requirements, and the court of appeals
affirmed that decision. See Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 427 F. Supp. 899, 902-03 (D. Mass.
1977); see also Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee, 447 F. Supp. 940, 943 (D. Mass. 1978), aff'd sub
nom. Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (1st Cir. 1979); Native Village of Tyonek v.
Puckett, 957 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1992); Catawba Indian Tribe v. South Carolina, 718 F.2d 1291, 1298
(4th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 740 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 1984) (en bane), rev'd on other grounds, 476 U.S. 498
(1986); Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe v. Weicker, 39 F.3d 51, 59 (2d Cir. 1994); Joint Tribal Council v.
Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 377 n.8 (1st Cir. 1975); Smith & Kancewick, supra note 152, at 483-96 (citing
Montoya as authoritative); Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, Nos, F86-0075 CIV (HRH),
F87-0051 CIV (HRH), 1994 WL 730893, at *4, *12 (D. Alaska 1994); William W. Quinn, Jr., Federal
Acknowledgment of American Indian Tribes: Authority Judicial Interposition, and 25 C.ER. § 83, 17 AM.
INDIAN L. REv. 37, 44-45 (1992) (noting that Montoya has formed the judicial test for courts that have
attempted to determine tribal existence); cf. Torres & Milun, supra note 157, at 634-36 (analyzing critically
district judge's reliance on Montoya in Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee).
168. See Weatherhead, supra note 152, at 22, 23-30 (noting consensus among courts, commentators,
and BIA that group seeking status as tribe must, inter alia, "form[] a separate community" and must "have
a tribal organization with authority over its members"); Sedolvia Native Ass'n, Inc. v. Lujan, 904 F.2d
1335, 1350-51 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Unlike... Native Alaskan Villages ... (plaintiff Native village
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recent years the Court has placed great emphasis on the consent of tribal
members, positing members' consent as the basis of tribes' authority.' 69 If
the putative members of the group have not agreed to be governed under a
tribal political structure, it is hard to imagine how the group could be called
a tribe in any meaningful sense of the word.' 70 After all, any private
organization or individual can claim to govern all Native Hawaiians-or all
American Indians-but the relevant question is whether all Native Hawaiians
have accepted such governance.' 7' The problem for Native Hawaiians is that
there appears to be no Native Hawaiian group that meets this most basic
criterion. 172 There are many groups that claim to represent all Native
corporation] is not a governmental unit with a local governing board. .Because [plaintiff] is not a
governing body, it does not meet one of the basic criteria of n Indian ribe.'" (citing Montosa)); Golden
Hill Paugussett Tribe, 39 F.3d at 59 ("The Monto alCandelara definition and the BIA cntena both have
anthropological, political, geographical and cultural bases and require, at a minimum, a community with
a political structure."); United States v. Washington. 641 F.2d 1368. 1372-73 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that
group "must have maintained an organized tribal structure" in order to exercise treaty rights and concluding
that appellant groups were not tribes because "'the[ir] governments have not controlled the hves of the
members"); I OPINIONS OF THE SOLICITOR, supra note 115. at 864 (Opinion of Dec 13. 1938) ('"here
must be a currently existing group distinct and functioning as a group . -); id, at 725 (Opinion of Feb
8, 1937) (rejecting St. Croix Chippewa's application for recognition as trbe because "there exists no form
of band organization"); see also United States v. Mazune. 419 U S. 544. 557 (1975) (upholding
congressional delegation to Indian tribes because "Indian ribes are unique aggregations possessing
attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their terntory")
169. Thus, in Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990). the Court. in holding that the Salt Riser Pima-
Maricopa Indians did not have criminal jurisdiction over a nonmember Indian ""ho lived on their
reservation, relied in part on "the voluntary character of tribal membership and the concomitant right of
participation in a tribal government, the authority of which rests on consent " Id at 694. see also id
(rejecting "an extension of tribal authority over those who have not giv.en the consent of the gosered that
provides a fundamental basis for power within our constitutional system"). td at 693 (stating that ribe's
"authority comes from the consent of its members"). Of particular relesance for this Article. the Court
stated flatly that "[p]etitioner's general status as an Indian says little about his consent to the exercise of
authority over him by a particular tribe." id. at 695. See generally L. Scott Gould. The Consent Paradigm
Tribal Sovereignty at the Millenium, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 809 (1996) (diseussing Supreme Court's emphasis
on consent).
170. There is a robust debate among political philosophers oser the individual consent necessary to
render a government legitimate. The position taken in this Article is not a statement of adherence to a
particular vision of the state, but rather is a judgment about what the Supreme Court ssould tand perhaps
should) consider in the particular context of unrecognized groups seeking status as recognized Indian nbes
171. Significantly, it is not even clear what percentage of Natie Hawaiians consider themseles to
be Native Hawaiians, much less members of a Native Hawaiian ibe The 1990 U S Census asked
respondents to identify their ethnicity, and one of the options was "Hawaiian " 12 5% of respondents so
identified themselves. The State of Hawaii conducted its own tabulation of the population in 1990. hoses Cr.
and it relied not on self-identification but on the ethnic background of the respondents' parents It found
that 19% of the population was Native Hawaiian (or, in the parlance of the sur-ey, "'Hawaaan") See
OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 54. at 10. This means that about one-third of those %%ith natise
blood did not (and perhaps do not) identify themselves as Native Hawaiians. See also td at 9 ("While their
ancestors once may have been unified politically, religiously, sociallN, and culturally, contemporary [Native]
Hawaiians are highly differentiated in religion, education, occupation, politics, and esen in their claims to
Hawaiian identity." (quoting George S. Kanahele, The New Hawaiians. 29 SOC PROC-sS t,, H.%w 21. 21
(1982)); OFFICE OF HAwAIIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 54. at 24 (summanzang the Natie llasanian population
as "a rapidly growing population, predominantly young in composition, racialls mixed, gender-balanced.
urbanite, unattached, and slowly moving toward economic self-sufficiency")
172. As the Hawaiian Sovereignty Election Council has stated
Some Hawaiian organizations have developed constitutions, position papers, and master plans
for sovereignty or independence. In essence these organizations are political parties, each
earnestly advancing their own platforms. These organizations arc self.appointed The) hase not
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Hawaiians, but none that claims that all Native Hawaiians have assented to its
representation.173 The lack of such universal membership defeats the
received the consent of the Hawaiian people, as a whole, to be their government.
HAWAIIAN SOVEREIGNTY ELECTIONS COUNCIL, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 13 (1995); see also Cary
Goldberg, Native Hawaiians Vote in Ethnic Referendum, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1996, at AI0 (noting that
there are now scores of Native Hawaiian groups, and that "Native Hawaiian groups remain divided on what
sovereignty should mean, and no unifying native Hawaiian leaders have emerged").
173. Even the Native Hawaiian groups with the largest memberships claim no more than a fraction
of Native Hawaiians among their members. See, e.g., Peter Rosegg, Hawaiians Considering 4 7)pes of
Sovereignty, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Oct. 2, 1994, at B4 (identifying Ka Lahui Hawaii and State Council
of Hawaiian Homestead Associations as two biggest groups attempting to constitute Native Hawaiian tribal
entity entitled to federal recognition; noting that Ka Lahui claims 24,000 members and State Council 30,000
members); Mahealani Kamau'u & H.K. Bruss Keppeler, Sovereignty: What Will It Look Like?, HONOLULU
ADVERTISER, Oct. 24, 1993, at B I (identifying as two biggest groups attempting to set up their own
governing structure Ka Lahui Hawaii, with 18,000 members, or approximately seven percent of total Native
Hawaiian populace, and State Council of Hawaiian Homestead Associations, with 30,000 members);
Anniversary Stirs Hawaii Sovereignty Movement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1993, at A15 (identifying Ka Lahui
Hawaii as "[tihe largest of the pro-sovereignty organizations," and as claiming 14,000 members); Kekuni
Blaisdell, 'Aloha 'Aina' at Heart of Sovereignty, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Mar. 22, 1994, at B I (noting
that Ka Lahui has more than 20,000 members, both Native Hawaiians and non-Native Hawaiians, and that
'Ohana Council claims 7,000 members); Goldberg, supra note 172, at AIO (noting that many Native
Hawaiian groups range from family groups to Ka Lahui Hawaii, which claims 21,000 members); Stu
Glauberman, Third Hawaiian Group Enters Self-Determination Fight. HONOLULU ADVERTISER, July 25,
1989, at A3 (identifying Office of Hawaiian Affairs and Ka Lahui Hawaii as two main groups fighting for
Native Hawaiian self-determination, and stating that new third group, State Council of Hawaiian Homestead
Associations, includes association presidents who represent about 27,000 people; identifying Hou Hawaiians
as much smaller group); Angelo Ragaza, Trouble in Paradise, ETHNIC NEwsWATCtI, Jan. 31, 1996, at 48
(noting that Nation of Hawaii claims 10,000 members, and that Ka Lahui Hawaii claims 20,000, out of
estimated total Native Hawaiian population of at least 200,000); Hawaii's Search for Sovereignty.
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 17, 1994, at 9 (noting that State Council of Hawaiian Homestead
Associations claims 30,000 members); Stu Glauberman, Who's Who in Quest for Sovereignty Here,
HONOLULU ADVERTISER, June 13, 1992, at A2 (stating that Ka Lahui has had 12,000 enrolled members
since 1987); Burl Burlingame, Dennis 'Bumpy' Kanehele: His Actions Turned Sovereignty into More thtan
Just a Concept, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Jan. 2, 1995, at A7 (noting that 'Ohana Council changed name
to "The Provisional Government of the Independent Nation State of Hawaii," and identifying it as "a vague
confederation of approximately 7,000 sovereignty boosters"); Amicus Brief for Hou Hawaiians at 2, Hawaii
Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (No. 83-141) ("The Hou Hawaiians was founded in 1975 and
has approximately 300 members."); Appellants' Supplemental Memorandum at 10, Price v. Hawaii, 764
E2d 623 (9th Cir. 1985) (No. 84-2444) ("[1]he Hou have approximately 300 members.").
The existence of so many groups reflects divisions within the Native Hawaiian community over
whether there should be a Native Hawaiian governmental entity, and, if so, what form it should take. See
Pat Omandam, No Consensus on Sovereignty: Too Much Infighting in Hawaiian Community, 92 Percent
Say, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Aug. 25, 1995, at 8 (discussing polls showing absence of consensus
among Native Hawaiians); Christy Hoppe, Divided Destiny: Despite Factions, Many Hawaiians Support
Native Rule, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 18, 1995, at IA (noting disputes among sovereignty groups);
Ragaza, supra, at 48 (noting that sovereignty groups' inability to agree on course of action has weakened
their credibility); Kamau'u & Keppeler, supra, at BI (noting different visions of Native Hawaiians' future,
ranging from formation of independent nation to staying with status quo); Alan Matsuoka, Unity May Be
the Key to Turning the Sovereignty Dream into Reality, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Aug. 25, 1995, at AI
(noting different approaches).
Differences also arose over the advisability of the recent Native Hawaiian vote, with Ka Lahui, among
other groups, bitterly criticizing the vote as a state attempt to coopt the sovereignty movement. See Shane
Pale et al., The Ka Lahui Hawai'i Rebuttal to HSEC (visited Oct. 31, 1996)
<http://kalahui.orghsec 1O.html> [hereinafter Ka Lahui Hawai'i Rebuttal] (containing Ka Lahui's criticisms
of Native Hawaiian Vote, Hawaiian Sovereignty Election Council's (HSEC) responses, and Ka Lahui's
rebuttal to HSEC's responses); Blaisdell, supra, at BI (noting opposition to government commission
planning Native Hawaiian vote); Mahealani Kamauu, Ka Lahuis Rancor Hurts Sovereignty Movement,
HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, May 1, 1995, at AlI (criticizing tactics used by Ka Lahui in opposing Native
Hawaiian vote).
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proposition that all Native Hawaiians are members of a tribe-like organization;
after all, it seems impossible to call a group a tribe if it can assert only that it
works on behalf of all Native Hawaiians, with no affirmative act on the Native
Hawaiians' part.
It might be contended that the Office of Hawaiian Affairs and the
Hawaiian Homes Commission serve this function. 7 ' Both entities appear to
have been designed, at least in part, to further the interests of Native
Hawaiians.' 75 In addition, OHA's governing council is chosen by an
electorate that includes all Hawaiians of native descent (and only such
Hawaiians). 176 Thus OHA (and perhaps the HHC) can claim to represent all
Native Hawaiians.
This reasoning, however, does not indicate that either OHA or the HHC
can meaningfully be called a tribe. OHA and the HHC were created by the
government and operate as governmental organizations. Their structure and
functions have not been determined by Native Hawaiians, acting autonomously.
OHA and the HHC are simply entities, created by a government, that are
designed to assist a group of Native Americans-just like the BIA; they are
no more tribes than the BIA is.'77 The fact that OHA has a board that is
elected by Native Hawaiians does not change the fundamental fact that its
purposes and the means of effectuating them are determined by the state
government. 78 In addition, OHA and the HHC may assert that they represent
174. One commentator has so suggested. See Houghton. supra note 19. at 45-47 (asserting that Native
Hawaiians exercise self-government through OHA and HHC).
175. The purposes of OHA are stated in statutes, and the firt so of them are bettenng the conditions
of Native Hawaiians and Hawaiians (the latter encompassing the former) See IAW REV STAT A.N § 10.
3(1)-(2) (Michie 1995). There is no statement of purpose in the HHCA. and the federal goernment has
declined to approve the statement of purpose passed by the Hawaii legislature See supra note 67 The
purpose suggested by the HHCA's legislative history was improving the conditions of landless Native
Hawaiians. See, e.g., 1920 Hearings, supra note 63. at 129-31 (statement of Franklin Lane. Secretary of
Interior). As was noted above, however, commentators have argued that the real purpors %%as to aid
Western sugar interests and/or to prevent Asian homesteading See sutpra note 63
176. As was noted above, OHA's electorate-and its class of beneficianes-mcludes all lawaiians
who are descended from pre-1778 inhabitants, not just those %% hose native blood quantum is 50% or greater.
See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
Also, all the members of the Board of Trustees of OHA "shall be Hawaiians." HA'' CO.SST art. XII.
§ 5, (i.e., "any descendant of the aboriginal peoples inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands" in 1778. HA w REV
STAT. ANN. § 10-2 (Michie 1995)), and four of the nine members of the HHC "shall be descendants of not
less than one-fourth part of the blood of the races inhabiting the Hawaiian islands prcious to 1778."
HHCA § 202(a).
177. It would be a clear case of bootstrapping for the federal government to designate the BIA as a
semiautonomous entity, to allow all "Indians." defined racially, to vote for the board of the BIA. and then
to assert that the government had thereby brought all those Indians within the special relationship; it would
also circumvent the limitations on recognition suggested by Unted Siates v Sandoval, 231 U S. 28. 46
(1913), see infra notes 213-15 and accompanying text. and the trbe/race distinction of M1ancan That is.
if the creation of OHA were sufficient to constitute a tribe. then there would be no limitation on a state
government, or the federal government, recognizing all of the Native Americans within its boundaries and
thereby rendering Sandoval's and Mancari's limitations meaningless.
178. It should also be noted that it is not at all clear that the creation of OHA was constitutional in
the first place, as it was (and is) an organization designed solely to benefit a group based on ethmicity See
infra notes 217, 242 and accompanying text. It would, of course, be circular reasoning to argue that Native
Hawaiians are a tribe because of OHA, and that OHA is constitutional because its beneficiaries are
The Yale Law Journal
all Native Hawaiians, but, as was noted above, such assertions of authority are
not sufficient to confer tribal status on an entity; and the mere fact that all
Native Hawaiians can vote in OHA elections (and that many do) does not
mean that Native Hawaiians have united under OHA's leadership. 79 Finally,
the aforementioned blood quantum difference in the class of beneficiaries for
OHA and the HHC underscore the absence of a coherent Native Hawaiian
group that can constitute a tribe.
One seemingly possible way to avoid the problem of the absence of a
Native Hawaiian entity would be to posit a series of Native Hawaiian tribes,
rather than one mass tribe.' There is reason to doubt, though, whether any
Native Hawaiian entity would meet the constitutional minima for an "Indian
Tribe[]." The group that has made the strongest claim is probably the Hou
Hawaiians, a self-proclaimed Native Hawaiian tribe that has brought legal
challenges asserting certain rights as a tribe against the State of Hawaii. In
Price v. Hawaii,' the Hou attempted to challenge Hawaii's alleged failure
to provide for the betterment of Native Hawaiians-defined as those with fifty
percent or more native blood-as delineated in the Admission Act of
1959."' The Ninth Circuit held that the Hou could not sue as an Indian tribe
within the meaning of a jurisdictional statute, because they did not constitute
a tribe for purposes of the statute.'83 Although the court did not directly
address whether the Hou satisfied the constitutional minima for status as a
tribe, it did list several reasons for rejecting the Hou's position, including that
the Hou did not demonstrate that it exercised political authority over its
members and could not establish derivation from a longstanding historical
tribe.'" Moreover, the court's language about the Hou's connection to a
historical tribe intimated that the Hou would not satisfy any definition of a
tribe:
Although native Hawaiians in general may be able to assert a
longstanding aboriginal history, the issue before us is whether the
particular subgroup seeking recognition-the Hou Hawaiians-can
establish that they are a longstanding aboriginal sovereign rather than
members of the tribe.
179. As will be discussed below, it would be a quite different matter if Native Hawaiians created a
tribal entity-for example, by Native Hawaiians holding their own elections, creating a governmental body,
and defining its power and authority. See infra Part V.
180. It should be noted, though, that whether one posits a mass tribe or a series of tribes, the
incompatibility with the language of the statutes benefiting Native Hawaiians would remain; in either case,
the problem is that the statutes do not provide for distribution through tribes and, in fact, contain no
reference to tribal affiliation (and there are not even any regulations tying the programs to tribal
membership).
181. 764 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1985).
182. See id. at 625-26.
183. See id. at 627.
184. See id. (discussing historical continuity and longstanding tribal political authority); id. at 628
(discussing current exercise of political authority).
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a recently formed association. To allow any group of persons to
"bootstrap" themselves into formal "tribal" status--thereby obtaining
the federal economic and legal benefits attendant upon tribal
status-simply because they are all members of a larger aboriginal
ethnic body would be to ignore the concept of "tribe" as a distinct
sovereignty set apart by historical and ethnological boundaries.'
In any event, the question whether there are any Native Hawaiian tribes
is largely academic, because it seems clear that many Native Hawaiians who
are eligible to receive benefits under federal and state programs are not
members of the few organizations that could plausibly call themselves
tribes.186 As a result, even if there are Native Hawaiian tribes that could be
subject to the special relationship with the federal government, the existing
programs that benefit Native Hawaiians would nonetheless exceed the scope
of that relationship because they apply to all Native Hawaiians, not merely to
those who are members of tribes. In this way, the programs for Native
Hawaiians would be analogous to programs (like that at issue in Adarand)
benefiting all American Indians, defined racially, which would not be within
the special relationship and would be subject to strict scrutiny.' 7
D. The History and Treatment of Native Hawaiians Entitles Them to the
Constitutional Status of Indian Tribes
A different line of reasoning would concede that Native Hawaiians do not
constitute a tribe per se but would argue that, in light of their history and
treatment, they should be construed to be a tribe for constitutional purposes;
put somewhat differently, that because of Native Hawaiians' experiences-and
in particular the similarity between their treatment and that of Indian
tribes-Native Hawaiians are entitled to the same constitutional status that
Indian tribes have.
1. The Histories of Native Hawaiians and Indian Tribes Are Similar in
Constitutionally Dispositive Ways, so They Should Have the Same
Legal Status
One way of formulating this argument would be to assert that the history
and experience of Native Hawaiians and Indian tribes are constitutionally
185. Id
186. See supra note 173.
187. See supra Section III.A. A court could try to save the Native Hawaiian programs by reading the
statutes in conjunction with regulations limiting the benefits to members of trbes. as the Supreme Court
did in Mancari. The obvious problem with such an approach is that no such limiting regulations exist.
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analogous, and thus their constitutional status should be the same as well.188
The argument would be that in every constitutionally relevant respect, the
histories of Indian tribes and Native Hawaiians are essentially identical, so that
it would be inappropriate for a court to analyze statutes benefiting Indian tribes
differently from those benefiting Native Hawaiians. 89
There are, indeed, similarities between the history of Indian tribes and that
of Native Hawaiians. The federal government signed treaties with Indian tribes,
frequently dispossessed them of their land, and sometimes subverted their
leaders. Similarly, the United States signed treaties with the kingdom of
Hawaii, and the actions of Westerners generally-and the United States
specifically-arguably had the effect of subverting Hawaiian traditional leaders
(in particular, the monarch) and transferring ownership of lands from the
monarch to the United States. 90
The problem with the suggestion that the history of Native Hawaiians and
Indian tribes is similar in constitutionally dispositive ways is that the two
groups differ in a crucial respect: American Indians remained in political
organizations, but Native Hawaiians did not. That is, unlike American Indian
tribes, Native Hawaiians generally did not remain in self-contained groups. The
188. This argument could be construed as implicating equal protection: Indian tribes and Native
Hawaiians are similarly situated, so the government (in this case, interestingly, through its courts) would
have no rational basis for applying a different constitutional standard to a program benefiting Native
Hawaiians than to one benefiting Indian tribes.
189. The findings of many of the federal statutes singling out Native Hawaiians rely heavily on the
history of Native Hawaiians, implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) suggesting a similarity to the history of
Indian tribes. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 7902 (1994) (containing 12 findings about history of Kingdom of
Hawaii and federal government's relations with Hawaii); Joint Resolution of Nov. 22, 1923, Pub. L. No.
103-150, 107 Stat. 1510 (1993).
190. On the significance of the United States's actions, see infra Subsection III.D.2. Some
commentators have suggested that the Hawaiian Constitution of 1840 and instruments signed by
Kamehameha III in 1848 indicate that the Crown and Government lands were owned for the benefit of "the
chiefs and people." See MELODY KAPILIALOHA MACKENZIE, NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK 5-9
(1991); Karen N. Blondin, A Case for Reparations for Native Hawaiians, 16 HAW. BAR J. 13, 29 (1981).
The meaning of the quoted phrase is not entirely clear: the "people" may not have been limited to Native
Hawaiians, and one commentator has noted that "[b]oth Kamehameha III and the legislature used the phrase
'chiefs and people' as legally interchangeable with 'the Hawaiian Government."' Hanifin, supra note 58,
at 117. In addition, the 1840 Constitution was repealed in 1852, and the subsequent Hawaiian constitutions
(the last of which before the overthrow was the "Bayonet Constitution" of 1887) did not suggest that tite
Crown or Government lands were for the people. See id. at 116. Moreover, the Hawaii Supreme Court held
that the 1848 instruments provided for ownership in the Crown and the Government, respectively, not in
the people. See In re Estate of His Majesty Kamehameha IV, 2 Haw. 715, 725-26 (1964); McPherson,
supra note 19, at 459. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it may be that Native Hawaiians had certain
traditional rights (such as gathering rights) in some Crown and Government lands as of 1893. Cf. Public
Access Shoreline Hawaii v. Hawai'i County Planning Comm'n, 903 P.2d 1246, 1271-72 (Haw. 1995)
(noting possibility of retention of traditional rights by some Native Hawaiians). No court or commentator
appears to have alleged, however, that such traditional rights included the fight to exclusive use and
possession of the land-a right that is essential to any claim of ownership. See 'Ohana v. United States,
76 F.3d 280, 282 (9th Cir. 1996). Furthermore, insofar as Native Hawaiians had traditional rights in some
of the land, it is not clear that the events of 1893 and 1898 limited them. Cf. Pele Defense Fund v. Paty,
837 P.2d 1247, 1272 (Haw. 1992) (noting possibility of survival of traditional gathering rights in ceded
lands). Nonetheless, the possibility that the United States's actions eliminated some rights that Native
Hawaiians had in Crown and/or Government lands arguably provides some support for the historical
analogy to dispossession of Indians' lands.
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monarch's role as central authority of Hawaii was supplanted by the United
States beginning in 1898.
The federal government made treaties with Indian tribes that generally left
the tribal governing structure intact, even though the government limited the
tribes' power and land base. In implementing its policy of assimilation of
Indians and allotment of native lands during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, the United States frequently weakened tribal structures and
undermined tribal leadership (e.g., by subverting traditional leaders who did
not support the federal government's plans). These pressures led to changes in
Indians' organization-for instance, the deterioration of subtribal political
entities-but political organizations continued to exist, including within them
almost all Indians.' 9' And, though a continuation of the government's
assimilation and allotment policies might have eventually destroyed all tribal
organizations, Congress's passage of the IRA in 1934 instead led to the
strengthening of many tribal organizations by ending allotment and restoring
tribal lands and autonomy.
9 2
Events worked out differently in Hawaii. The uniting of the Hawaiian
islands under Kamehameha in 1810 meant that the replacement of the
Hawaiian monarch with the United States government would, ipsofacto, affect
the governing structure of Native Hawaiians. Indeed, there was no domestic
government for Native Hawaiians after the American annexation; the Queen
had been overthrown, and no indigenous governmental entity replaced her. The
new governing structure led by Americans totally displaced the Hawaiian
regime, and no remnant of the latter remained."' 3 The comparable event for
American Indians would have occurred if the United States government had
forced the abdication of their tribal leaders and then had taken over the tribes
for itself. Instead, in the continental United States the federal government could
leave tribes in place and still control the lion's share of the land-because the
United States controlled the area around a tribe's territory (i.e., the area outside
of the small land areas allotted to a particular tribe). The United States's
approach in Hawaii was different: It supplanted the monarch. If the United
States government had left the Queen with authority over some of the land of
Hawaii (and over Native Hawaiians), her position might have been roughly
analogous to that of tribal leaders on the mainland. The Queen lost all her
power, however, and the United States assumed control over all the land of
Hawaii.
191. See CORNELL, supra note 41. at 72-84. 101-05 (1988). See generally CoIiE.. supra note 2. at
62-150 (discussing Indian treaties and legislation, and scope of tnbal self-government).
192. See IRA, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934); 2 FRANCIS P. PRUCIIA. THE GREAT FAniER TIE UNrrED
STATES GOvERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 954-68 (1984).
193. In addition, whereas the IRA had fostered the solidification of tubal structures, the HHCA. in
leasing land directly to individuals, provided no incentives for the formation of tribes For a discussion of
the potential significance of this aspect of the HHCA, see infra note 276.
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2. Native Hawaiians' and Indian Tribes' Histories Differ Only Because
of Federal Government Actions, and Those Actions Should Have No
Effect on Native Hawaiians' Constitutional Status
The discussion above suggests a slightly different formulation of the
argument about the similarity of the history of Native Hawaiians and Indian
tribes: Native Hawaiians might not currently constitute a tribe, and their history
since 1893 might differ from that of Indian tribes, but Native Hawaiians
collectively constituted a tribe before 1893, and the federal government's
actions in assisting in the destruction of their tribal government (in this case,
the Hawaiian kingdom) should not deprive them of their tribal status. That is,
Native Hawaiians might argue that the only difference between their
experience and that of Indian tribes was that the United States destroyed their
government completely; and, they might contend (with considerable equitable
force), the United States should not profit from that destruction.19' The
proper remedy, under this theory, would be a finding that a special relationship
exists, on the rationale that, where the government ends a tribe's existence, the
remaining people should be treated as if they still constituted a functioning
entity.
One difficulty with this argument flows from the very characteristic that
gives it equitable punch-its focus on the actions of the United States. It seems
fair to hold the United States responsible not only for the 1898 annexation that
ended the Western-dominated post-1893 Republic, but also, at least in part, for
the 1893 overthrow of Queen Lili'uokalani. After all, the landing of troops by
the United States Minister appears to have precipitated the Queen's overthrow;
and, although the Minister lacked presidential authority, his position, apparent
authority, and access to men and materiel are attributable to the United
States.' 95 The problem is that what was destroyed in 1893 was not a polity
194. It also might be argued that failing to recognize a special relationship with Native Hawaiians
would create a pernicious incentive system: If the United States completely destroys the governing
structures of an indigenous group, it owes nothing to them; but if it leaves some remnants of the
government intact, it must accord that government special status and give it benefits.
This argument, however, misses the mark in two ways. First, the issue addressed in this Article is not
whether the government "owes" Native Hawaiians anything; the issue is whether, when the government
chooses to assist Native Hawaiians (as I believe it should), its actions are subject to strict scrutiny or
rational basis review. Concluding that strict scrutiny applies does not mean that the government therefore
"owes" nothing to Native Hawaiians. Second, the existence of a special relationship will allow the federal
government to single out Native Hawaiians in all kinds of ways, many of which may be detrimental to
Native Hawaiians. See supra note 30; infra text accompanying note 201. The special relationship, then, is
not some sort of benefit that is being withheld from Native Hawaiians.
195. In fact, in 1993 Congress passed a joint resolution "apologiz[ing] to Native Hawaiians on behalf
of the people of the United States for the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii on January 17, 1893 with
the participation of agents and citizens of the United States." Joint Resolution of Nov. 22, 1993, Pub. L.
No. 103-150, § 1, 107 Stat. 1510, 1513. The resolution does not actually acknowledge direct federal
responsibility for the overthrow, but it can be read as accepting some responsibility for the actions of the
United States Minister and other Americans.
The joint resolution consists of a lengthy preamble and a few operative provisions. Though these
operative provisions are extremely limited and appear to create no rights, the apology is a part of those
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Native Hawaiians
composed solely of descendants of pre-1778 inhabitants of the Hawaiian
islands: A majority of the inhabitants were Asians and Westerners who arrived
in the nineteenth century. In fact, many of these non-Native Hawaiian
inhabitants were citizens of Hawaii, and a good number were born there.
t9
The Hawaiian monarch was a Native Hawaiian, but, as was noted above, after
1887 the monarch had very little power; Westerners were in control."' By
the time the United States Minister landed troops in 1893, Hawaii had already
been transformed from an indigenous native government presiding over pre-
1778 arrivals to a multiethnic oligarchy presiding over a heterogeneous
population.'9 The point is not that a gradual destruction of a native group's
sovereignty is different, for special relationship purposes, from a more sudden
conquest; rather, the point is simply that most of the steps in the destruction
process predated the United States's interference. Thus, it may not be fair to
characterize the United States's actions as destroying the sovereignty of a tribe
composed only of Native Hawaiians;199 and, if not, then the argument based
on the United States's actions (as opposed to those of Westerners more
generally) does not support the recognition of a special relationship with pre-
1778 inhabitants. Simply stated, it is not clear that the United States destroyed
the equivalent of a Native Hawaiian tribe.2°
A more fundamental defect in the argument that Native Hawaiians have
the same constitutional status as Indian tribes because of the United States's
actions is that it misconstrues the constitutional inquiry. The question is
whether there is a special relationship between the United States and an
"Indian Tribe[]" in the constitutional sense (i.e., under the Indian Commerce
Clause). This requires an existing entity comprising the Native Hawaiian
operative provisions (not just the preamble); as a result, it arguably provides support for the proposition
that the United States bears some responsibility for the 1893 overthrow.
196. See supra text accompanying note 54.
197. In fact, as a major treatise notes, "[b]y the time of annexation. Natase Hawaiians had been
deprived of their original sovereignty for many years. [so] annecxation did not radically alter the condition
of their lives." COHEN, supra note 2, at 801.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 49-55.
199. This is not to say that the federal government's actions did not harm Nauve Hawaiians; they often
did, just as the federal government inflicted harms on African Americans and, for that matter, on Asians
in Hawaii. In fact, as to the latter, not only did the United States deny the franchise to Asians (while
allowing Native Hawaiians to vote), but one of the articulated impetuses for the 1900 Organic Act for the
Territory of Hawaii, ch. 339, 31 Stat. 141, was to extend to Hawaii strict limits on the immigration of
Asians. See H.R. REP. No. 56-305, at 5 (1900); see also supra note 62 and accompanying text. note 63.
As the example of African Americans reveals, however, the government's pnor infliction of harms does
not render current benefits to the descendants of the harmed group nonsuspect.
200. This is not to suggest, of course, that the United States has no culpability for the destruction of
the Hawaiian kingdom; it is just that the kingdom destroyed was not limited to descendants of pre-17 7 8
inhabitants. Accordingly, insofar as one might characterize the overthrown government as an "Indian
Tribef-" for constitutional purposes, the tribe so construed probably would not be limited to those
descended from pre-1778 inhabitants, and instead might include later arrivals of a variety of races. While
this does not necessarily defeat the argument that the government was a tribe, because it is conceivable that
a court would adopt a broad definition of "Indian," it does cast doubt on the argument that the United
States's actions in the 1890s provide a basis for giving benefits to a group comprising only pre-17 7 8
inhabitants.
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beneficiaries of federal and state programs that can be called an "Indian
Tribe[]." If no such entity exists, it is hard to understand how it could be part
of a relationship. Put somewhat differently, there would be no entity to "treat"
as the Indian tribe. If such an entity were to be created, the sad history of the
United States's actions-or, more broadly, Westerners' actions-might be
relevant to the question whether the newly formed Native Hawaiian entity
could be treated as the monarchy's successor for special relationship purposes.
Such a situation would be quite different, however, because there would be an
entity that the federal government could treat as an "Indian Tribe[]" that
included all Native Hawaiians.
It might seem tempting to characterize the argument slightly differently,
as involving the lost rights of Native Hawaiians. On this theory, Native
Hawaiians should not lose the rights that are associated with status as a tribe
simply because the United States destroyed their government; the United States
should grant them the rights that it should never have taken away. The
problem with this argument (in addition to the problems addressed above) is
that the question, properly understood, is not really about the government
granting or refusing to grant "rights." At its most basic level, the inquiry is
whether or not a particular relationship exists between two entities. It may be
argued that this relationship, in practice, usually confers benefits, but the
relationship does not necessarily do so, because it merely .gives the federal
government greater latitude in singling out Indian tribes. The existence of a
special relationship simply means that the government can more easily increase
or decrease Indian tribes' rights and benefits, and there is no guarantee which
will occur. The special relationship directly empowers the federal government,
not Indian tribes. Some might argue that, regardless of the foregoing, the
experience of Indian tribes reveals that the special relationship has increased
their rights and benefits. Such an argument, however, ignores the long history
of actions taken pursuant to the special relationship that seriously harmed
Indian tribes. Moreover, such harms are not limited to actions taken long ago;
in more recent years the Supreme Court has upheld, under the special
relationship, enactments that harmed, rather than benefited, tribal members. 20'
A variation on this argument would be that Native Hawaiians are akin to
a terminated Indian tribe, i.e., a tribe that the United States once recognized
but no longer does.202 The analogy is not exact, because terminated tribes
were not actually terminated (only their relationship with the federal
government was), and many tribal communities remained intact after they lost
federal recognition, whereas the Hawaiian government itself was terminated
201. See supra note 30. For a related discussion of this issue, see infra note 246.
202. As a judge and Native American law scholar has noted, "it is technically inaccurate to refer to
'terminated tribes' because it is the federal-tribal relationship and not the tribe that is terminated by statute."
WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 52 (1st ed. 1981). Terminated tribe" has become a term
of art in Native American law, however, which this Article will use merely as convenient shorthand.
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and no continuing entity remained. 3 The analogy does not advance the
argument that Native Hawaiians should be treated like current tribes, however.
In addition to the issue of the composition of the "tribe" in 1893, there is a
more basic reason: Terminated tribes are no longer subject to the special
relationship. 2°4 Thus, even if a court were to accept the analogy to terminated
tribes, it probably would not find that the special relationship extended to
Native Hawaiians absent an organized Native Hawaiian tribe. -0
There is one other possible argument based on the terminated tribe
analogy: that the statutes benefiting Native Hawaiians are analogous to the
distributions of tribal assets that occur when a tribe is terminated. The idea
would be that Native Hawaiians never received their tribal assets outright, but
instead received a bundle of benefits as a substitute. The statutes benefiting
Native Hawaiians, however, are ongoing, permanent programs; they are not
mere distributions of assets. We can construe these programs as recompense
for Native Hawaiians' subjugation and dispossession, just as we can construe
programs benefiting African Americans as recompense for slavery, but both
will be subject to strict scrutiny.206
203. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text. Even if one construed the post- 1893 Republic as
constituting a Native Hawaiian government (which would be a stretch, given that it apparently %&as
controlled by Westerners), it, too, was officially terminated: The Annexation Act of 1898 stated that the
Government of Hawaii had "cede[d] absolutely and without reserve to the United States of America all
rights of sovereignty of whatsoever kind in and over the Hawaiian Islands and their dependencies " Act
No. 55, 30 Stat. 750, 750 (1898).
204. See South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe. Inc., 476 U S 498. 505-06 (1986) (holding that.
because of termination, "the special federal services and statutory protections for Indians are no longer
applicable to the Catawba Tribe and its members"): United States v. Antelope, 430 U S 641. 647 n 7
(1977) ("'While anthropologically a Klamath Indian even after the Termination Act obviously remains an
Indian, his unique status vis-i-vis the Federal Govemment no longer exists "' (quoting United States v
Heath, 509 F.2d 16, 19 (9th Cir. 1974))); St. Cloud v. United States. 702 F Supp. 1456, 1465 (C D S D
1988) (holding that Termination Act "terminated the special relationship between St Cloud and the federal
government"); see also Lee Herold Storey, Leasing Indian lWater Off the Reservation. A Use Consistnt
With the Reservation's Purpose, 76 CAL. L. REv. 179, 204 n.141 (1988) ("'Termtnation' means that an
Indian treaty will no longer be recognized by the United States and that the trbe no longer retains special
rights as a sovereign nation."). As the Ninth Circuit stated in United States v Washington. 641 F 2d 1368
(9th Cir. 1981):
When assimilation is complete, those of the group purporting to be the tribe cannot claim tribal
rights. While it might be said that the result is unjust if the tribe has suffered front federal or
state discrimination, it is required by the communal nature of tribal rights. To saurant special
treatment, tribes must survive as distinct communities.
Id. at 1373. Congress can, of course, rerecognize a terminated tribe. just as it can newly recognize a tribe,
but such an action would still be subject to the limitation suggested by United States %, Sandoval. 231 U S
28, 46 (1913). See infra notes 213-15 and accompanying text.
205. The terminated tribe analogy may nonetheless be relevant to federal government efforts to foster
the re:.creation of a Native Hawaiian government. See infra note 265.
206. There may seem to be an additional argument based on similanties between Indian tribes and
Native Hawaiians-namely, that though Native Hawaiians may not be cohesive enough to meet the
standards applied today for status as a tribe, neither did some of the currently recognized Indian groups
when they were originally recognized. The suggestion would be that Native Hawaiians are no less cohesive
than some tribes were when they were recognized, so there is no legitimate, rational basis for depriving
Native Hawaiians of recognition.
It should be noted that this is the same attack that nonrecognized American Indian groups can make
on the current standards for recognition. It is an attack on the recognition process itself, the relevant
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This does not mean, of course, that the history of Native Hawaiians is
irrelevant, but merely that it does not create a special relationship. The history
still stands as a powerful argument for congressional action to remedy the
mistakes made by the United States and, more generally, by Westerners in
Hawaii. It is relevant, therefore, to the impetus for congressional action to
create tribal entities and, perhaps, to the existence of a compelling
governmental interest in assisting Native Hawaiians (or, more narrowly, in
assisting their creation of a Native Hawaiian tribe).2 7
indigenous group would assert that the current standards are ahistorical and therefore inappropriate (and
perhaps violate the group's right to equal protection).
Assuming that certain currently recognized tribes would not, at the time of recognition, have met
current standards for tribal status, this argument is nonetheless unavailing. Insofar as the earlier recognition
of putatively inchoate groups of American Indians would have been constitutional at the time but would
be unconstitutional now, this merely demonstrates that constitutional standards change over time. It is no
more inappropriately ahistorical to apply current, higher standards to the recognition of new Indian or
Native Hawaiian tribes than it is to apply current, higher standards to statutes singling out the members of
one race for a benefit. It may be, for example, that Congress could have constitutionally singled out African
Americans for special treatment in 1880, but that does not immunize either that preference or a similar
newly created preference today. If the federal government could be estopped from changing its legal
standards because the change would be ahistorical, separate but equal might prevail today. One could
attempt to distinguish the definition of "Indian Tribe[]" from other parts of the Constitution and argue that
the government should not alter its application of this definition. There appears to be no reason, however,
why changes in equal protection standards should not affect what the federal government can do, including
in its recognition of "Indian Tribes." Nothing in the Constitution suggests that the definition of "Indian
Tribe[]" should be hermetically sealed from the remainder of constitutional law such that changes in other
aspects of constitutional jurisprudence leave "Indian Tribe[]" unaffected,
Insofar as there may be a few Indian tribes that do not and have never met the relevant requirements
for status as a tribe but nonetheless were (and continue to be) recognized, it seems doubtful that this alters
the constitutional analysis. It may be that a group has long been subject to benefits, but that does not, of
course, mean that those benefits are therefore constitutional. It merely means that no one has yet challenged
the existence of the group in court (or courts have ignored equal protection limitations on benefits), and
that the other two branches of the federal government have been remiss in their duty to ensure that they
act constitutionally by giving benefits on a racial basis only when those benefits are narrowly tailored to
further a compelling government interest.
In this regard, it does bear mentioning that there is another possible category: Indian groups that were
inchoate at the time they were recognized but, in response to the incentives created by recognition, have
become unified over time. Such groups might not have satisfied current constitutional standards at the time
they were recognized, but may now have the requisite cohesion because the federal government's programs
for tribes encouraged such cohesion. These groups still might be subject to legal challenge, on the theory
that one of the requirements for status as an Indian tribe is continuous existence as a tribe since the creation
of the tribe hundreds of years ago. See infra Section V.B. It seems likely, however, that the tribe in
question would survive such a challenge; a court would probably conclude that, whatever the circumstances
were of its creation, they now constitute a tribe. This might, in other words, be a case in which a court
would defer to the effect of a history of recognition, because that recognition would have resulted in the
creation and stabilization of a coherent tribal community. If so, then the failure of the HHCA to foster the
creation of Native Hawaiian tribes had profound and dramatic consequences for the current legal status of
Native Hawaiians. See infra note 276.
207. See infra note 265. The complicating factor here is that the "tribe" that the United States helped
to destroy was not limited to descendants of pre-1778 inhabitants, see supra text accompanying notes
53-55; so, insofar as the federal government's compelling interest would flow from harms inflicted by the
United States (rather than those inflicted by Westerners more generally), the relevant harmed group might
not be limited to Native Hawaiians.
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E. Federal Statutes Singling Out Native Hawaiians Constructively Confer
Tribal Status
A different argument, based on the protective rather than the destructive
aspects of the United States's actions, is that federal statutes, by singling out
Native Hawaiians, have constructively conferred upon them tribal status. The
idea would be that Congress's history of treating Native Hawaiians as if they
were an Indian tribe, and giving benefits to them on that basis, effectively
means that Native Hawaiians have been recognized as a tribe. Under this
argument, courts should-and perhaps must2 0-- defer to the congressional
treatment of Native Hawaiians as an Indian tribe.
At the outset, it should be noted that the long history of federal enactments
for Native Hawaiians does not advance the argument very far, as it may
merely reveal that Congress has violated the equal protection component of the
Fifth Amendment since early in this century or that the constitutional standards
have changed over time (or both),209 Statutes are of course presumed
208. The argument, in this strongest form, would be that a court may not revtsit the quesion of
recognition where Congress has clearly spoken.
209. It is not clear, in fact, at what point the HHCA would have been considered to vtolate the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment (assuming, of course, that it does so now) This raises an
interesting and difficult question of temporality.
In 1921, when the HHCA was enacted, there would have been three major hurdles for any litigant
who wanted to challenge its constitutionality. First, it is not clear that the Supreme Court ssould hase
considered such a challenge justiciable. In Lone Wolf st Hitchcock. 187 U.S. 553 (1903. the Court
suggested that congressional decisions regarding Indians were nonjusticiable political questions, so there
was no role for the Court to play in considering them. See id. at 565. But cf Delaware Tribal Bus Comm
v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977) (rejecting Lone Wolfs suggestion that congressional decisions involving
Indian tribes are not justiciable). Second, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence did not include strict scrutiny
for measures involving racial classifications, and the Court had not begun construing the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause as having an equal protection component. See. e.g. Detroit Bank v
United States, 317 U.S. 329, 337 (1943) ("Unlike the Fourteenth Amendment. the Fifth contmans no equal
protection clause and it provides no guaranty against discriminatory legislation by Congress."): LaBelle Iron
Works v. United States, 256 U.S. 377, 392 (1921) ("Reference is made to cases decided under the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; but clearly they are not in point. The Fifth Amendment
has no equal protection clause ....") (citations omitted). The Secretary of Interior appeared to apply
correctly the jurisprudence of the day when, in 1921, he rejected the notion that the HHCA constituted
impermissible class legislation, analogizing it to legislation for the benefit of Indians or veterans See 1920
Hearings, supra note 63, at 129-31 (statement of Franklin Lane. Secretary of Intenor). He might plausibly
have included African Americans on that list as well. It was not until Korematsu v. United Stares. 323 U.S.
214 (1944), that the Supreme Court suggested that strict scrutiny was appropriate for legislation involving
racial classifications, see id. at 216, and it was not until Mancari that the Court articulated the race versus
tribe distinction, see Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553-55 (1974). Third. even if the Fifth Amendment
had been understood to prohibit the federal government from enacting legislation to benefit a racial or
ethnic group, such a prohibition probably would not have been extended to the temtory of Hawaii. As the
Attorney General of Hawaii noted in testimony before the House Committee on Terrtones in 1920. the
relevant constitutional provisions were understood not to apply to federal actions on temtones. See 1920
Hearings, supra note 63, at 162-64 (statement of Harry Irwin, Attorney General of Hawaii). The Attorney
General, in supporting the constitutionality of the HHCA, stated that "[t]he only provisions of the
Constitution of the United States which could, by any construction, affect legislation of this kind. are
section 2 of article 4 and section 1 of the fourteenth amendment." Hawaiian Homes Commission Act. 1920:
Hearings on H.R. 13500 Before the Senate Comm. on Territories. 66th Cong. 134 (1921) (statement of
Harry Irwin, Attorney General of Hawaii). Attorney General Irwin explained that the former (the Privileges
and Immunities Clause) "has no application to legislation by Congress affecting the Territories," id., and
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constitutional, but such a presumption does not become conclusive by the mere
passage of time.10
Nonetheless, on one level, the argument based on congressional action
seems plausible: Congress has great latitude in determining whether or not to
recognize a given group as an Indian tribe, and it may seem reasonable to
assert that a history of such recognition confers tribal status. One problem with
this contention is simply that Congress has not actually recognized Native
Hawaiians as a tribe. It has singled them out, but that does not confer
recognition. After all, there are a number of statutes that give benefits to all
American Indians (just as there are many statutes giving benefits to other racial
or ethnic groups), but this by no means suggests that Congress has recognized
a tribe encompassing all American Indians, much less that all American
Indians are subject to the special relationship such that programs singling them
out are subject to rational basis review. Including American Indians within the
special relationship on this basis would, in fact, ignore and undercut Mancari's
careful distinction between legislation for tribes and legislation for American
Indians as a race. As the Court pointedly noted in Mancari, the political
classification subject to the special relationship-Indian tribes-"exclude[s]
many individuals who are racially to be classified as 'Indians. ' '' 2t  If the
giving of benefits to a Native American group (in this case, American Indians)
had been sufficient to confer tribal status, the Court would not have made this
statement; that it did so state confirms that the existence of statutes singling
out a Native American group does not constructively confer recognition on that
group.2
12
that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment "operates only as a protection against State action," id. at 135.
The Supreme Court articulated a similar position in 1922, holding that, absent congressional extension of
particular rights to a territory, only "fundamental" constitutional rights applied there. See Balzac v. Porto
Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1922); see also Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 218 (1903) (holding that
provisions of Fifth and Sixth Amendments concerning grand and petit juries were not "fundamental" and
therefore not applicable in territory, absent explicit congressional action). It is far from clear that the right
to equal protection-specifically, in the context of land-would have been considered to be one of those
fundamental rights; in fact, the Ninth Circuit concluded just six years ago that the right to equal opportunity
in the acquisition of land on the Northern Marianas Islands was not fundamental, and on that basis held
that Congress acted constitutionally in restricting alienation of land to native peoples in the territory's
constitution. See Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 E2d 1450, 1459-62 (9th Cir. 1990).
Thus, although the HHCA was passed 75 years ago, the long history is not particularly significant;
during much of that time, it escaped invalidation because the prevailing view was that, even if it were
properly understood as singling out Native Hawaiians as a racial group, such an action was not justiciable
and raised no particular constitutional problems. In fact, the long history may cut against deferring to the
legislative judgment reflected in the HHCA, because it was passed at a time when Hawaii was not yet a
state and when Congress understood its obligations under the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment very differently; the changes in Supreme Court jurisprudence and Hawaii's status may suggest
that now is the time to consider the HHCA anew.
210. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (striking down longstanding congressional policy
of inserting legislative vetoes in legislation); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (striking down
longstanding federal policy of racial segregation in public schools).
211. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24.
212. Significantly, the Court in Mancari had before it a longstanding congressional enactment that
encompassed nontribal Indians: the IRA, which applied to those who were members of tribes or had 50%
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Moreover, even if Congress had recognized Native Hawaiians as a tribe
(constructively or formally), such an action would not be sufficient to confer
tribal status and thereby create a special relationship. In United States v.
Sandova,2 13 the Court, after discussing Congress's plenary power over
Indian tribes, stated, "Of course, it is not meant by this that Congress may
bring a community or body of people within the range of this power by
arbitrarily calling them an Indian tribe ...."2"4 More recently, the Court
stated that its recognition of Congress's important role "has not deterred this
Court, particularly in this day, from scrutinizing Indian legislation to determine
whether it violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.
[citing Mancari]. 'The power of Congress over Indians may be of a plenary
nature; but it is not absolute.' 21 5 Put somewhat differently, the mere fact
that Congress may proclaim a group to be a tribe, or a benefit to be nonracial,
does not make it so. If Congress decided to avoid the strictures of Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena 216 by declaring that all minority racial and ethnic
groups were Indian tribes (or perhaps instead that all Native Hawaiians who
contributed, say, more than $100 to a particular political action committee
constituted an Indian tribe), there is no reason to believe that a court would
native blood. If the existence of such an enactment (the foundational modern statute on Indians. no less)
had been sufficient to create a special relationship with the class it delineated, the Court could hae simply
deferred to its definition. In reality, of course, Mancari avoided the language of the IRA and delineated the
special relationship as applying to tribal members, rather than all those covered by the statute See id..
supra note 38.
213. 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
214. Id. at 46; see also Baker v. Carr. 369 U.S. 186. 216-17 (1962) (quoting same language from
Sandoval, then stating, "Able to discern what is 'distinctly Indian.' the courts will strike down any heedless
extension of that label. They will not stand impotent before an obvious instance of a manifestly
unauthorized exercise of power.") (citation omitted); United States v. Chavez. 290 U.S 357. 363 (1933)
(quoting same language from Sandoval); United States v. Candelana. 271 U.S. 432. 439 (1926) (same);
Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575. 582 n.3 (Ist Cir. 1979) ("Nor can Congress arbitrarily
label a group of people a tribe.").
As Christopher Ford has noted, the Court's conclusion in Sandoval underscored its unvillingness
simply to defer to Congress:
In finding that the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico could be regulated as an Indian tnbe pursuant
to the enabling legislation which authorized New Mexico's entry into the Union. the Court did
not stop upon finding a sort of de facto federal recognition resulting from the Pueblos' treatment
by the President and Congress as "dependent communities entitled to [United States) aid and
protection, like other Indian tribes." Rather, the Court undertook an independent examination
into the "Indian-ness" of the Pueblo groups: "[C]onsidenng their Indian lineage." and their
"isolated communal life, primitive customs and limited civilization, this assrtion of
guardianship over them cannot be said to be arbitrary but must be regarded as both authorized
and controlling."
Christopher A. Ford, Executive Prerogatives in Federal Indian Jurisprndence: The Constitutional Law of
Tribal Recognition, 73 DENV. U. L. REv. 141, 157 (1995) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Sandoial. 231 U S.
at 47).
215. Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm., 430 U.S. at 84 (quoting United States v Alcea Band of
Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 54 (1946)); see also United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians. 448 U.S. 371. 413
(1980) (stating that deference to Congress in tribal matters embodied in political question doctnne "has long
since been discredited in takings cases, and was expressly laid to rest in Delaware Tribal Business
Comm[itteel v. Weeks").
216. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
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conclude that Congress's declaration of tribal status had, ex proprio vigore,
rendered the group a tribe. The Court would likely show great deference to
Congress's determination of tribal status, but it would not find that the
determination alone was sufficient.
IV. IMPACT OF THE LACK OF A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP ON PROGRAMS
SINGLING OUT NATIVE HAWAIIANS
The foregoing indicates that current constitutional jurisprudence would not
include Native Hawaiians among those who are subject to the special
relationship with the federal government.27 As a result, government
programs 2 8 that single out Native Hawaiians for different treatment would
217. Interestingly, the question whether the special relationship extends to Native Hawaiians may have
limited significance for OHA-because OHA might be subject to strict scrutiny in any event. In the one
Supreme Court case in which the Court considered an equal protection challenge to a state action that
treated Indian tribes (or their members) specially, the Supreme Court stated clearly that, though "'the
unique legal status of Indian tribes under federal law' permits the Federal Government to enact legislation
singling out tribal Indians .... States do not enjoy this same unique relationship with Indians .... "
Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 500-01 (1979)
(quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 551-52) (emphasis added). Although the Court did not specify the level of
scrutiny that would apply to state programs that single out tribal Indians (because it found that the special
relationship applied in this case), the exclusion of states from the special relationship indicates that rational
basis review would not apply. The reasoning above, see infra text accompanying notes 117-21, regarding
Mancari's distinction between tribal and racial classifications applies here: The classification that is not
subject to the special relationship (in Mancari, racial classifications, and in Yakima Nation, classifications
made by states) presumably would be subject to some form of heightened scrutiny, because otherwise the
Court's distinction between those classifications and classifications subject to the special relationship would
be irrelevant and misplaced. Thus, some form of heightened scrutiny-probably the one that applies to
other state enactments that single out other ethnic groups, i.e., strict scrutiny under City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)-would appear to apply to such enactments. See also infra note 293.
OHA could defend itself by pointing out that, in Yakima Nation, the Court actually found that the
state enactment at issue was subject to rational basis review, because the state "was legislating under
explicit authority granted by Congress" by virtue of a federal law that specifically consented to the state
legislation at issue. See Yakima Nation, 439 U.S. at 501. OHA could invoke section 5(f) of the Hawaii
Admission Act, which provided that certain lands granted to Hawaii were to be held by the state
as a public trust for the support of the public schools and other public educational institutions,
for the betterment of the conditions of native Hawaiians, as defined in the Hawaiian Homes
Commission Act, 1920, as amended, for the development of farm and home ownership on as
widespread a basis as possible for the making of public improvements, and for the provision
of lands for public use.
48 U.S.C. § 5(f) (1994). The problem for OHA is that its beneficiaries are not limited to "[N]ative
Hawaiians, as defined by the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act," and some of its revenues do not come
from the lands referred to in section 5(0. See infra note 242; supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text,
As a result, it is not at all clear that Yakima Nation's safe harbor for authorized state programs would apply
here. See also infra note 292. Thus, with or without a special relationship between the federal government
and Native Hawaiians, OHA probably would be subject to heightened scrutiny.
218. Both Adarand and Croson involved government programs that contained racial classifications.
See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2101-04; Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94 (plurality opinion). The Court has ruled
in a number of cases that the equal protection components of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments reach
only state action, so Adarand and Croson have no direct application to private programs. See, e.g.,
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619-20 (1991); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407
U.S. 163, 173 (1972); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883); see also TRIBE, supra note 151, at
1688-720 (discussing difficulty of distinguishing state from private action). It should be noted, however,
that the Supreme Court has interpreted certain statutes governing private action as imposing the same equal
protection constraints as the Constitution. See, e.g., General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458
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be subject to the strict scrutiny of Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena 2 9 and
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.2-'0 if they were challenged on equal
protection grounds. Just as the preferences for "Native Americans"-defined
racially-in the statutes at issue in Adarand' 21  and Croson" were
presumably subject to strict scrutiny, -3 so, too, would be the preferences for
Native Hawaiians. 22 The impact of such scrutiny on programs for Native
Hawaiians would likely be significant.
The familiar standard of strict scrutiny is that racial or ethnic
classifications "are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures
that further compelling governmental interests."'  To satisfy the compelling
interest requirement, the state and federal governments could not rely on
historical, societal discrimination against Native Hawaiians,' nor could they
rely on amorphous claims of discrimination in particular industries or
spheres.227 Instead, they would have to produce particularized findings
U.S. 375, 390-91 (1982) (holding that section 1981 of Civil Rights Act of 1866 imposes same constraints
as Constitution). But see Johnson v. Santa Clara County Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 632-33 (1987)
(holding that Title VII is not coterminous with Equal Protection Clause, so that private employers have
more latitude than public employers).
219. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
220. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
221. 115 S. Ct. at 2102-03 (discussing statutory presumption that "'Native Americans. Asian Pacific
Americans, and other minorities" are socially and economically disadvantaged).
222. 480 U.S. at 478 (discussing statutory scheme classifying Indians. Eskimos. and Aleuts as
"minority group members" for purpose of defining Minority Business Enterpnses).
223. As was noted above, the programs at issue in Metro Broadcasting Inc. % FCC. 497 U S. 547
(1990), and Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)--the other two major affirmative action cases-also
had preferences for Native Americans, defined racially, that were subject to heighteed scrutiny See Metro
Broad., 497 U.S. at 553 n.l; Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 454; supra text accompanying notes 138-42
224. This is particularly likely in light of the fact that neither Congress nor the Department of Interior
has formally recognized Native Hawaiians as a tribe. In the absence of a formal recognition, and in light
of the many difficulties inherent in such recognition, see supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text, it
seems highly implausible that a court would, on its own authority, find that a special relationship exists
This does not mean that Congress could avoid these problems simply by recognizing Native
Hawaiians as a tribe. Such recognition, without other actions, probably would not cons ince a court that the
special relationship applied. See infra note 271. The point is simply that. without any federal recognition.
Adarand and Croson almost certainly would apply.
225. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
226. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469. 499 (1989) (stating that "sorry history
of both public and private discrimination in this country [that] has contributed to a lack of opportunities
for black entrepreneurs" is insufficient to justify racial classification in contracting); id. at 505 ("To accept
Richmond's claim that past societal discrimination alone can serve as the basis for ngid racial preferences
would be to open the door to competing claims for 'remedial relief* for every disadvantaged group -)
The Court in Adarand did not attempt to explicate how strict scrutiny should be applied in that case;
instead it characterized its holding as extending Croson's strict scrutiny standard to federal programs, see
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2110-11, 2113-14 (although it did leave open the possibility that Congress's powers
might be slightly greater than states' powers, see infra text accompanying note 240) Crojon's delineation
of the strict scrutiny standard stands, therefore, as the prevailing Supreme Court treatment of this issue. On
the application of Adarand, see generally Office of Legal Counsel. Memorandum to General Counsels re:
Adarand, June 28, 1995 [hereinafter OLC Memorandum], and Lia A. Fazzone. Comment. Raise High the
Roof Beam: Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena and the New- Law of Scrutiny for Federal Affirmative
Action, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 599 (1996).
227. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 499 (stating that "'an amorphous claim that there has been past
discrimination in a particular industry cannot justify" racial quota).
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sufficient to ensure that each challenged program was remedying the present
effects of past discrimination in the relevant sphere.228 Moreover, they would
have to show that they identified discrimination with some specificity prior to
enacting the relevant programs.229 In addition, relying on underrepresentation
of Native Hawaiians in a given industry or sector would be insufficient; the
federal or state government would have to demonstrate "a 'strong basis in
evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary.' 230 Such
evidence, it appears, must rise to the level of a prima facie showing of
discrimination against Native Hawaiians.23' Satisfying the narrow tailoring
requirement, meanwhile, would depend upon a number of factors,232
including whether the relevant government considered race-neutral alternatives
and found that they would not achieve the program's aims;233 whether the
program excluded those who, though Native Hawaiian, "ha[d] [not] suffered
from the effects of past discrimination" against Native Hawaiians; 234 whether
status as a Native Hawaiian is a requirement for eligibility or merely one of
many factors; 235 whether the program was temporary or at least provided for
periodic review;236  and whether the program's effects on non-Native
Hawaiians was significant or intrusive.237
It seems unlikely that many, if any, of Hawaii's current programs singling
out Native Hawaiians could meet these standards. The compelling interest
requirement alone would pose an enormous hurdle. Hawaii would not be able
to rely on general statistical disparities between Native Hawaiians and other
Hawaiians to justify preferential treatment. With respect to each program,
228. See id. at 498.
229. See id. at 504. Croson did not clarify whether the government entity must have evidence of
discrimination sufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny before it acts, or whether it can merely have a significant
quantum of evidence at the time of enactment and later buttress it with additional studies. Lower courts,
however, have allowed the use of post hoc studies to supplement pre-enactment evidence. See Concrete
Works of Colo., Inc. v. City of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1521 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1315
(1995); Contractors Ass'n v. City of Philadelphia, 6 F.3d 990, 1004 (3d Cir. 1993); Harrison & Burrowes
Bridge Constructors, Inc. v. Cuomo, 981 F.2d 50, 60 (2d Cir. 1992).
230. Croson, 488 U.S. at 500 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986)
(plurality opinion)).
231. See id. at 500, 501. Neither Adarand nor Croson explicitly rejected the possibility that a
nonremedial objective--such as diversity--could constitute a compelling interest. Justice O'Connor's
opinion in Croson strongly so suggested, however: "Unless [classifications based on race] are strictly
reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics
of racial hostility." Id. at 493 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
Even if a nonremedial objective could constitute a compelling interest, it is not clear that many, If
any, of the programs benefiting Native Hawaiians could be persuasively characterized as advancing such
an objective. Cf Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 569-79 (1990) (reviewing evidence that
broadcast licensing preferences for minorities adds variety to perspectives communicated by radio and
television).
232. See Fazzone, supra note 226, at 616-17; OLC Memorandum, supra note 226, at 19-28.
233. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 507.
234. See id. at 508.
235. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
236. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 178 (1987) (plurality opinion); Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 489 (plurality opinion); id. at 513 (Powell, J., concurring).
237. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 282-84 (1986) (plurality opinion).
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Hawaii would have to show that Native Hawaiians were subject to
discrimination in the field that the program covered, and the proof would have
to be in the form of identification of specific instances of past discrimination
against benefited individuals or, at a minimum, gross statistical disparities
focused on the percentage of qualified Native Hawaiians in a particular
sphere. 8 Such statistics can be supplied by disparity studies, but courts will
scrutinize them carefully. In several cases a court has invalidated a program
that relied on new disparity studies, because the court disputed the studies'
findings of discrimination on which the affirmative action program was
based.239
As to federal programs, the Court in Adarand left open the possibility that
Congress may have greater latitude than states in fashioning a race-based
program, in light of its power under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment.24° Assuming that such latitude exists, however, it seems
doubtful that it would have any effect on the basic requirements of strict
scrutiny, such as the requirement that there be a strong basis in evidence that
the relevant remediation is necessary.24 ' There is little reason, therefore, to
believe that any differences in the standards applied to federal versus state
programs for Native Hawaiians would be significant.22 The upshot is that
238. The Court in Croson indicated what it meant by relevant statistics. Richmond had emphasized
that in the five years before its program began, minority businesses were awarded less than one percent
of construction contracts despite the fact that minorities constituted half of Richmond's population, and it
argued that this disparity created an inference of discrimination in the construction industr) Richmond also
noted that there were very few minority members of local construction trade associations. The Court
rejected these comparisons as inadequate; it said that more probative statistical inquiries would have
compared the number of qualified minorities in the relevant labor market with the percent of contracts
received, and the number of minority contractors qualified to join trade associations with the number of
minorities in those associations. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 499-504.
239. See Contractors Ass'n v. City of Philadelphia. 893 F. Supp. 419. 427-38 (ED Pa. 1995)
(rejecting disparity study as flawed and unreliable); Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of New Haven.
791 F. Supp. 941, 946-48 (D. Conn. 1992) (rejecting evidence gathered by New Haven as inadequate
factual predicate to justify set-aside ordinance), vacated as moot. 41 F3d 62 (2d Cir 1994). see also
Concrete Works v. City of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1530-31 (10th Cir. 1994) (rejecting certain findings but
remanding rather than striking down program), cert. denied. 115 S. Ct. 1315 (1995). Lamprecht v FCC.
958 F.2d 382, 395-98 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Thomas, J.. sitting by designation) (rejecting findings (in case
involving nonremedial program) indicating that preference for women would ameliorate barriers faced by
women).
240. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena. 115 S. Ct. 2097. 2114 (1995).
241. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 500 (treating requirement of strong basis in c idence as integral to strict
scrutiny standard); see also OLC Memorandum, supra note 226. at 32 ("lAlfter Adarand. Congress is
subject to the Croson 'strong basis in evidence' standard.").
The main potential difference that the Court has suggested bet% cen Congress's power under Section
5 and those of the states is that Congress can rely on national findings, rather than having to make findings
for each affected region of the country. See Croson. 488 U.S. at 504 (noting possibility of Congress making
national findings); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 515-16 n.14 (Powell. J.. concumng) ("The degree of specificity
required in the findings of discrimination and the breadth of discretion in the choice of remedies may vary
with the nature and authority of a governmental body."). This distinction would have no real impact on
programs benefiting Native Hawaiians, as the geographical breadth of any congressional findings regarding
Native Hawaiians presumably would not be an issue.
242. If the review of federal programs were more lenient because of Congress's Section 5 authority.
such review would probably apply not only to federal programs but also to a program like the HHCA that
Congress originally enacted and then imposed on Hawaii. After all. Congress did not merely authorize
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many (if not all) programs for Native Hawaiians would likely be
invalidated. 3
V. METHODS OF BRINGING NATIVE HAWAIIANS WITHIN THE SPECIAL
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
It thus appears that existing legislation singling out Native Hawaiians
would be subject to strict scrutiny under Adarand and Croson, and that this
level of scrutiny would jeopardize a number of programs. Before I move to the
next question-how strict scrutiny can be avoided-an antecedent question that
lurks in the background bears brief mention: Would most Native Hawaiians
Hawaii's passage of the HHCA; it made such passage a condition of statehood. See Admission Act § 4
("As a compact with the United States relating to the management and disposition of the Hawaiian home
lands, the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, as amended, shall be adopted as a provision of the
Constitution of said State .... ). Moreover, the requirement was not that Hawaii enact some form of
homelands program, but that it pass the HHCA. Hawaii has enacted changes to the HHCA, but most of
them have been approved by Congress (because the Admission Act required that certain changes depend
upon federal consent). See supra notes 64-67.
There are, however, some changes to the HHCA that have not been approved by Congress (usually
because the Admission Act exempted them from this requirement), and it could be argued that such changes
mean that the HHCA has exceeded the federal authorization and thus is outside Congress's Section 5
powers. See supra notes 64, 67. This presents a thorny question. It might be noted that the Admission Act
specifically permitted such changes, and that Hawaii is legislating pursuant to that authorization, The
problem with this reasoning is that giving the power to change is different from authorizing the changes
themselves; after all, the Admission Act also allows Hawaii to amend any of the territorial laws that Hawaii
inherited (except the HHCA, of course) and to have the powers of lawmaking ordinarily accorded to states,
see Admission Act § 15, but that does not mean that each amendment of a territorial law or each new law
can thereby be characterized as authorized by the federal government.
In any event, even if all of the HHCA were construed as enacted pursuant to Congress's Section 5
authority, it seems unlikely that a court would reach the same conclusion with respect to the other major
state program for Native Hawaiians, OHA. Unlike the HHCA, the Hawaii law (in this case, a constitutional
amendment) creating OHA was not required by the federal government. It was the product of a state plan
to benefit all Native Hawaiians-i.e., all those who were descended from pre-1778 inhabitants. Many
legislators apparently believed that the creation of OHA was grounded in section 5(f) of the Admission Act,
which provided that certain federal lands were to be "held by ... [Hawaii] as a public trust" for five
purposes, one of which was "the betterment of the conditions of native Hawaiians, as defined in the
Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920." Admission Act § 5(f); see Van Dyke, supra note 19, at 72-73;
80-8 Op. Haw. Att'y Gen. 12-13 (1980) ("OHA insures that native Hawaiians will receive a direct
beneficial interest from public lands."). OHA's revenue, however, is not limited to that from the public
lands delineated in section 5(f), so the program's implementation is much broader than was provided for
by the Admission Act. Furthermore, the class of beneficiaries of OHA programs includes all descendants
of pre-1778 inhabitants, rather than the HHCA's limitation to those with 50% or more native blood, See
supra text accompanying notes 71-75. This definition more than doubles the pool of potential beneficiaries
of OHA (from 81,000 to 209,000) and, in this way, exceeds the scope of the original authorization. See
supra note 73.
243. It also bears mentioning that the equal protection analysis could be affected by the fact that,
though Native Hawaiians are a minority, there is no ethnic majority in Hawaii; in fact, according to the
State of Hawaii's figures, Native Hawaiians, Japanese, and Caucasians are the three biggest ethnic groups
in Hawaii, each constituting between 19% and 23% of the population. See HAWAIt DEP'T oF HEALTH,
supra note 54, at A-66 (calculating Hawaii's population as 19.5% Native Hawaiian-defined as having any
native blood-23% Caucasian, 20% Japanese, 10.5% Filipino, 4.5% Chinese, and 22.5% "others"). In light
of the absence of a majority group, the Court might examine the legislative enactments for Native
Hawaiians more closely, on the theory that various combinations of these minority groups could have
aggregated their voting power in the legislature in ways that benefited them and harmed the other minority
groups.
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(and, for that matter, Native Americans) prefer that they be treated as
participants in the special relationship that the Supreme Court has delineated?
The Court has construed the special relationship as entailing broad federal
power over Indian tribes; and, as was noted above, the Court has treated all
measures singling out tribes (or their members) as subject to rational basis
review, irrespective of whether they benefited or harmed those singled out.
2 "
As the Court stated in upholding the constitutionality of "checkerboard"
criminal jurisdiction that was disadvantageous to Indian tribes, "'the unique
legal status of Indian tribes under federal law' permits the Federal Government
to enact legislation singling out tribal Indians, legislation that might otherwise
be constitutionally offensive." 2 5 This has led some commentators to suggest
that the special relationship, as applied by the Court, may be more harmful
than helpful to Indians' interests. 24 For Indian tribes, jettisoning the special
244. See supra notes 30, 40-44 and accompanying text.
245. Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation. 439 U.S. 463, 500-01
(1979) (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974).
246. Professor L. Scott Gould put the point trenchantly:
Although Mancari was greeted by many as a victory for Indians. it was correctly foreseen by
others as containing the seeds for discrimination against the tribes it purported to protect and
against Indians as individuals. Mancari's perfidy is that, although enunciating a congressional
responsibility to tribes, it imposes no limits on the use of the political classifications it creates.
thereby allowing the subterfuge of status to overcome distinctions which would otherwise be
blatantly unconstitutional.
L. Scott Gould, The Congressional Response to Duro v. Reina: Compromising Sovereitgnty and the
Constitution, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 53, 96 (1994) (footnotes omitted); see also Ball. supra note 28. at
62 ("Although the trust doctrine has undeniably served as a remedy in certain instances of federal
mismanagement of tribal lands and money, it appears in fact primarily to give moral color to depredation
of tribes."); Frickey, supra note 22, at 1139 n. 12 (1990) (citing Mancart and noting that "[ilt is more than
a little ironic that the Americans who were here first have essentially the same equal protection guarantees
as nonresident aliens"); cf. COHEN, supra note 41. at 171 ("In private law, a guardian is subject to rigid
court control in the administration of the ward's affairs and property. In constitutional law the guardianship
relation has generally been invoked as a reason for relaxing court control over the action of the
'guardian.'").
Many commentators have sought to eliminate the harmful aspects of the special relationship by
suggesting that rational basis review should be limited to legislation that benefits Indians or furthers tmbal
self-government. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 115. at 174-76: Clinton. supra note 23. at 1013-16
Johnson & Crystal, supra note 40, at 606. Such a position, of course, is premised upon a rejection of
Supreme Court jurisprudence and thus is beyond the scope of this Article. It does bear mentioning.
however, that the help/harm dichotomy might in some instances be difficult to apply and thus of limited
usefulness. After all, earlier in this century limitations on Native Americans* access to alcohol were often
enacted in an attempt to protect Native Americans, who were thought incapable of handling alcohol, and
these restrictions were considered by many (including the Supreme Court) to be beneficial to Native
Americans, see. e.g., United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 41-44 (1913) (cataloging statements in favor
of limitations); yet today most would say that these restrictions harmed Native Americans. Moreover. such
difficulties are by no means limited to legislation passed one hundred years ago. To pick an example that
has more modem overtones, how should a court charactenze a federal government program under which
federal and tribal governments worked together to find, treat, and. if necessary, incarcerate pregnant Indian
women who abused alcohol or other drugs? Furthermore, the complex task of distinguishing between harm
and benefit is rendered more difficult by the fact that the goal of benefiting Indians might sometimes be
at cross-purposes with the goal of furthering tribal self-government, leading to the difficult question of
which should prevail. To take a hypothetical regulation from this age of devolution of government services
to the state and local level, how should a court treat federal legislation under which (formerly) federal
government benefits were distributed by states, except that tnbes distnbuted funds to all their members?
This would probably enhance the power and stability of tribal governments, but might be opposed by those
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relationship would entail convincing the Supreme Court to alter its
jurisprudence by abandoning Mancari and its progeny. If, however, current
programs for Native Hawaiians are not subject to the special relationship, then
Native Hawaiians do have the choice whether to pursue the constitutional
status of "Indian Tribe[]" and thereby enter the special relationship or to leave
matters as they stand and thereby avoid the harmful effects that sweeping
government power could entail.247 If Native Hawaiians decide to take the
latter route, they need read no further; if, on the other hand, they decide that
the benefits of the special relationship outweigh its costs, the remainder of this
Part addresses whether and how that can be achieved-that is, how (if at all)
Native Hawaiians can be brought within the special relationship between the
federal government and Indian tribes.
A. Methods of Creating a Native Hawaiian Tribe or Tribes
1. Native Hawaiians Organizing Themselves into Tribes
One alternative is for Native Hawaiians to organize themselves into a
tribe-like organization or organizations. 48 Native Hawaiians could create an
association that would assume the functions and role played by tribes among
American Indians. Thus, they could elect a set of leaders and agree to be
bound by tribal law. If possible, they could live on a contiguous piece of land.
In this way, they could demonstrate the characteristics of "tribeness" that the
Supreme Court identified in Montoya v. United States.249
Some Native Hawaiian groups have already attempted to create such an
organization, but each has attracted only a small fraction of Native
Hawaiians. 50 Another possibility was raised by the recent Native Hawaiian
vote, the results of which were announced this past September."S In summer
who were distant from their tribal leadership. In particular, for many Native Americans who did not live
on the lands of their tribe, it might come as a rude shock to find out that their tribe still claimed them as
members and thus now had the exclusive power over their federal benefits.
247. The recent Native Hawaiian vote provides some guidance on this question. Seventy-three percent
of those who returned ballots voted in favor of the creation of a Native Hawaiian government. See infra
text accompanying note 254. The significance of this figure is mitigated by two factors, however. First,
only 40% of those who received ballots sent them in (and, in light of the dispute over the number of Native
Hawaiians, it is not even clear what percentage of Native Hawaiians received ballots in the first place). See
supra note 54; infra text accompanying note 261. Second, it is not at all clear that voters understood the
potential ramifications of their vote regarding the creation of a special relationship and the concomitant
enhanced power of the federal government.
248. As will be discussed below, the possible requirement that a newly recognized tribe be the
successor to a historical sovereign entity complicates the question whether a single tribe or a series of tribes
would stand on stronger constitutional footing. See infra notes 284-87 and accompanying text. For purposes
of simplicity, this Article will refer to the creation of a single Native Hawaiian tribe, though it should be
remembered that the creation of several tribes might also be possible.
249. 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901).
250. See supra note 173.
251. The Hawaii statute that authorized this vote (codified as a note to the Hawaii Organic Act)
provides in relevant part:
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1996 a ballot was mailed to all "Hawaiians"-defined as all who are
descended from pre-1778 inhabitants- 2 -asking the following question:
"Shall the Hawaiian people elect delegates to propose a Native Hawaiian
government? ' ' 53 Of the 30,423 valid ballots that were returned, 22,294 (or
73%) were marked yes.25 The plebiscite is planned as the first of six steps
toward the creation of a Native Hawaiian government: According to the plan,
there will now be an election of delegates, the formation of a research group
to collect information about possible forms of government, a convention of
delegates that would draft a proposed constitution, extensive public hearings,
and, finally, a vote of Native Hawaiians on whether or not to approve the
proposed constitution 55 The idea is that Native Hawaiians will create their
own governing body (akin to an Indian tribe) and make decisions through it,
"rather than through government-appointed or self-appointed individuals and
organizations," as is currently the case. 56 The explicit intention, then, is to
The purpose of this Act is to acknowledge and recognize the unique status that the Natisc
Hawaiian people bear to the State of Hawaii and to the United States and to facilitate the efforts
of the Native Hawaiian people to determine self-governance of their own choosing In the spirit
of self-determination and by this Act, a Hawaiian sovereignty elections council is established
to:
(1) Hold a Native Hawaiian Vote in 1996 to determine the will of the Natc
Hawaiian people for self-governance of their own choosing; and
(2) Based upon the Native Hawaiian Vote approved by a majonty of ballots cast.
provide for a fair and impartial process to resolve the issues relating to form.
structure, and status of Hawaiian self-governance.
Hawaii Organic Act § 2, 1993 Haw. Sess. Laws 359 (as amended by 1994 Haw. Seas. Laws 200 and 1996
Haw. Sess. Laws 140).
The vote was originally planned for 1995 but was postponed because the Hawaiian government cut
its funding. See Ragaza, supra note 173, at 48. In addition, the legislation providing for the vote onginally
referred to the creation of an "indigenous sovereign nation." but that was amended in 1996 to refer to "self-
governance." See 1996 Haw. Sess. Laws 140; Rice v. Cayetano, Nos. Civ.96-00390 DAE. Civ.96-00616
DAE 1996 WL 562072, at *2 n.4 (D. Haw. Sept. 6. 1996). One other change of note was that the mandate
required to authorize the Hawaiian Sovereignty Elections Council to proceed was changed from a majonty
of Native Hawaiians to a majority of votes cast. See 1996 Haw. Sess. Laws 140; Rice. 1996 WL 562072,
at *2 n.4; see also infra note 261.
252. The voting guidelines adopted by the state legislature require that a person be "Hawanan" to vote,
and stated that a "Hawaiian" was "any descendant of the indigenous people inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands
which exercised sovereignty and subsisted in the Hawaiian Islands prior to 1778." See Rice. 1996 WL
562072, at *2.
253. See id. at *2.
254. See Walter Wright, Hawaiians Vote Yes, HONOLULU ADVERTISER. Sept. 12. 1996, at A-I.
255. See HAWAIIAN SOVEREIGNY ELEcTIONS COUNCIl. To BUILD A NEw NATIO.N (Ho'OKOKULU tIE
AUPUNI HOU) 6 (n.d.).
256. HAWAIIAN SOVEREIGNTY ELECTIONS COUNCIL, supra note 172. at 12. The report to the
legislature further states:
Some Hawaiian organizations have developed constitutions, position papers, and master
plans for sovereignty or independence. In essence these organizations are political paries. each
earnestly advancing their [sic] own platforms [sic]. These organizations are self-appointed. They
have not received the consent of the Hawaiian people, as a whole, to be their government.
... No one organization can presume to represent the Hawaiian people without the
Hawaiian people's consent to be governed by that organization. No one organization can claim
the assets and entitlements of the Hawaiian people without the consent of the Havaian people
to be represented [by] them for that express purpose.
Id. at 13.
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organize a native government that can serve the same functions as a tribal one.
It is not clear that the government will be organized as planned, in part for
reasons that flow out of the state's involvement in the process. First, the state
government funded the vote and may be asked to fund (through the legislature
and/or through OHA) further steps in the process.5 7 The state funding for
the vote sparked an unsuccessful attempt to enjoin the release of the vote.
The claim against the vote may now be moot (because the figures were
released), but further state funding may eventually lead to Ninth Circuit review
of state involvement and invalidation on equal protection and Fifteenth
Amendment grounds 5 9 Second, the state's involvement led to a split among
Native Hawaiian groups. Many Native Hawaiian groups (such as Ka Lahui
Hawaii) called for a boycott of the vote, contending that it was not a true
reflection of Native Hawaiians' wishes, but instead a state-controlled
process.26° The absence of unity may have been reflected in the total number
of votes cast. Only forty percent of the ballots mailed out were returned, as
compared with seventy-three percent of the ballots returned in the most recent
OHA elections. 26'
In light of the discord among Native Hawaiian groups (and the possibility
of a successful legal challenge to further state involvement), it is not clear that
the process begun by the Native Hawaiian vote will produce a Native
Hawaiian government, much less one that meets the constitutional minima for
status as a tribe. Nonetheless, the vote may be a promising start toward Native
Hawaiians' creation of a Native Hawaiian government.
Whether Native Hawaiians choose to organize a tribe through the
plebiscite process or a different one, the primary attraction of Native
257. See Wright, supra note 254, at A-2.
258. See Rice, 1996 WL 562072.
259. If the state were not involved, a referendum or other process leading toward the creation of an
independent Native Hawaiian organization would, of course, raise no constitutional issues; it would stand
on the same footing as any other private election to the governing board of a private entity. Moreover, as
this Section has suggested, it would be an appropriate way for Native Hawaiians to organize themselves
into a tribal entity.
It should be noted, though, that similar constitutional problems surrounding OHA's electorate could
not be solved so simply, as OHA itself is a governmental, rather than private, entity. Thus, even if there
were no state funds used in organizing OHA's elections, the fact remains that the elections are for a unit
of the government. It is not clear that anything turns on the form of OHA's elections, however, because
OHA may be unconstitutional anyway. See supra notes 217, 242.
260. See Ka Lahui Hawai'i Rebuttal, supra note 173; Pat Omandam, Native Vote Opponents Rap
Results, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Sept. 13, 1996, at A7.
261. See Hawaiian Vote: A Signal for Caution, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Sept. 12, 1996, at A12;
RESULTS OF VOTES CAST, GENERAL ELECTION AND SPECIAL ELECTION FOR THE OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN
AFFAIRS, NOVEMBER 8, 1994, at 395 (n.d.).
Interestingly, the legislation on the Native Hawaiian vote originally provided that the sovereignty
process would move forward if a majority of the "qualified voters"--that is, a majority of Native Hawaiian
adults-approved of the proposition to create a Native Hawaiian government. Legislation passed In 1996
(after some Native Hawaiian groups had said they would boycott the vote) amended that threshold,
changing "qualified voters" to "votes cast." See 1996 Haw. Sess. Laws. 140; Rice, 1996 WL 562072, at
*2 n.4. The change proved to be significant: Over 70% of the votes cast favored the proposition, but they
represented less than one-third of the qualified voters.
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Hawaiians organizing themselves into a tribe is the likelihood that the resulting
organization would, in both its structure and its goals, reflect the aims and
desires of Native Hawaiians. Another advantage of such a process is that it
would not depend on the federal government enacting a statutory scheme
designed to encourage the creation of a tribe; Native Hawaiians could simply
organize themselves into a tribal grouping on their own. This, however, would
put a huge burden on Native Hawaiians. They would have to create the tribal
structure and convince all other Native Hawaiians to join them, without being
able to offer any specific incentive for doing so.
7 2
2. Congressional Incentives Through Legislation Giving Benefits to a
Native Hawaiian Tribe
A different method of bringing Native Hawaiians within the special
relationship would be for Congress to pass legislation that would give benefits
directly to a Native Hawaiian tribal organization that met specified criteria
(e.g., those from Montoya v. United States)23 for status as a tribe.2'  The
idea would be to create incentives for Native Hawaiians to organize themselves
into a tribe through the inducement of federal largesse. Because the benefits
would flow to an organization that, by definition, met the criteria for
cohesiveness, this system would eliminate the difficulties associated with
giving benefits to an inchoate grouping of Native Hawaiians.
262. The obvious incentive for the creation of a Native Hawaiian tribe is mitigating the danger that
programs benefiting Native Hawaiians will be declared unconstitutional. This may not prove to be an
adequate incentive, however; a Native Hawaiian would be joining only to avoid a possible danger, the
contours of which may not be clear to the average Native Hawaiian. rather than to gain new benefits. The
lack of affirmative incentives to join a Native Hawaiian tribe might be addressed in part by the promise
of congressional action to give significant benefits to such a tribe once it was established. That is.
organizers of a tribe might have an easier time persuading others to join if they could promise that. once
established, the Native Hawaiian tribe would enjoy the full panoply of benefits available to American
Indian tribes. This possibility undercuts one of the advantages identified above, however Its success would
depend on the passage of a legislative scheme to confer new benefits on Native Hawaiians (and on Native
Hawaiians' belief in the promise of such congressional action), and thus would mitigate Native Hawaiians'
sense of control over the process.
263. 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901).
264. The State of Hawaii also could set up a system whereby it would recognize Native Hawaiian
groups that met certain criteria. It seems unlikely, though, that the Supreme Court would treat such state
recognition as creating a special relationship for constitutional purposes such that benefits for these tribes
would be subject to rational basis review. In Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian
Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 501 (1979), the Supreme Court stated that the special relationship does not include
states. See supra note 217. In fact, in several cases the Court has stated that the federal government has
exclusive authority to deal with Indian tribes. See Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians. 471 U.S. 759.
764 (1985); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832); see also United States v. Mazurie. 419
U.S. 544, 554 n.l 1 (1975) (noting "Congress' exclusive constitutional authority to deal with Indian tribes")-
Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 376 n.2 (1976) (discussing "plenary and exclusive power of the
Federal Government to deal with Indian tribes"). Yakima Nation noted the possibility of the federal
government authorizing state actions with respect to tribes (including, perhaps, recognition), but that, of
course, would require Congress's involvement. See 439 U.S. at 501.
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This may seem like putting the cart before the horse, because
congressional enactment of statutory benefits should follow, rather than
precede, the creation of a tribe.265 There is, however, a precedent for
legislation that spurs the creation of the very organizations that will receive
benefits as the equivalent of Indian tribes: the Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act of 1971 (ANCSA).266 Traditional Alaska Native villages had been
eligible for recognized status under the IRA since 1936 (two years after the
IRA's passage), but ANCSA, in settling Alaska Native land claims, opened the
way for new entities. 267 ANCSA provided for the creation of Alaska Native
Regional Corporations and Alaska Native Village Corporations, none of which
previously existed; ANCSA simply propounded the standards for the creation
and organization of these corporations and provided that they would receive
certain property.268 Moreover, these Regional and Village Corporations have
265. It could be argued that such a statute would run afoul of Adarand, on the theory that, in
attempting to foster the creation of a Native Hawaiian entity, the federal government would be singling out
a class-Native Hawaiians-who were not (yet) in tribal organizations. It seems unlikely, however, that
this would pose an insuperable hurdle. If the wording of the statute made clear that it had no effect upon
Native Hawaiians, defined by ancestry, but instead merely provided for recognition of an Indian tribe (in
this case, a Native Hawaiian tribe) that met certain qualifications, a court would probably treat the statute
differently from those directed at Native Hawaiians, defined racially, with no suggestion of tribal affiliation;
in fact, a court might treat the statute as an element of a resulting special relationship. That the statute
would likely contain some racial classification (e.g., descendance from pre-1778 inhabitants) probably
would not disqualify it from rational basis review, any more than the BIA hiring preference's effective
limitation to those with Indian blood did in Mancari.
It also bears mentioning that this is where the history of the United States's actions vis-h-vis the
Hawaiian government and the terminated tribe analogy, see supra Subsection IiI.D.2, might become
relevant. The federal government could plausibly articulate a compelling interest in assisting the creation
(or, more properly, the "re-creation") of a Native Hawaiian government, in light of its contribution to the
death of the govemment that had once constituted an indigenous political structure presiding exclusively
over Native Hawaiians; and providing for the re-creation of an indigenous political structure is arguably
narrowly tailored to serve that compelling interest. Moreover, there have been cases-most notably,
involving the Menominee Tribe-of federal government support for elections pursuant to which terminated
tribes were rerecognized. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 903b-c (1994). The Menominee Tribe's situation was different,
because it had retained some political organization after its relationship with the government was terminated
(and the statute on its elections was never subject to an equal protection challenge). Still, this does
constitute a historical example of federal involvement in the re-creation of a recognized tribe. As was noted
above, though, the success of this argument is complicated by the fact that, by the time the United States
Minister landed troops and helped to overthrow the government in 1893, it had become a multiethnic
oligarchical polity. See supra text accompanying notes 49-55, 196-98.
266. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-29e (1994).
267. The original 1934 IRA included Eskimos and other Alaskan aboriginal groups among those who
could create governmental organizations; the 1936 amendments to the IRA also permitted them to register
as federally chartered entities. See Act of May 1, 1936, ch. 254, § 1, 49 Stat. 1250 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 473a). Thus, as of 1936, the IRA provided that Indian groups (including Alaska Natives but not Native
Hawaiians) that met certain statutory requirements could adopt constitutions for carrying out governmental
activities and could incorporate by federal charter for business purposes. See Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576,
§§ 16-17,48 Stat. 987-88 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 476-77). Many traditional Alaska Native
villages responded by registering as federally chartered villages under the IRA. See Smith & Kancewick,
supra note 152, at 493-94.
268. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1606-07; Martha Hirschfield, Note, The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act:
Tribal Sovereignty and the Corporate Form, 101 YALE L.J. 1331, 1333-37 (1992); John F. Walsh, Note,
Settling the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 38 STAN. L. REV. 227, 248-53 (1985); see also Arthur
Lazarus, Jr. & W. Richard West, Jr., The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: A Flawed Victory, In
AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE LAW 132, 134-35 (Lawrence Rosen ed., 1976).
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now been included in many of the statutory definitions of "Indian tribe" and
as a result receive some of the same benefits that accrue to federally
recognized tribes.269 ANCSA does not require that the corporations meet the
requirements delineated in Montoya (though it does mandate that the Secretary
of Interior divide Alaska into regions, "with each region composed as far as
practicable of Natives having a common heritage and sharing common
interests") 270 and the constitutional status of these corporations for purposes
of equal protection analysis is not clear; ANCSA is nonetheless significant,
because it represents a legislative effort to foster the creation of organizations
that will be treated as "Indian tribes. 27'
B. The Significance of the Noncontinuous Existence of a Native Hawaiian
Tribe
Assuming that Native Hawaiians do organize themselves into a tribal
organization (whether at their own initiative or in response to legislative
incentives), would that tribal organization be an "Indian Tribef]" for
constitutional purposes such that it would be subject to the special relationship'?
In other words, if Native Hawaiians took the steps outlined above, would the
special relationship extend to them?
269. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 450b(e) (self-determination): id. § 1603(d) (healh care), d § 19033)
(child welfare); id. § 2026(14) (BIA programs); id. § 2403(3) (substance abuse programs), id § 251112)
(tribal schools); id. § 3501(1) (energy resources); id. § 3703(10) (agncultural resources), id. § 4001(2) (trust
fund management); 26 U.S.C. § 45A(c)(6) (1994) (employment tax credits); 33 U S C § 2701(15) ( 1994
(oil pollution compensation); 38 U.S.C. § 3115(c) (1994) (vocational rehabilitaton); 42 U S C § 628tc)(2)
(1994) (child welfare services); id. § 3002(6) (older Americans programs).
270. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(a).
271. It may seem tempting to avoid the time and effort that these tso methods entail by means of a
third option: Congress (or perhaps even the Department of Interior) simply recognizing Natise lawaiians
as a tribe, without having to rely on any elaborate legislative schemes or on any actions b, Natie
Hawaiians.
Such recognition would bring Native Hawaiians closer to consincing a court that they wsere subject
to the special relationship; the lack of recognition is one of the obstacles to Nati'.c Hawaians' status as
an Indian tribe, and this proposal would remove it. The problem, how. ever. is that there ac constitutional
limits to congressional authority; the Supreme Court has stated that it will gise some deference to a federal
decision to recognize an Indian tribe but will make an independent judgment as to w*hether federal
recognition was arbitrary or irrational. See supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text- It seems likely that
federal recognition of Native Hawaiians as a whole would fail that test, as was noted abose, all Natiie
Hawaiians have not assented to the governance of a tribal organization. See supra notes 172-73 and
accompanying text. Part of the problem for the Native Hawaiian community, in fact. is that many Nativ.e
Hawaiians left their land during the nineteenth century and became ordinary laborers Their real connection.
as the definitions used in relevant statutes reveal, is that they share a common ancestry See OFFICE OF
HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 54, at 9 (noting that Native Hawaiians "are highly differentiated in
religion, education, occupation, politics, and even in their claims to Hawaiian identity" (quoting Kanahele.
supra note 171, at 21)); id. at 24 (describing Native Hawaiian population as. inter alia. "racially mixed.
gender-balanced, urbanite, [and] unattached"). Any federal recognition of the entire community of Natise
Hawaiians would be similar to a federal recognition of all people of American Indian descent It would
eviscerate Mancari's distinction between racial and political classifications, it would suggest that .,ancari*'s
limitation can be circumvented simply by defining a tribe as being composed of all members, and only
those members, of a racial group. It seems unlikely that a court would accept such a transparent effort to
transform a racial classification into a tribal one.
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At first glance, the answer seems easy. Montoya suggested a number of
criteria ('a body of Indians of the same or similar race, united in a community
under one leadership or government, and inhabiting a particular though
sometimes ill-defined territory"),"2 and a Native Hawaiian tribe could be
structured to satisfy all of them. Even if there are additional requirements
regarding the structure and function of a tribe (e.g., that it hold meetings
periodically)27 3  these could be met simply by setting up the tribe
accordingly. Some sources suggest, however, that there may be an additional
requirement for status as a tribe that does not inhere in the current structure of
a tribe and thus cannot be met so easily: that the tribe have a long and
continuous existence as a functioning tribal organization. The BIA's
regulations, as well as some lower court cases, indicate that this is an
additional prerequisite for status as a tribe.2 74
If there is a requirement of continuous tribal organization, it would
probably preclude the creation of a Native Hawaiian tribe for constitutional
purposes; as was noted above, Native Hawaiians have not remained in a tribal
entity.2 75 There is some reason to doubt, however, that such a requirement
exists. For one thing, it has not been established that a tribe must have any
particular connection to a historical sovereign entity (much less continuous
functioning from historical times until the present). 6 Although a number of
272. Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901).
273. Cf 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(c)(1)(iii) (1996) (noting significance of widespread involvement in political
processes by most of group's members).
274. See id. § 83.7(b) (requiring that "[a] predominant portion of the petitioning group comprises a
distinct community and has existed as a community from historical times until the present"); id. § 83.7(c)
(requiring that "[t]he petitioner has maintained political influence or authority over its members as an
autonomous entity from historical times until the present"); see also, e.g., United States v. Washington, 641
F.2d 1368, 1372 (9th Cir. 1981) ("Mhe group must have maintained an organized tribal structure.").
As was noted above, the BIA's regulations determine whether the federal government will recognize
a group, not whether the government has the constitutional authority to do so; accordingly, the BIA's
inclusion of these requirements does not necessarily indicate that they are constitutionally mandated. See
supra note 160 and accompanying text.
275. See supra text accompanying notes 172-73; see also text accompanying note 193.
276. If there is no requirement of historical continuity, then the structure and implementation of the
HHCA contain a bitter irony for Native Hawaiians: Had the HHCA been drafted differently-specifically,
in a manner that encouraged the formation of a Native Hawaiian tribe or tribes--the concerns raised in this
Article might have been mitigated (if not avoided entirely). Congress could, for instance, have decided to
foster the creation of a Native Hawaiian tribe by legislating that the lands at issue would be given outright
to a tribal organization that met Montoya's criteria for status as a tribe. Native Hawaiians could then have
created the tribe, and it could have served the role in their lives that tribes serve on reservations in the
United States. Such an arrangement would have had the effect of creating a Native Hawaiian tribe, which
the federal government could single out for legislation under the principles of Mancari. In fact, this bears
a strong similarity to the manner in which ANCSA created Alaska Native Regional and Village
Corporations (although their constitutional status is uncertain, in part because of the potential requirement
of historical continuity). See supra notes 266-71 and accompanying text; infra note 278.
Alternatively, assuming that the drafters of the HHCA saw no reason to encourage the creation of a
Native Hawaiian tribe, they still could have precluded the constitutional problems facing the HHCA by
simply giving the government's land outright to Native Hawaiians; by now, the statute of limitations for
a claim challenging the transfers would have long since run. This divestiture of land would not have placed




lower courts have suggested that a connection is required, the Supreme Court
has not. Most notably, the definition contained in Montoya v. United States
posited only contemporaneous requirements (e.g., "inhabiting a particular
though sometimes ill-defined territory").2" Also, nothing in the term "Indian
Tribes" suggests that an unbroken history is necessary. As was noted above,
the Indian Commerce Clause's use of the term "Indian Tribes" rather than
"Indians" may suggest that something more than an agglomeration of Indians
is necessary, that there must be a group coherent enough to be called a
"Tribe[]." The same cannot be said of a requirement that such an Indian group
have a long history; the term "Indian Tribe[]" is consistent with both a
formulation that would include such a requirement and one that would not. It
may be, therefore, that the Supreme Court would not impose a requirement of
a historical connection to a longstanding tribe.27
The fact that the HHCA neither fostered the creation of a Native Hawaiian tribe nor gave the land
to Native Hawaiians outright might seem to represent another way that the federal government is
responsible for the absence of such a Native Hawaiian tribe. The problem with this line of argument is that
the federal government was not obligated to enact the HHCA in the first place. Its action %as purely
discretionary. It would be difficult to convince the Supreme Court that the United States's actions, in not
going far enough to assist Native Hawaiians' creation of a tribe, thereby deprived Natic Hawaiians of
tribal status. The real complaint, it seems, is not with the HHCA (which certainly did not prevent Nati',
Hawaiians from creating tribes; it merely did not foster them), but with the original actions in deposing the
government of Hawaii and eliminating its role entirely. And that, as has been discussed aboe. may be a
source of shame for the United States, but it does not provide a basis for finding that the special
relationship exists.
277. 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901). The facts of Montoya appear to give some support to the proposition
that a long history is not necessary, although the issue is not free from doubt. In Montoya, the question was
whether a recently formed group of American Indians composed of members of several tribes (primarily
the Chiricahua Apache Indians) was a "'band, tribe or nation in amity with the United States'" for purposes
of a statute allowing for property claims against the United States. Id. at 264 (quoting Act of Mar. 3. 189 1.
ch. 538, 26 Stat. 851, 851-52). The Court found that the group in question
was, at and long before the occurrence complained of. "known and recognized as a band.
separate and distinct in its organization and action from the several tribes, then at peace, to
which its members had formerly belonged, and that the band as thus constituted was not in
amity with the United States."
Id. at 269 (citation omitted). The Court found that the group constituted a "band" of Indians and stated that
it had been a band "long before the occurrence complained of," id. at 269. even though the findings of fact
indicated that the "band" came together in 1876 and took the property at issue in 1880. see id. at 261 n.2.
262 n.3. Admittedly, all of the members of this band had been members of full-fledged Indian tribes
beforehand, so the new band represented a reconstitution of the existing tribes, rather than the creation of
a new tribe with members that had never before been subject to the special relationship and whose only
connection to a tribe was through their ancestors. It is not clear that their prior membership in a different
tribe played any role in the Court's decision, however, and the fact remains that a new group coalesced in
1876 and, by 1880, was considered to be a band of Indians.
278. In this regard, it should be noted that some of the groups currently regarded as tribes are not the
successors to previous tribes. In some cases the federal government consolidated several tribes into one
newly created tribe, and in other cases it split a single tribe into several tribes. See COHEN, supra note 2.
at 5-6. More importantly, the federal government on several occasions aggregated loose bands of American
Indians into tribes, even though no previous tribal organization existed. See Washington v. Vashington
State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 664 n.5 (1979) ("T]he territonal officials
who negotiated the treaties [at issue] on behalf of the United States took the initiative in aggregating certan
loose bands into designated tribes and even appointed many of the chiefs who signed the treaties.")-
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 192 (1978) (noting that United States established
relations with tribe that was aggregation of loosely related villages); see also COHEN, supra note 2. at 6.
This has also occurred more recently, as many statutory definitions of "Indian tribe" include not only
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More important, if there is a requirement of a connection to a historical
tribe, it is not clear that there is a further requirement of continuous
functioning. The sources that have posited the criterion of a historical
connection have differed on whether it requires merely that the current tribe
be the successor to a historical tribe or that it also have an unbroken history
of functioning as a tribe. In particular, the main circuit that deals with Native
American law-the Ninth-has presented a shifting view on this issue. In a
1981 case, the court suggested that the tribal organization must have been
maintained, though it found that such maintenance could be demonstrated "if
some defining characteristic of the original tribe persists in an evolving tribal
community.''279 More recently, the court put forward a slightly broader
formulation: "[A] relationship between the modern-day entity seeking tribal
status and the Indian group of old must be established, but some connection
beyond total assimilation is generally sufficient. 2 80 Finally, in a 1992 case,
the Ninth Circuit stated that the members of a new tribe must meet Montoya's
criteria and demonstrate "that they are 'the modern-day successors' to a
historical sovereign entity that exercised at least the minimal functions of a
governing body"; significantly, the court did not suggest any requirement of
continuous functioning from historical times until the present.28, Thus,
assuming that there is a requirement of a connection to a historical sovereign
entity, there is some judicial support for the suggestion that continuous
functioning is not required.
This is significant, because, insofar as there is a requirement of a
connection to a previously sovereign entity but not a requirement of continuous
functioning, a newly created Native Hawaiian tribe would have a credible
argument: The tribe could argue that it was the modern-day successor to the
Alaska Native villages (which, though often incorporated after 1936, generally had long been functioning
as governing units) but also Alaska Native Regional Corporations and Village Corporations, all of which
were created in response to ANCSA. See statutes cited supra note 269. On Alaska Native villages, see
Smith & Kancewick, supra note 152, at 493, 496-98. Cf Paul A. Matteoni, Comment, Alaska Native
Indian Villages: The Question of Sovereign Rights, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 875, 894 (1988) (asserting
that "[h]istorical governmental powers had not been maintained before the creation of the[] modem village
governments" under IRA). Finally, also relevant is 25 U.S.C. § 476(f) (1994), which prohibits distinctions
between tribes that were created through combination or splitting and those that have a continued existence
stretching back through the nineteenth century.
Admittedly, this history is of limited importance; it may merely indicate that the federal government
has inappropriately treated as tribes some groups that cannot meet the constitutional minima for status as
a tribe. See supra note 206. Moreover, even if these groups would not be vulnerable to challenge today
because they have now existed for 60 years, that precedent would help Native Hawaiians only if their
organizations could exist for 60 years before being challenged, and there is of course no guarantee of such
a grace period.
279. United States v. Washington, 641 F.2d 1368, 1372-73 (9th Cir. 1981).
280. Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 557 (9th Cir. 1991).
281. Native Village of Tyonek v. Puckett, 957 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Native Village
of Venetie, 944 F.2d at 559); see also Pit River Home & Agric. Coop. Ass'n v. United States, 30 F.3d
1088, 1096 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that "group claiming tribal status must show they are 'modern-day
successors' to a historical sovereign entity that exercised political and social authority") (quoting Native
Village of Venetie, 944 F.2d at 559).
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Hawaiian polity in the late eighteenth century that was gradually subverted by
outside forces. This argument may seem like a stretch, because the new tribe
would exercise very little power. The same is true, however, of Indian tribes
that once exercised complete dominion over large land areas and now have
relatively modest authority over small reservations.? Moreover, the
inevitable differences between the new tribe and its historical predecessor may
be of limited significance. The cases have required a strong historical
connection, but, as the Ninth Circuit stated, "[t]he correlation between the
present-day group of Indians and any historical sovereign entity need not be
perfect." 3
This point introduces, however, an important complicating factor. As was
noted above, by 1893 the government of Hawaii was a multiethnic oligarchical
polity. A new tribe limited to descendants of pre-1778 inhabitants that claimed
to be the successor to the 1893 government would have a hard time
establishing that its limitation to Native Hawaiians was consistent with the
composition of the 1893 polity (or even that the 1893 government was an
"Indian Tribe[]" for constitutional purposes). The obvious solution would be
for the new Native Hawaiian tribe to assert derivation from a Native Hawaiian
polity that did not include Westerners, as this would help to justify the
limitation to Native Hawaiians. The difficulty with this solution is that
Westerners' influence stretches far back in Hawaii. Western residents had been
eligible for naturalization since 1840 and had been treated as ordinary subjects,
for purposes of the application of Hawaii's laws, since 1829.2 In fact, there
were permanent Western residents dating back to the late eighteenth century,
chief among whom were advisers to Kamehameha who helped him to
overcome the rulers of the other islands and unite them under his rule in
18 10.285 Assuming that Native Hawaiians want to create a tribe that includes
only pre-1778 descendants, then, the appropriate date for purposes of the
derivation of the new tribe appears to be 1778 (before Westerners arrived). If
so, however, then Native Hawaiians would probably need to create several
tribes, corresponding to the kingdoms that existed at the time (i.e., with
282. In addition, it is not clear that any significance attaches to the form of the relevant government.
As the Ninth Circuit said in a case involving Alaska Native Villages:
To the extent that Alaska's natives formed bodies politic to govern domestic relations. to punish
wrongdoers, and otherwise to provide for the general welfare, we perceive no reason %hy they,
too, should not be recognized as having been sovereign entities. If the native villages of Venetie
and Fort Yukon are the modern-day successors to sovereign historical bands of natives, the
villages are to be afforded the same rights and responsibilities as are sovereign bands of native
Americans in the continental United States.
Native Village of Venerie, 944 F.2d at 558-59.
283. Id at 559 n.13.
284. See I KUYKENDALL, supra note 45, at 129, 229-30: 1 STATUTE LAWS Or His MAJESTY
KAMEHAMEHA II, ch. V, art. I, §§ 3, 10-14 (1846).
285. See I KUYKENDALL, supra note 45, at 25-51.
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different rulers over different islands).28 6 If, on the other hand, Native
Hawaiians wanted to create a single tribe, they would probably need to define
its membership as of 1810 at the earliest (which might mean the inclusion of
some Westerners who are not descended from pre-1778 inhabitants). 287 In
light of these complications, it is impossible to determine in advance whether
a hypothetical Native Hawaiian tribe (or tribes) could demonstrate a sufficient
relationship to a historical sovereign entity. It does seem possible, though, that
a tribe (or tribes) could satisfy this criterion; and the more connections Native
Hawaiians could demonstrate between a new tribe and its historical
predecessor, the stronger the constitutional footing of the new tribe would be.
C. Limitations of Any Approach to the Creation of a Native Hawaiian Tribe
The foregoing indicates that there are ways of creating a Native Hawaiian
tribe (or tribes) that might meet the constitutional minima for status as an
"Indian Tribe[]" under the Indian Commerce Clause and thus be subject to the
special relationship. That would not, by itself, be sufficient to subject the
current programs for Native Hawaiians to rational basis review, however.
There would still be two significant obstacles to the application of rational
basis review to the current programs, absent further legislative action.
First, the newly created special relationship between the federal
government and a Native Hawaiian tribe (or tribes) likely would not alter the
constitutional status of any program that still had an ancestry-based definition
of "Native Hawaiian" (as all the programs currently do). Such definitions
probably would continue to be analyzed as racial classifications. Federal (as
well as state) action thus would be necessary in order to bring the statutory
286. Kuykendall identified four kingdoms as of 1778: one over the island of Hawaii and the Hana
district of east Maui; a second over Maui (except the Hana district) and its three dependent islands; a third
over Oahu; and a fourth over Kauai and Nihau. See id. at 30.
Of course, it is possible (perhaps probable) that multiple tribes would not break cleanly along
geographical lines, and instead would simply be several coexisting groups (not unlike the current cluster
of Native Hawaiian groups). If a series of tribes were organized on this basis, they would be hard pressed
to claim derivation from the pre-1778 kingdoms; instead, they would probably have to claim derivation
from the post-1810 Hawaiian monarchy. Under these circumstances, however, it would be harder for
multiple tribes to meet any requirement of a historical connection than it would for one large tribe of all
Native Hawaiians. If there were one tribe, that group could plausibly assert that it had assumed all the
powers and functions of the former monarchy, except insofar as those powers and functions were now
exercised by the United States and the state government. If there were several tribes the various groups
would further divide their limited power and functions among themselves, and thus could not make this
claim. These tribes would be forced to argue that, as a collectivity, they were the successors to the
monarchy, and that their decision to split up into several tribes did not affect their successorship. It is not
clear that such an argument could overcome the fact that the tribes would be attempting to fracture the
Hawaiian kingdom into subparts that the kingdom never had.
287. Inclusion of some Westerners would not necessarily defeat a claim of tribal status, as the Court
has never directly addressed the question whether the presence of a few Westerners in a tribe alters its
status. See supra note 144. In this regard, it does bear mention that some Indian tribes included Westerners




schemes within the special relationship; the definitions of "Native Hawaiian"
would probably need to center on tribal membership, rather than ancestry.'ss
Second, the extension of the federal government's special relationship with
Indian tribes to Native Hawaiians would, in all probability, have little impact
on most of the state programs that benefit Native Hawaiians. The one category
that might be affected is state programs that have been authorized by the
federal government.2 9 Under Adarand and Croson, these programs currently
would be subject to strict scrutiny; if the special relationship were extended to
Native Hawaiians, federally authorized programs would, under Washington v.
Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation,2 be subject to
Mancari's rational basis review.29" ' Extension of the special relationship to
Native Hawaiians would likely have no bearing, however, on the
constitutionality of state programs for Native Hawaiians that are not federally
authorized. Such programs currently would be subject to strict scrutiny under
Croson, and, assuming creation of a special relationship with Native
Hawaiians, would still be subject to heightened (presumably strict) scrutiny in
light of the inapplicability of Yakima Nation. There are two ways in which
these programs could conceivably be affected by the extension of the special
relationship at the federal level, but both of them are purely conjectural: It is
possible that the Supreme Court will apply more lax standards of federal
authorization in the special relationship context than in the affirmative action
context;292 and it is possible that the Supreme Court will utilize a form of
288. These statutory changes would be necessary because, as was discussed above. see supra notes
154-55 and accompanying text, the mere existence of a tribe would likely be insufficient if the statutory
scheme did not depend on tribal membership. That, presumably, is why the Court did not suggest in
Adarand Constructors. Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. CL 2097 (1995), City of Richmond %- J.A. Crson Co.. 488 U S
469 (1989). Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990). or Fullilove %- Klutznick. 448 U S. 448
(1980), that the relevant program's inclusion of American Indians. defined racially, would be subject to a
different level of scrutiny; though all the American Indian beneficianes may have been members of tnbes.
the programs giving them benefits did not require tribal membership and were instead based on ethicity.
It might be contended that because all Native Hawaiians would be members of the Native Hawarian
tribe (or tribes), the Native Hawaiian situation would be different and analogous to a statute simply
referring to "the Navajo." See supra note 154. The analogy fails, however, because the obvious intent of
the latter statute would be to benefit the members of the Navajo tribe (and otherwise, it would be
constitutionally problematic); the statutes benefiting Native Hawaiians. however, were not enacted with
reference to any tribe. Moreover, because it is overwhelmingly likely that some Native Hawaitans would
not choose to join the Native Hawaiian tribe (or tribes), the current statutory definitions of "Native
Hawaiian" would not be coextensive with the membership of the Native Hawaiian tnbe (or inbes)
289. The obvious candidate is the HHCA, which was not merely federally authonzed but was
originally passed as federal legislation and imposed upon Hawaii as a conditon of statehood. See supra
note 64. The existence and scope of the federal authorization of the HHCA is not entirely free from doubt.
however. See supra note 242.
290. 439 U.S. 463 (1979).
291. See supra note 217.
292. It is interesting to compare the level of authorization that courts, in pre-Adarand days. required
for application of Metro Broadcasting (rather than Croson) to a program with the level of authonzation
they require for application of Mancari's analysis to state programs for Indian tribes.
Though Croson did not address the issue directly, some lower courts after Croson found that state
or local programs were authorized by federal law (and thus reviewable under Metro Broadcasting's then-
applicable intermediate scrutiny); but courts construed congressional authonzation narrowly and clanfied
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heightened scrutiny less rigorous than strict scrutiny in considering the
constitutionality of state actions that single out members of tribes.293 Even
if these speculative changes came to pass, however, their impact on a program
like OHA is unclear, because OHA might not satisfy even broad standards of
federal authorization and might be unconstitutional even if subjected to some
form of heightened scrutiny less rigorous than strict scrutiny.
Both of these obstacles could be avoided, but only through significant
legislative changes. Eliminating the problems created by the current definitions
of "Native Hawaiian" would be simple enough: The federal government 94
that state programs with substantive provisions that were not found in the federal statute would be subject
to Croson's strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Milwaukee County Pavers Ass'n v. Fiedler, 922 F.2d 419,424-25 (7th
Cir. 1991); Harrison & Burrowes Bridge Constructors, Inc. v. Cuomo, 981 E2d 50, 57-58 (2d Cir. 1992);
Tennessee Asphalt Co. v. Farris, 942 F.2d 969, 975 (6th Cir. 1991); Ellis v. Skinner, 961 F.2d 912, 915-16
(10th Cir. 1992); see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 491 (plurality opinion) (intimating that Congress could
authorize states and municipalities to institute programs with preferences that they could not enact on their
own account).
With respect to the application of the special relationship to state laws, the main case is Yakima
Nation itself, in which the Court found that a state legislated pursuant to the special relationship where the
enactment at issue was explicitly authorized by a federal statute. Lower courts, though, in applying Yakima
Nation, have gone beyond the four comers of the decision and have interpreted the requirement of federal
authorization liberally; it is not clear that these courts would limit the authorization to cases in which the
state statute's provisions were wholly within the authorizing federal scheme. See Peyote Way Church of
God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1218-19 (5th Cir. 1991) (concluding that federal law implicitly
authorized state law, even though federal law did not explicitly authorize any state laws, because state law
was promulgated after federal law and mirrored federal law); Livingston v. Ewing, 601 F.2d 1110 (10th
Cir. 1979); St. Paul Intertribal Hous. Bd. v. Reynolds, 564 R Supp. 1408 (D. Minn. 1983); Krueth v.
Independent Sch. Dist. No. 38, 496 N.W.2d 829 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). Determining the exact level of
authorization that current case law requires for application of the special relationship to state programs,
however, is complicated by the fact that these are the only four post-Yakima cases in which a court
addressed the application of the special relationship to a state action, and, of the four, two misconstrue
Yakima Nation and a third ignores it. See St. Paul, 564 F. Supp. at 1412 (relying in part on state statute
benefiting members of Indian tribes because "[sItate action for the benefit of Indians can also fall under
the trust doctrine and therefore be protected from challenge under the equal protection clause or civil rights
statutes," and failing to note any requirement of federal authorization); Krueth, 496 N.W.2d at 836-37
(simply stating that Mancari's special relationship also applied to state action and quoting statement
immediately above from St. Paul); see also Livingston, 601 F.2d at 1114-15 (relying on provision of Civil
Rights Act of 1964 that excluded preferences for Indians from scope of Act in rejecting equal protection
challenge to local ordinance permitting only American Indians to sell goods in certain areas; failing to
address question whether federal statute constituted authorization for state statute under terms of Yakima
Nation (and, in fact, failing to cite Yakima Nation)).
293. In light of Adarand and Croson, we know that strict scrutiny applies to state (or, for that matter
federal) laws containing racial classifications. The Court has never squarely stated, however, what level of
scrutiny applies to state laws containing tribal classifications. Yakima Nation indicates that it would be
heightened scrutiny of some sort, see supra note 217, and the logic of Yakima Nation and Croson suggests
that strict scrutiny would be the applicable form of heightened scrutiny: If states have no special
relationship with Indian tribes, then state legislation for Indian tribes is presumably analogous to state
legislation for any other group composed entirely of members of one ethnicity; moreover, there is no
particular reason to assume that the Supreme Court would apply intermediate scrutiny to a state
classification of tribes. Nonetheless, the level of scrutiny for state classifications of tribal Indians is not
settled, and there is some possibility that the Court would fashion a level of review less rigorous than strict
scrutiny. Accordingly, the transformation of Native Hawaiians' federal status from that of a racial group
to that of an Indian tribe could conceivably affect the level of scrutiny for state enactments benefiting
members of the Native Hawaiian tribe (or tribes).
294. Congress could enact such a change, or perhaps, in light of Mancari's reliance on a BIA
regulation, the BIA could make the change on its own, even absent legislation so providing. Cf. supra note
38.
Native Hawaiians
and Hawaii could simply change all the definitions to "members of the Native
Hawaiian tribe [or tribes]." In order to remove the danger of heightened
scrutiny for unauthorized state programs, however, the federal government
would have to decide to authorize the numerous state programs for Native
Hawaiians-a significant step toward benefiting Native Hawaiians that the
federal government might not be willing to take.
Even if Native Hawaiians did create a tribe (or tribes) and all the
legislation singling out Native Hawaiians was modified accordingly, however,
the resulting programs almost assuredly would not apply as widely as they do
now. Although the goal would be to create a Native Hawaiian tribe that would
include all Native Hawaiians, it seems likely that some Native Hawaiians
would not affiliate themselves with this tribal entity, thereby rendering
themselves ineligible for the relevant benefits. While this may seem to be an
argument against creating tribes, in fact it is a function of the Supreme Court's
delineation of the special relationship. It also, however, underscores the
likelihood that placing programs for Native Hawaiians on sound constitutional
footing will entail the removal of benefits from some individuals who are
currently entitled to them.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has focused on the constitutional status of programs for Native
Hawaiians, but its conclusions apply to all government programs that single
out native groups: Unless those programs are limited to Native Americans who
are members of entities that can constitute "Indian Tribes" in the constitutional
sense, they will be subject to strict scrutiny, rather than rational basis review.
Mancari and its progeny apply rational basis review only to programs for
members of Indian tribes, and the substitution of some other political
classification for tribal status likely will not suffice. Tribal status appears to be
a sine qua non. Moreover, strict scrutiny will apply even where the federal
government has mistreated the relevant native group, and even where the
reason that no tribe exists is that the government helped to extinguish it.
Finally, a history of statutes singling out the relevant group also will not create
a special relationship.
The effect of strict scrutiny on existing programs for Native Americans
may be dramatic: It is not clear that any such programs will meet the Supreme
Court's requirements for demonstrating a compelling interest and narrow
tailoring. The obvious solution is for native groups to create tribal structures,
but this would work only if there is no requirement that a tribe have had a
continuous existence. Even then, the programs for native groups, defined
racially, would probably have to be reformulated so that they applied only to
tribal members (and federal authorization would be necessary for state
programs, even after they were reformulated).
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The foregoing underscores the stark dichotomy that exists in the post-
Adarand world: All programs containing racial classifications are
presumptively invalid, except for the programs that apply to "Indian Tribes"
under the Indian Commerce Clause; the latter programs are consistently
upheld, regardless of whether they benefit or harm tribal members. The
forbidding environment for racial classifications has no impact on the legal
status of programs for Indian tribes. This has significant implications for native
groups, as they may attempt to expand the existing universe of Indian tribes
to include them and thereby ensure that programs benefiting them are upheld.
The ramifications are also important for individual Native Americans: As long
as the programs singling out members of the new Indian tribe confer benefits
(as is the case with most of the current programs treating Native Hawaiians
specially), there will be a great incentive for individual Native Americans to
join them. Adarand, then, will have the presumably unintended effect of
encouraging tribalism.
At bottom, a native group's constitutional status will depend on whether
or not it is an "Indian Tribe[]." The need to create a tribe may seem unfair to
Native Hawaiians and other Native Americans who are not organized into
tribes; they may believe that their status should not be any different from that
of members of Indian tribes. On the other hand, Native Americans' ability to
create a tribe and thereby avoid strict scrutiny for their programs may seem
unfair to other ethnic groups, like African Americans; no matter what entity,
tribal or otherwise, such ethnic groups create for themselves, strict scrutiny
will apply. Both sets of concerns go to the heart of the special relationship, as
they raise doubts about the granting of preferences based on (voluntary)
membership in an organization, as opposed to (involuntary) membership in a
racial or ethnic group. It is not clear that it makes any sense for so much to
depend on a person's membership in a tribe; but unless the Court rejects
Adarand or Mancari, that sharp dichotomy, and its serious consequences, will
remain.
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